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This thesis iŶǀestigates to ǁhat eǆteŶt highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶdeƌƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ 
in managerial and senior professional positions in European economies varies. Secondly, it 
examines how family policies impact on this gender gap in top positions. In a last step, this 
thesis investigates what else – if not family policies – can explain why women are not only 
underrepresented in top positions, but why this gap is wider in some countries than in others. 
Following a multilevel approach, context-level data stems from various sources such as the 
OECD, Multilinks and Eurostat and is from around the year 2010. Individual-level data such as 
occupational positions stems from the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) 2010. 
Depending on data availability, models include between 22 and 31 European countries.  
Using two definitions for top positions (managerial; managerial and senior 
professional), findings suggest highly educated women face an even greater gender gap in 
top positions than lesser educated women.  
Secondly, the thesis partly supports the hypothesis following the welfare state 
paradox theory that family policies widen the gender gap in so far as the same family policies 
that help women enter the labour market, hinder women from reaching top positions. For 
example, generous childcare seems to actually widen the gender gap in top positions. 
Informal childcare and financial support however reduce the gap.  
Thirdly, following the question as to what else could explain the gender gap, this thesis 
finds limited evidence for the impact of labour market institutions such as unions on the 
gender gap in top positions. The models however do suggest that in countries with strong 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
͞The gƌoǁiŶg ďody of ƌeseaƌĐh oŶ this issue has uŶifoƌŵly fouŶd that women are 
economically disadvantaged in all countries. Nevertheless, the size of the disadvantage 
ǀaƌies ĐoŶsideƌaďly aĐƌoss ŶatioŶal laďoƌ ŵaƌkets.͟ (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005, p.949) 
 
In the past decades, women in large numbers and from various educational and 
socioeconomic backgrounds have joined the labour markets of developed economies. 
Despite this trend, women are still economically disadvantaged in terms of wage structures, 
occupational segregation and hours worked as highlighted, for example, by Mandel and 
“eŵǇoŶoǀ ;ϮϬϬϱ, see Ƌuote aďoǀeͿ aŶd desĐƌiďed ďǇ the EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ͛s ƌepoƌt fƌoŵ 
2014 on equality between women and men 2014 (European Commission, 2015). According 
to this report, 75 percent of men between the ages of 25 and 54 years are employed in the 
labour market on average in the EU. However, only 63.5 percent of women are participating 
in the formal labour market. What is more, employed women are still four times more likely 
to be working part-time than employed men. At the same time, more and more families 
depeŶd oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ǁoƌk—with 61 percent of mothers being breadwinners or co-
breadwinners (European Commission, 2015). Salaries do not reflect this as women get paid 
only 84 cents on average in the EU for every 1 Euro a man earns. Even in the same occupation 
and with the same education level, women tend to be paid less than their male counterparts.  
 
In addition to the gender pay gap, women also face discrimination in terms of their 
position in the labour market as they are underrepresented in influential and powerful 
positions. Only 20 percent of members on boards of large companies in 2014 were women 
(European Commission, 2015). The underrepresentation of women in these top positions 
such as managerial and senior professional occupatioŶs has loŶg ďeeŶ desĐƌiďed as the ͞key 
issue fƌoŵ a poliĐǇ peƌspeĐtiǀe͟ ;Hakiŵ, ϭϵϵϮ, p.ϭϯϮͿ. This is ďeĐause geŶdeƌed hieƌaƌĐhies 
seem to crucially affect the gender pay gap (Hakim, 1992), and are therefore responsible for 
gendered differences in economic independence and power between genders. However, 
ǁhile ǁoŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ ŵaƌket paƌtiĐipatioŶ ƌates haǀe ďeeŶ the foĐus of a laƌge ďodǇ of 
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literature—as briefly outlined in the following section—ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ top 
positions has not received the same attention in academic literature or data and methods 
applied in the existing research are limited. Charles (1992), for example, investigates 
occupational segregation—both vertical and horizontal—and finds that in 1985 women were 
underrepresented in professional and production jobs but overrepresented in clerical, sales 
and service jobs in 25 developed economies. However, Charles (1992) does not examine the 
impact of policies and only includes a limited range of institutional factors such as the 
presence or absence of corporatism. Therefore, her study remains rather descriptive by 
focusing on labour market factors only and also by putting more emphasis on the dependent 
variable rather than causal factors.  
 
Taking this gap in the literature into account, this thesis contributes to the discussion 
of gender labour market inequalities by examining cross-ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiatioŶ iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
underrepresentation in top positions. Thus, this thesis aims to contribute to the existing body 
of literature both by looking at an under-researched dimension of inequalities and by applying 
different methods to investigate the matter. The contributions made by this thesis are as 
follows: 
 
FiƌstlǇ, to the authoƌ͛s kŶoǁledge, all studies oŶ the geŶdeƌ gap iŶ top positioŶs applǇ 
the international definitions of occupations1 in a rather limited way by following its major 
groups without examining the specific occupations that are aggregated by these major 
groups. However, as with all aggregate data there are assumptions and simplifications made 
that are potentially problematic. For example, there is no hierarchical distinction made 
amongst educational professional occupations despite the fact that different levels and types 
of qualifications are required to obtain these positions. As this thesis is interested in 
hieƌaƌĐhies, it deǀelops a Ŷeǁ defiŶitioŶ of ͞top positioŶs͟ that aiŵs to oǀeƌĐoŵe these 
                                                             
1 The majority of studies uses the ILO International Standard Classification of Occupations. The most recent 
ISCO-08 version distinguishes at the most aggregated level between: Managers; Professionals; Technicians and 
Associate Professionals; Clerical Support Workers; Services and Sales Workers; Skilled Agricultural, Forestry 
and Fishery Workers; Craft and Related Trades Workers; Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers; 
Elementary Occupations; Armed Forces Occupations.  
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liŵitatioŶs. What is ŵoƌe, ďǇ folloǁiŶg Chaƌles͛ ;ϭϵϵϮͿ aŶd otheƌ sĐholaƌs͛ appƌoaĐh of 
applying individual-level data instead of aggregate macro-leǀel data suĐh as ͞ ǁoŵeŶ͛s oǀeƌall 
shaƌe iŶ ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs͟ this studǇ ǁill ŵeasuƌe at the saŵe tiŵe the diƌeĐt effeĐt of 
gender on job hierarchies.  
 
Secondly, a more holistic study is needed on the drivers of the gender gap in top 
positions. This is because even though scholars find an explanation for women being 
underrepresented in higher position in the occupational hierarchy, we cannot fully explain 
why the extent of these gendered hierarchies varies substantially across countries. While the 
causes for cross-national differences of the gender gap in top positions are highly 
ĐoŶtƌoǀeƌsial, patteƌŶs eǆplaiŶiŶg diffeƌeŶĐes iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt oƌ paƌt-time rates 
have been identified by a large body of literature (see Chapter 2). Studies here largely focus 
on the role of the welfare state in addressing inequalities (i.e. the role of the labour market 
and its actors and the role of the family itself). Scholars such as Gornick et al. (1997), for 
example, argue that women are more likely to work in countries with progressive family 
policies. Also, Esping-AŶdeƌseŶ ;ϭϵϵϵͿ aƌgues that ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt ƌates aƌe dƌiǀeŶ ďǇ 
family policies and institutions.  
 
However, Mandel and Semyonov (2006) question the positive interaction between 
progressive family policies and gender inequalities and claim that policies can actually worsen 
one dimension of gender inequalities, while improving another one. This claim has been 
examined by a limited number of studies (eg. Clarke, 2015, Misra et al., 2012) that focus on 
iŶeƋualities suĐh as the geŶdeƌ paǇ gap, ŵotheƌs͛ eŵploǇŵeŶt aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
underrepresentation in managerial positions. So, why do we need another study on the 
impact of family policies on women in top positions? This is because previous scholarly work 
uses a narrow definition of managerial positions and ignores senior professional positions 
that are likely to be affected by family policies as well. What is more, all studies mentioned 
use aggregate data and thus do not take into account composition effects—namely what 
happens when we control for other important factors, at the individual and company levels, 
other than gender. Thirdly, studies (such as Mandel and Semyonov, 2006; Clarke, 2015) look 
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at a small range of family policies only and often summarize policies in indices, which might 
cover or exaggerate associations. This thesis aims to overcome these limitations. 
 
The mixed results of previous studies lead to another question: What else other than 
family policies lead to cross-national variation of the gender gap in managerial and senior 
professional positions? Scholars such as Estevez-Abe (2005, 2006, 2007) and Dieckhoff et al. 
(2015) discuss the effects of labour market institutions such as union density or employment 
protection legislation on gender inequalities. Studies here either focus on a limited number 
of laďouƌ ŵaƌket iŶstitutioŶs oƌ look at ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt ƌates, the geŶdeƌ paǇ gap oŶlǇ 
or use aggregate data. Thus, this thesis aims to combine the findings of previous studies and 
also applies a new approach towards defining managerial and senior professional 
occupations. Additionally, in contrast to previous studies recent data is applied, especially 
since much scholarly work including national skill profiles still uses data from the 1980s and 
1990s. It needs to be noted here, that this thesis treats all women as potential mothers. This 
is because of statistical discrimination and the motherhood penalty. Statistical discrimination 
(Anker, 1997) is based on the assumptions that only due to the possibility of motherhood or 
care-giving women show a greater risk for career interruptions, which will affect their skills, 
productivity and experience. For the purpose of this thesis, all women are assumed to be 
affected by family policies as to employers it does not necessarily matter whether or not 
women, in the end, make use of family policies or remain without family responsibilities.  
 
1.1 Family policies and labour market institutions – drivers of labour market 
inequalities?  
 
Before summarising the main theoretical assumptions on how family policies affect 
labour market inequalities, this section highlights the need to include context-level factors 
into the analysis as individual-level factors fail in explaining the cross-national variation of 
occupational segregation, and more specifically, the gap in top positions. In other words, this 
thesis argues that we need to look beyond individual level variables to explain why women in 
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some countries are even less likely to reach top positions. Those variables at the same time 
help to explain why on average women are discriminated against across all countries.  
 
Factors at the family and household level have, for example, been described as the 
main drivers for gendered differences in the occurrence of part-time employment. Since 
women still do most of the domestic work including childrearing, they tend to choose jobs 
with reduced hours in order to combine domestic and formal labour-market work (Blossfeld, 
1994; Moen, 1985; Stier and Lewin-Epstein, 2001). There have been two main approaches to 
explain this phenomenon at the household level: theories focusing on rational choice making 
such as the Social Exchange Theory and frameworks including the cultural and normative 
dimension (e.g. Pfau-Effinger, 1998). Social Exchange Theory is based on the assumption that 
spouses exchange resources in a rational way. This means that the spouse with the least 
economic resources also has less influence on decision-making and its outcomes, thus is 
consequently more dependent on the other spouse. Other scholars such as Pfau-Effinger 
(1998) however argue that the traditional division of labour between the spouses is a 
ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe of ͞iŶteƌƌelatioŶs of Đultuƌe, stƌuĐtuƌe aŶd aĐtioŶ͟ ;Pfau-Effinger, 1998, p. 150).  
 
Moving beyond these household-level factors, scholars such as Esping-Andersen 
(1999), Lewis (1992), Sainsbury (1996), McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994) look at the impact 
of family policies on gender labour market inequalities. Key focus here is how public policies 
suĐh as faŵilǇ poliĐies affeĐt the leǀel of ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe fƌoŵ the faŵilǇ, aŶd thus, 
the extent to which women are able to take part in the labour market. In other words, how 
does the welfare state intervene in order to help individuals to combine care responsibilities 
with formal employment? However, studies show mixed results and some scholars even 
argue that family policies can contribute to a worsening of gender inequalities.  
 
Mandel and Semyonov (2005, p. 953) describe the paradox in welfare regime 
literature and argue that protective family policies in developed welfare regimes have led to 
an increase of the pay gap whereas generous welfare states with developed family policies 
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reduce inequalities in terms of reducing gender gaps in employment rates. The question 
remains why Scandinavian countries with their generous welfare states and gender-specific 
policies still show comparably high levels of occupational gender segregation (Estevez-Abe, 
2005, p. 153). Previous studies examining family policies and gender labour market 
inequalities such as by Mandel and Semyonov (2002), Clarke (2015) and Misra et al. (2012) 
do not help solve the puzzle as they focus on a select few family policies only or apply indices, 
and thus, cannot explain the direct connection between a wide range of policies and gender 
labour market outcomes. Additionally, they mainly look at employment rates or the gender 
pay gap and thus ignore gendered hierarchies in the labour market. In the majority of studies 
dependent variables are measured at the macro-level and are aggregated, which risks 
composition effects. In other words, statistical associations might be due to the different 
composition of individual level factors (such as gender, age, work experience) of a sample, 
and therefore, these factors need to be controlled for. And even if individual-level data is 
used, the samples are large and not tailored to the research question. This increases the risk 
of large sample fallacy because of the large sample groups. As discussed above, the author 
aƌgues that theƌefoƌe appƌoaĐhes Ŷeed to ďe iŶĐluded to eǆplaiŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt 
outcomes. 
 
The current debate on gender labour market inequalities has neglected the potential 
role of labour market institutions in shaping labour market inequalities. Few scholars (e.g., 
Estevez-Abe, 2005; England, 2005; Dieckhoff et al., 2015) have linked labour market 
iŶstitutioŶs to ǁoŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ ŵaƌket patteƌŶs. Theƌe aƌe ŵaiŶlǇ tǁo diƌeĐtioŶs the 
literature is taking: One—represented by scholars such as Dieckhoff et al. (2015) and Schäfer 
et al. (2012) and others—focuses on the role of capital versus labour. The assumption here is 
that unions and their collective bargaining power crucially shape labour market outcomes by 
ƌepƌeseŶtiŶg ǁoƌkeƌs͛ iŶteƌest uŶions (see Blanchflower, 1996; Bertola, Blau and Kahn, 2007; 
Kahn, 2007; Schwander and Hausermann, 2013; Emmenegger et al., 2012). This body of 




A second body of literature refers back to Human Capital Theory (Becker, 1964) and 
the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) (Hall and Soskice, 2001). This approach is based on the VoC 
assuŵptioŶ of ͞ĐoŵpleŵeŶtaƌities͟ ďetǁeeŶ iŶstitutioŶs aŶd ͞sǇsteŵ ĐooƌdiŶatioŶ͟ ;Coates, 
2005). Complementarities meaning that labour relations and corporate governance, labour 
relations and the national training system, corporate governance and inter-firm relations are 
developed in a way that complement each other (Hancké et al., 2007: p.5). These institutions 
develop their own set of Comparative Institutional Advantages. Depending on how firms 
engage in their different relationships, they are labelled Liberal Market Economies (LME) or 
Coordinated Market Economy (CME).  In contrast to the PRT, the VoC examines employers as 
protagonists of the specific developments in the institutional setting of political economies. 
In other words, employers have facilitated certain institutions to develop to allow for the 
development of certain skill settings, which allows better competition in the market. Taking 
the ideas of the Human Capital Theory even further, scholars such as Estevez-Abe (2005, 
ϮϬϬϴͿ aƌgue that theƌe is aŶ assoĐiatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đaƌeeƌ/eŵploǇŵeŶt aŶd 
comparative institutional advantages. For example, Estevez-Abe for examines not only 
different levels of skills within the labour market, but also types of skills and explores their 
impact on gender segregation (see Estevez-Abe, 2005; Estevez-Abe, 2007; Estevez-Abe, 
Iversen, and Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
 
All in all, it is clear that scholars have investigated the impact of individual-level factors 
and macro-level variables such as family policies and labour market institutions on gender 
labour market inequalities. Findings however remain inconsistent and the drivers for cross-
natioŶal ǀaƌiatioŶ of geŶdeƌ iŶeƋualities aƌe uŶĐleaƌ. What is ŵoƌe, ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh 
top positions have rarely been associated with family policies and institutions.  
  
   
1.2 Aims and objectives of this thesis 
 
Based on the literature just presented, the overall research focus of this thesis is to 
examine family policies and labour market institutions and their impact on cross-national 
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variations of the gender gap in top positions. In order to do so, this thesis aims to contribute 
to the debate outlined above in five ways. As a first contribution, the thesis contributes to 
the liteƌatuƌe ďǇ lookiŶg at pƌeǀious ŵeasuƌeŵeŶts of ͞top positioŶs͟ aŶd defiŶiŶg these iŶ a 
more distinct way.  Examining vertical segregation and by providing a new way of measuring 
vertical segregation, this thesis understands top positions as managerial positions and as 
senior professional and managerial positions. The reason to focus exclusively on gendered 
hierarchies is that we have yet to understand not only why women are underrepresented in 
top positions, but more importantly why the extent of the gender gap varies cross-nationally.  
 
Variation in labour market participation rates on the other hand can be best explained 
by welfare regime theory and the differences in family policy levels across countries. Working 
hours, or part-time rates have an ambiguous role for women (see Stier and Lewin-Epstein, 
2001) and therefore do not clearly capture the extent of discrimination. This is because part-
time and flexible working hours can, on the one hand, serve as a useful tool to make the 
labour market more flexible and enable workers to combine work and family. On the other 
hand, it is women that are pressured to choose those reduced hours and therefore have to 
deal with potential disadvantages in terms of payment and career chances. This is 
problematic as part-time jobs tend to be lower paid than full-time jobs and have a lower 
status (Kalleberg, 2000).  
 
Another dimension that could be examined is the emergence of female- and male-
dominated occupations. However, for comparative purposes this indicator is not suitable as 
first of all measurements focus too much on aggregate macro-level data and secondly 
horizontal segregation and namely the gender-related choices for occupations are also due 
to cultural factors that we cannot fully take into account. Lastly, the author picked vertical 
segƌegatioŶ oƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs as the depeŶdeŶt ǀaƌiaďle. Theƌefoƌe, this 
thesis does not look at the gender pay gap as the dependent variable since the gender pay 
gap is not a direct outcome, but rather highly connected with both the gender gap in 





Vertical segregation on the other hand though shows to be the most comparable and 
meaningful dimension to concentrate on, as it is the most detrimental variable influencing 
the gender pay gap and is measurable at the individual level. Also it is an area that has not 
been explained through welfare state family policies. Mandel and Semyonov (2005) have 
pointed out that progressive welfare state policies even seem to harden the glass ceiling 
women face.  
 
As a second contribution, this thesis folloǁs MaŶdel aŶd “haleǀ͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ Đlaiŵ that ǁe 
need to take class and education into account if we want to understand how labour market 
institutions affect female labour market outcomes. Korpi et al. (2013) argue similarly that in 
order to understand how family policies affect gender inequalities, we need to distinguish 
between the highly educated and the general workforce. However, because the focus of this 
thesis is oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶdeƌƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ top positioŶs, theƌe ǁill ďe Ŷo ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ 
between highly educated individuals and the general workforce as the group of female and 
male managers and professionals in all included countries is largely highly educated anyway. 
Therefore, conclusions on the few individuals reaching top positions without tertiary 
educations are too weak to be analysed. However, it is still vital to exclude the general 
workforce from the analysis as what might affect the majority of the female workforce might 
have a different or no impact on highly educated women. We can see this when looking at 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt ƌates. The shaƌe of highlǇ educated women in the labour market 
however has not changed dramatically over time, but the employment patterns of the overall 
female population have changed. Even just based on these descriptive observations, we can 
see that educational levels need to be taken into account, which is why this thesis narrows 
down the sample to highly educated women only. By doing so, the thesis aims to avoid large 
sample size fallacy, as statistical significance is more likely to be found if sample sizes are large 
(Lantz, 2013).  
 
The third contribution is the use of individual-level data. Researchers such as Clark 
(2015) have mainly focused on aggregated macro-level data when exploring the impact of 
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laďouƌ ŵaƌket iŶstitutioŶs aŶd faŵilǇ poliĐies oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt outĐoŵes—e.g. 
occupational segregation. Aggregated data though fails to take population composition into 
account—e.g. diffeƌeŶĐes iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s eduĐatioŶ leǀels aĐƌoss ĐouŶtƌies, aŶd also ƌisks 
ecological fallacies. Ecological fallacy, in this case, means that we assume that findings from 
an aggregate level apply to individuals belonging to this aggregate group. In other words, by 
belonging to a group, an individual is assumed to be affected by factors like all other 
individuals in the group. However, this might not be the case and aggregate data can mask or 
exaggerate effects. In order to avoid this, we need a multi-level approach based on individual-
leǀel data. Heƌe the authoƌ foĐuses oŶ aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s likelihood to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs aŶd 
examines how the gender of the person influences this likelihood. Using individual-level data 
also allows the author to shape the definition of top positions more thoroughly taking into 
account the arguments made by previous scholars. Thus, we can not only include both the 
general definition of managerial positions, but also highly professional individuals that are 
especially affected by the Human Capital arguments made by Estevez-Abe (2005, 2007) et al. 
(2001).  
 
Fourthly, the author identifies a limitation in the literature on family policies and 
gender inequalities, namely the tendency of scholars to use aggregate indices and family 
policy regime typologies as independent explanatory variables. Korpi et al. (2013) construct a 
new welfare regime typology, while Mandel and Semyonov (2006) establish a welfare state 
intervention index. However, because we do not fully know how different family policies 
affect highly educated women and the gender gap in managerial positions in different ways, 
we cannot rely on composed indices that might not allow us to understand which policy 
eǆaĐtlǇ it is that is paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ďeŶefiĐial oƌ detƌiŵeŶtal foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đaƌeeƌs as iŶdiĐes ŵask 
effects. For example, the welfare state intervention index includes various policies, which can 
have a conflicting effect on the dependent variable. Thus, this thesis examines the impact of 
single-faŵilǇ poliĐies oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s, aŶd theƌefoƌe, 
does not assume that countries follow typologies neatly or assume that policies will have 
uniform effects. This contribution also serves as a critique on the typology approaches that 




Fifthly, this thesis contributes to the existing literature on vertical segregation by 
drawing on scholarly work that looks at the impact of labour market institutions on the gender 
gap. Here, only few studies are available that link labour market institutions with this specific 
dimension of gender inequalities (see for example Schäfer et al., 2012). Despite their 
contributions, these studies show the same limitations as the above-mentioned studies on 
family policies and gender inequalities as they either follow a narrow definition of vertical 
segregation or capture the dependent variable using aggregate level data. What is more, to 
the authoƌ͛s kŶoǁledge theƌe is Ŷo studǇ aǀailaďle that ĐoŵďiŶes the tǁo sepaƌate 
arguments— labour market institutions as a result of power conflicts versus institutions as a 
tool to retain workers and protect skill investments as a comparative advantage—and the 
implications of these on vertical segregation. Here, the thesis makes another contribution in 
that it uses updated data on skill profiles. So far, all scholarly work that uses national skill 
profiles based on the definition from Iversen and Soskice (2001) has applied data from the 
1980s to 1999, which by now is outdated. For the purpose of this thesis, the author has 
collected the variables used for more recent years and thus the thesis is taking into account 
changes in the vocational training and education system that can be applied to most recent 
data.  
 




Research Question 1: Are women underrepresented in top positions and to what extent 
does ǁoŵeŶ’s likelihood to ďe eŵploǇed iŶ a top positioŶ ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ’s ǀaƌǇ aĐƌoss 
countries? 
ReseaƌĐh ƋuestioŶ Ϯ: Hoǁ do faŵilǇ poliĐies at a ŶatioŶal leǀel affeĐt ǁoŵeŶ’s 
likelihood to achieve top positions at the individual level relatiǀe to ŵeŶ’s? 
ReseaƌĐh QuestioŶ ϯ: What else, otheƌ thaŶ faŵilǇ poliĐies affeĐt ǁoŵeŶ’s likelihood to 




1.3 General approach and research strategy 
 
From a methodological perspective, this thesis aims to investigate the impact of family 
policies and labour market institutions on the gender gap in top positions. Here, top positions 
are defined as managerial and highly professional positions measured at the individual-level, 
which allows us to control for other individual-level and job characteristics. Independent 
variables are measured at the macro-level by using both summative indices and single 
variables for family policies and labour market institutions. The method of analysis is 
multilevel modelling random slopes models (MLM) as this thesis investigates whether context 
and national policies matter when examining variation between individuals in reaching top 
positions (see Hox, 2002).   
 
As mentioned above, three main questions are examined: the cross-national variation 
of ǁoŵeŶ͛s shaƌe iŶ top positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s—in other words, the gender gap in top 
positions; the association between family policies and women in top positions; and thirdly, 
the relationship between labour market institutions and women in managerial positions. The 
year and sample of the analysis are European countries in the year 2010. Thus, the overall 
research strategy is to analyse the quantitative relationship between national level variables 
and individual labour market position using multilevel analysis (see Hox, 2002). Here, 15 
variables for family policies are included and 8 variables measuring labour market 
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
Following the structure of this introduction, the second Chapter of this thesis aims to 
firstly illustrate cross-national variation in gender labour market inequalities. By doing so, 
Chapter 2 provides the justification for the selection of the sample being tertiary individuals 
and for the selection of the dependent variable. Data presented focuses largely on most 
recent data from European countries and includes statistics on employment rates, part-time 
rates, the pay gap, the emergence of female- and male dominated occupations and lastly the 
gender gap in top positions. The Chapter starts introducing data on employment rates and 
the occurrence of part-time employment and explores reasons for cross-national variations 
of both. Here, as this thesis is a comparative piece of research and investigates not gender 
inequalities per se, but rather differences between countries, literature focusing on country-
level differences, namely family policies, and their impact on inequalities is presented. The 
first conclusion of this Chapter is that whilst these policies help us understand variation on 
employment rates and to some extent part-time employment, they do not explain variation 
of the gender pay gap, gendered hierarchies or the emergence of female- and male- 
dominated occupations. The Chapter here discusses these three outcome variables in detail 
highlighting the importance of vertical segregation. It then introduces the idea of the welfare 
state paradox (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005) that argues that the same policies that improve 
one dimension of gender inequalities seem to increase occupational segregation. Concluding 
with a critical discussion of this paradox, the Chapter highlights the need to address 
methodological shortcomings of research on family policies and occupational segregation, 
specifically vertical segregation. It also raises the question that based on the conflicting 
theoretical and empirical evidence for or against the welfare state paradox, what else, other 




Chapter 3 picks up this question and discusses another body of literature that 
identifies labour market institutions as drivers for cross-national variation in the gender gap. 
Here, the literature review distinguishes between a conflict approach following Power 
Resource Theory (Korpi, 1976) and theories following a gendered version of the Varieties of 
Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Estevez-Abe, 2005, 2007; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001). The key 
argument here is that labour market institutions such as unions and collective bargaining help 
workers to combine their interests and exert pressure on governments to introduce policies 
that help them reconcile work and family. However, due to the gendered nature of union 
representation (Schwander and Häusermann, 2010), the effect of strong unions on gender 
inequalities is questionable. Institutions such as employment protection legislation or skill 
profiles, on the other hand, are suspected to increase gender inequalities as they lead to more 
discrimination against women from employers (Estevez-Abe, 2005, 2006). This is because 
investments into specific skills are riskier for women who are more likely to interrupt their 
careers for family responsibilities and secondly, employment protection legislation makes it 
harder for employers to lay off workers, which again, makes them more reluctant to hire 
women. However, the Chapter also highlights that scholarly work following these 
assumptions has limitations which need to be addressed.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses the methodological approach and research strategy of this thesis. 
It discusses how both the welfare state paradox and the impact of labour market institutions 
on the gender gap in top positions can be explored. As argued before, the key contribution is 
to include individual-level data in the analysis. Data on policies and labour market institutions 
is available at the country level. Following previous research, but also for methodological 
reasons, datasets on European countries are used for the analysis. For individual-level data, 
the European Working Conditions Survey is used. The context of the dependent variable is 
explained in Chapter 2, but clearly defined in Chapter 4. For family policies and labour market 
institutions a wide range of databases are used and also introduced in Chapter 4. Because the 
data structure is therefore hierarchical with policies and labour market institutions at the 
country level and occupational data on the individual-level, the author, therefore, suggests 




Chapter 5 discusses the dependent variable aiming to show how the definition used 
in this thesis varies from macro-level definitions of the gender gap in top positions. The main 
contribution of this Chapter is to shoǁ that iŶdeed, ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs 
ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s ǀaƌǇ sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ aĐƌoss ĐouŶtƌies aŶd that a sigŶifiĐaŶt paƌt of this ǀaƌiatioŶ 
cannot be explained by individual-level factors. It also contributes to the literature in that it 
shows how highly educated women are even more disadvantaged than the general female 
workforce. Here, descriptive statistics are provided that aim to contribute to the existing body 
of literature by highlighting the need for individual-level data analysis, but also for multilevel 
modelling. In this Chapter, we also see that controlling for individual-level and job 
characteristics delivers different results and findings on the gender gap in managerial 
positions than data presented and used by other scholars. To summarize, Chapter 5 addresses 
the research hypotheses claiming that highly educated women are less likely than male 
colleagues to reach top positions even after controlling for a number of individual and job 
characteristics. There is cross-ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiatioŶ iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌelatiǀe likelihood of ƌeaĐhiŶg top 
positioŶs, ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ oŶlǇ ďe eǆplaiŶed ďǇ ĐoŶteǆt faĐtoƌs. ThiƌdlǇ, the defiŶitioŶ of ͞top 
positioŶs͟ ĐƌuĐiallǇ shapes the ƌesults aŶd thus supports the idea that aggregate-level data is 
not sufficient.  
 
Chapter 6 then follows with an analysis of the impact family policies and policy 
tǇpologies haǀe oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s. The ŵaiŶ fiŶdiŶgs of 
this Chapter are that there is limited evidence for the welfare state paradox. From 18 different 
indicators for family policies that are included in the random slope models—ranging from 
leave policies to childcare and data on expenditure—only very few are statistically significant. 
Only part-time childcare enrolment and the rate of children enrolled in no formal childcare at 
all seem to affect the gender gap in top positions. Thus, whilst for highly educated women 
family policies do not seem to hinder them from reaching top positions, they also do not help. 
These findings are presented by a thorough discussion of the descriptive statistics, which is 
then taken further by analysing how the observations meet the hypotheses made in the 
literature review. Consequently, the Chapter contributes to the debate on the impact of 
family policies on the gender gap by examining the impact of numerous policies on highly 




Chapter 7 aims to make similar contributions from a methodological perspective by 
addressing the impact of labour market institutions on the gender gap in top positions. Here, 
in contrast to previous studies both variables measuring union strength and variables 
measuring social protection and skill profiles are combined in a multilevel analysis. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the author also updated the skill specificity index using data first 
established by Iversen and Soskice (2001). While Iversen and Soskice used data from the 
1980s to 1999, this thesis applies data from around the yeaƌ ϮϬϭϬ. To the authoƌ͛s kŶoǁledge, 
this thesis is the first piece of academic work that questions whether the index is still usable 
and consequently updates it.  
Using more recent data, Chapter 7 allows for the possibility that not only skill 
specificity and social protection are institutional complementarities, but also that unions and 
collective bargaining can help us to understand cross-national variation in vertical 
segregation. Here, hypotheses range from the idea that social protection and skills specificity 
hinder women from reaching the top to the idea that strong representative unions help 
narrow inequalities. Findings are that in contrast to the gender version of Varieties of 
Capitalism, more employment protection legislation, specific skill needs and unemployment 
benefits seem to help women reach top positions. Additionally, unions help to narrow the 
gender gap, but only if the female workforce is unionised as well. This Chapter thus 
contributes to the existing literature by highlighting the important role of labour market 
institutions and different aspects of it in explaining the cross-ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiaŶĐe iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
relative access to top positions. 
  
The findings and limitations are summarised in the concluding Chapter 8. The 
conclusion also suggests further research and provides policy recommendations such as more 






Chapter 2: Family policies and gender labour market inequalities  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis investigates to what extent family 
poliĐies affeĐt ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs. Befoƌe iŶǀestigatiŶg this ƌelatioŶship, 
this Chapter presents the empirical background on the dependent variable—ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
underrepresentation in top positions.  
This is done by firstly analysing the extent of gender segregation in the labour market, 
namely gendered differences in pay; gendered differences in the type of jobs women and 
men do; and lastly gendered differences in job hierarchies. Secondly, the author argues that 
studies need to distinguish between highly educated women and lesser educated women. 
Evidence for this hypothesis is discussed by looking at how labour market participation varies 
across education levels. As shown in this Chapter, employment rates vary substantially for 
women with lower levels of education and additionally, these employment rates have also 
changed noticeably in the past 16 years. In contrast to this, employment rates of tertiary 
educated women have remained the same. This indicates that both samples—highly 
educated and lesser educated women—have to be examined separately as they seem to react 
differently to changes in the labour market.  
This Chapter also provides justification for why vertical segregation was chosen for 
this thesis as the outcome variable, over other dimensions of gender labour market 
inequalities. The main reason for this decision is that a wide range of literature explains why, 
for example, gendered employment rates and the occurrence of part-time employment vary 
substantially between countries: Scholars have identified a significant relationship between 
faŵilǇ poliĐies aŶd these laďouƌ ŵaƌket outĐoŵes. The iŵpaĐt of faŵilǇ poliĐies oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
underrepresentation in top positions, and more specifically, differences across countries 






2.1 The pay gap and occupational segregation across Europe 
 
This section addresses occupational segregation and therefore looks at gendered pay 
differences; how labour markets are segregated between men and women in terms of the 
type of jobs men and women undertake (horizontal segregation), and lastly, gendered 
hierarchies (vertical segregation). Scholars such as Mandel and Semyonov (2006) argue that 
occupational segregation is more pronounced in Scandinavian countries than in liberal 
economies. They argue that family policies are driving these inequalities.  
 
While sĐholaƌs haǀe laƌgelǇ tƌeated oĐĐupatioŶal geŶdeƌ segƌegatioŶ as a ͞geŶeƌiĐ 
iŶdiĐatoƌ of geŶdeƌ iŶeƋualitǇ͟ ;Chaƌles, ϮϬϬϯ, p. ϮϲϳͿ, ǁe Ŷeed to clearly distinguish between 
horizontal and vertical segregation (see for example Hakim, 1996; Semyonov and Jones, 1999; 
Blackburn et al., 2001, 2002; Charles, 2003). Horizontal segregation here refers to gendered 
differences in types of occupations and the emergence of female- and male-dominated 
occupations. It particularly refers to the observation that men tend to be concentrated in 
different sectors and occupations than women – i.e.. the underrepresentation of women in 
ŵaŶual oĐĐupatioŶs aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s overrepresentation in non-manual occupations (see 
Charles and Grusky, 1995; Grusky and Charles, 1998; Fagan and Burchell, 2002).  However, 
the impact horizontal segregation has on the gender pay gap is debated. Fortin and Huberman 
(2002), for example, find that in Canada in the 1990s horizontal segregation only explained 
20 percent of the earning gaps and find instead that vertical segregation is the main driver for 
earnings gaps (Fortin and Huberman, 2002, p. 12). 
 
Vertical segregation refers to gendered hierarchies in the labour market (Hakim, 1996; 
Spaeth, 1979; Rubery and Fagan, 1995; Fernandez, 1998; Baxter and Wright, 2000; Cotter et 
al., 2001). Women tend to be underrepresented in high-status occupations and high-paid jobs 
and face a glass ceiling when aiming for managerial positions (Baxter and Wright, 2000). The 
teƌŵ ͚glass ĐeiliŶg͛ iŶ this Đase desĐƌiďes a paƌtiĐulaƌ pheŶoŵeŶoŶ of ǀeƌtiĐal segƌegatioŶ ďǇ 




Scholars agree that both vertical and horizontal segregation combined contribute to 
gendered differences in pay. The author understands the gender pay gap therefore as a result 
of both types of segregation and discusses pay differentials first before then distinguishing 
between the gendered types and levels of occupations.  
 
2.1.1 The Gender Pay Gap 
 
High gender pay differentials despite welfare policies and laws show that welfare 
states have only limited capabilities to reduce occupational gender segregation which is the 
main cause for pay gaps (Fortin and Huberman, 2002, p.12). In other words, Hakim (1992) 
argues that it is not the occurrence of female and male- dominated types of jobs, but more 
importantly gendered hierarchies that cause the gender pay gap. However, what is the gender 
paǇ gap? The paǇ gap desĐƌiďes the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aŶd ŵeŶ͛s eaƌŶiŶg aŶd ĐaŶ 
be calculated in multiple ways. We can calculate the pay gap by working profiles – so 
distinguishing between part-time and full-time employment. This can be particularly 
important keeping in mind that women are much more likely to be working part-time than 
men. The pay gap can also be calculated from the perspective of different age groups. What 
we see currently is that the pay gap is on EU average lower among young employees than 
among older employees. In other words, it tends to widen with age. This could be due to the 
fact that career interruptions due to family responsibilities happen at a later time in an 
iŶdiǀidual͛s age.  AŶotheƌ faĐtoƌ Đould ďe that aĐtuallǇ iŶeƋualities are decreasing. This section 
does not distinguish between age groups, but rather presents an overall picture of the gender 
pay gap using the unadjusted gender pay gap data published by Eurostat (2018). It expresses 
the difference between the average of ŵeŶ͛s aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s gƌoss houƌlǇ eaƌŶiŶgs.  
 
On the EU-27 average, in 2015 women earned 16 percent less than their male 
counterparts in industry, construction and services, excluding public administration, defence 




Figure 2.1 Hourly gender pay gap in percentage, by Industry, construction and services 
(except public administration, defence, compulsory social security), 2015  
 
 
Source: Eurostat; no data available for Turkey, Former Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Switzerland 
 
This is despite equal pay being a right in all member states of the European Union. Pay 
gaps range from 6 percent in Italy, Luxembourg and Romania over 15 percent in Norway, 
Spain, Greece, Denmark and Bulgaria to more than 20 percent in Slovakia, United Kingdom, 
Austria, Germany, Czech Republic and Estonia. Differences in pay consequently do not follow 
the same patterns as variations in employment rates with Western and some Eastern 
European countries showing relatively high levels of gendered pay differences, Nordic 
countries average levels and Mediterranean relatively low to medium levels. In Italy for 
example, women tend to be less likely to be working in general, however, the gender pay gap 
indicates that there is relatively little differences in terms of pay. In Estonia on the other hand, 
where women employment rates are high despite low part-time rates, we find stark 
differences in terms of pay. Germany and Austria with both high employment and part-time 
rates seem to discriminate against women to a larger extent than the other European 
countries.  
 
6 6 6 7
8 8
11
14 14 14 14 14 15 15 15 15
15 16 16 16














































































































































































2.1.2 Horizontal Segregation 
How can we explain differences in pay? As discussed before, one of the causes of the 
gender pay gap is the occurrence of female- and male-dominated occupations. These can be 
examined from a vertical and horizontal perspective. We can measure horizontal segregation 
by looking at the types of occupations men and women tend to have.  
 
Figure 2.2 Percentage of female employees, by Top 20 occupations, 2010 in percentage 
 
Source: Burchell (2014) 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the share of female employees in the 20 most common 
occupations for 2010 and distinguishes between occupations with more than 60 percent 
female employees, male-dominated occupations with less than 40 percent women and mixed 
occupations.  Typically female-dominated occupations are, for example, health professionals, 




































and maintenance workers, sales workers, customer services clerks, associate nurses and 
healthcare assistants (see Burchell, 2014, p.17). With the exception of cleaners, these jobs 
are all white-collar jobs. Male-dominated occupations are mechanics and metal workers, 
drivers, building workers and miners, engineering and computing professionals, engineering 
and computing technicians, labourers in construction and industry, corporate managers, 
machine operators and assemblers. We find both blue and white-collar jobs here. Mixed 
occupations are finance, sales and administrative professionals, administrative, legal and 
social sciences professionals or food, wood and textile workers (ibid, 2014).  
 
Figure 2.3 Women in mixed (40-60% female), female-dominated and male-dominated 
occupations, 2010 in percentage  
Source: Burchell (2014) 
 
Examining these differences in types of occupations a different perspective, figure 2.3 
illustrates the share of women in mixed, female- and male-dominated occupations for 2010 
by country. Again, we find significant cross-national variations. In all countries with the 
exception of Italy, Greece and Luxembourg we find more than half of women employed in 
typically female-dominated jobs. Only in these three countries, we see over 40 percent of 
women in mixed occupations. Mixed occupations generally are not common for women with 
only 2 percent in Finland and an overall average across EU-26 countries of 18 percent. In all 
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countries, women are highly unlikely to be working in a male-dominated occupation with 
shares ranging from 6 percent in Estonia and Lithuania to a maximum of 17 percent in the 
United Kingdom. In general, in 2010 on the EU-26 average, 69 percent of all women worked 
in female-dominated occupations, 13 percent in male-dominated occupation and 18 percent 
in mixed occupations. Thus, we can say that again horizontal segregation does not follow any 
clear patterns and we can see it varying substantially across countries. We find that Denmark 
and Sweden show comparably high levels of women in mixed occupations and thus fewer 
women in female-dominated occupations. However, Finland on the other side seems to be 
highly segregated. The same is true for corporatist countries such as Germany, France, 
Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands with up to 78 percent of women working in female-
dominated occupations while other corporatist countries such as Luxembourg (30 percent) 
show very different levels. Mediterranean countries can be found on either side of the 
spectrum, while Baltic countries tend to have high levels of horizontal segregation.  
 
2.1.3 Vertical Segregation  
 
WoŵeŶ͛s ƌelatiǀe aĐĐess to top positioŶs depeŶds oŶ politiĐal, iŶstitutioŶal aŶd 
individual factors. Additionally, we find at the organisational level that career advancement 
depends on new jobs being created or job opportunities being opened to employees. This 
internal labour market allows for hierarchical advancement (see for example Tharenou, 
1997), but the selection of individuals for promotions tends to discriminate against women 
and minorities. These processes of discrimination within organisations are not subject of this 
thesis, but are discussed to some extent in the Appendix (see for example statistical 
discrimination in Appendix A). At the individual-level, traits such as work experience and 
training seem to affect career progressions as they are expected to increase productivity 
(Becker, 1975). Managerial skills and high job performance are also associated with 
managerial advancement progression (Tharenou, 1997). Thus, it needs to be noted that a 
combination of traits impact access to managerial and senior professional positions. 
Education and higher-status jobs for example are positively correlated, both for women and 
men (Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011). However, education cannot be the only factor as it 
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increases access to high-status jobs, but does not necessarily reflect the hierarchical position 
of employees within an organisation. This is why this thesis distinguishes between senior 
professional and managerial positions that require additional managerial traits. Managerial 
professionals are selected as these positions are always closely related to authority and 
power. Senior professionals in some cases include individuals who might only have the 
training and human capital trait and lack managerial competences. However, many senior 
professionals such as dentists or engineers are assumed to work in teams with staff in less 
senior positions. Thus, even senior professionals can be expected to have some kind of 
managerial responsibilities and authority.  
 
As pointed out by Spaeth (1979), the gender pay gap can be explained to a substantial 
extent by gendered differences in occupational authority. Spaeth (1979) here highlights the 
importance not only of authority, but also complexity and prestige of a job that allows 
researchers to distinguish occupations from a vertical perspective. Other studies refer to the 
uŶdeƌƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of ǁoŵeŶ at the top of oƌgaŶisatioŶs as the ͞glass ĐeiliŶg͟ ;see Baǆteƌ 
and Wright, 2000) arguing that while obstacles to get promoted increase for both genders as 
they move up the career ladder, it is particularly women that face the strongest hurdles to 
get promoted.  
 
Plotting the distribution of men and women between certain occupations however is 
not sufficient to fully explain gender wage gaps. Fortin and Huberman (2002) find that in 
Canada in the 1990s if we hold constant the ratio of female and male earnings in each 
occupation and then give the female workforce the male occupational distribution, only 20 
percent of the earning gaps can be explained by horizontal segregation. In other words, the 
geŶdeƌ paǇ gap is ƌatheƌ a ƌesult of ͞iŶtƌa-oĐĐupatioŶal ǀeƌtiĐal segƌegatioŶ͟ ;FoƌtiŶ aŶd 
HuďeƌŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϮ, p. ϯϱͿ. CoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, ǁe Ŷeed to eǆaŵiŶe the ͞ǁithiŶ-occupation 
ĐoŵpoŶeŶts͟ ;FoƌtiŶ aŶd HuďeƌŵaŶŶ, ϮϬϬϮ, p.ϭϮͿ aŶd examine hierarchies. Occupational 
ǀeƌtiĐal segƌegatioŶ geŶeƌallǇ ͞ is the keǇ issue fƌoŵ a poliĐǇ peƌspeĐtiǀe͟ ;Hakiŵ, ϭϵϵϮ, p.ϭϯϮͿ 
as it is the main driver for wage differentials in labour markets. Jurajda (2003) on the other 
hand questions the importance of occupational segregation for the gender wage gap. She 
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examines the gender wage gap in the transition countries of Czech Republic and Slovakia and 
finds that occupational segregation – as ŵeasuƌed iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aŶd ŵeŶ͛s shaƌe iŶ I“CO-coded 
occupations – is not causing the gender wage gap, but discrimination and violations of the 
equal pay clause within the labour market are. However, Jurajda (2003) excludes managerial 
occupations from her analysis, which is why her definition of occupational segregation mainly 
reflects horizontal segregation, but not hierarchical vertical segregation. 
 
According to Hakim (1992), vertical segregation – measured as the distribution of 
women in different ISCO classified occupation groups – does not only explain the gender pay 
gap. The absence of women in higher positions also reflects a lack of interest representation. 
This is particularly interesting when examining the relationship between labour market 
institutions such as trade union density and segregation. In other words, if women are not 
represented in top positions this means that their interests are much less likely to be picked 
up and pursued. Additionally, it means a lack of role models for women in less senior positions 
(Morgenroth, Ryan and Peters, 2015). Eurostat data follows the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in order 
to class occupations. Managers include Chief Executives, Senior Officials and Legislators, 
Administrative and Commercial Managers, Production and Specialised Service Managers and 
Hospitality, Retail and Other Services Managers. While this definition for managerial jobs will 
be followed for the descriptive purposes in this Chapter, the analytical part of this thesis will 
follow an adapted definition of managerial positions2. Based on Eurostat data however, we 
can already see that there is a wide cross-national variation of the gender gap in managerial 
occupations. On the EU-27 average, only 33 percent of all managers were women in 2015 in 
comparison to 30 percent in 2010 (see figure 2.4).  
 
                                                             
2 This adapted definition as discussed in Chapter 5. The thesis follows two definitions, one based on the ISCO-
Ϭϴ ĐlassifiĐatioŶ aŶd thus ideŶtiĐal to ͞ŵaŶageƌs͟, the otheƌ oŶe iŶĐludes Ŷot oŶlǇ ͞ŵaŶageƌs͟, ďut also 
͞seŶioƌ pƌofessioŶals͟.   
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Figure 2.4 Share of women in managerial positions, 2000 and 2015, in percentage, age 
group 20-64 years 
 
Source: Eurostat, no data available for Croatia for the year 2000 
 
 
Differences in the proportion of women in managerial jobs in 2015 range from less 
than 20 percent in Luxembourg to less than 30 percent in Cyprus, Greece, Croatia, 
Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Malta and Germany to less than 40 percent in Czech Republic, 
Austria, Estonia, Spain, Slovakia, Romania, France, Belgium, Portugal, Finland, Ireland, United 
Kingdom, Bulgaria, Norway, Slovenia and Iceland. Only in Lithuania, Sweden, Poland, Hungary 
and Latvia do we find between 40 and 44 percent of women being managers. Again, no clear 
patterns are visible in relations to welfare regimes. This is a stark contrast to the pattern of 
female employment rates discussed in the previous section where employment rates of 
women are high in social-democratic Scandinavian countries, medium- high in continental 
conservative European countries and lowest in Mediterranean welfare states.  
 
Looking at vertical segregation however, while former socialist countries again seem 
to offer better perspectives for women to reach managerial positions, Mediterranean, 
Western European and Scandinavian countries do not follow the same patterns we observed 
in terms of employment rates. Only in Lithuania, Sweden, Poland, Hungary and Latvia do we 
see high levels of female managers. What is more, even though corporatist Western European 
countries employ a high rate of highly educated women, they show the lowest rates of female 
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managers. In a nutshell, if family policies are the main reason for cross-national variation in 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt ƌates, at a fiƌst glaŶĐe, theǇ do not seem to have the same effect on 
vertical segregation.  
 
We ĐaŶ also see a ĐhaŶge oǀeƌ tiŵe iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s shaƌe aŵoŶgst ŵaŶageƌs fƌoŵ ϮϬϬϬ 
to 2015. In general, women are underrepresented in every single country illustrated in figure 
2.4 with Latvia in 2015 having the most equal ratio of female managers at 44 percent and 
Luxembourg the lowest with just 18 percent. What is more, we cannot generally say that 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s shaƌe of ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs has iŶĐƌeased oƌ deĐƌeased fƌoŵ ϮϬϬϬ to ϮϬϭϱ as 
some countries such as the Baltic ones seem to have more women in top positions in 2015 
than in 2000, but others remained at the same level or even increased vertical segregation.  
 
There has been an increase of 7 to 13 percent in Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Finland, Ireland, 
Bulgaria, Norway, Slovenia, Iceland, Sweden, Poland, Hungary and Latvia. There could be two 
potential explanations for this: Either we have more women in managerial positions in 2015 
than in 2010 because hierarchies have become less gendered and more women relative to 
ŵeŶ ƌeaĐh top positioŶs. Oƌ the oǀeƌall iŶĐƌease of ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt ƌates has siŵplǇ 
led to higher numbers of women in the labour market, and therefore consequently, the share 
of women over men in managerial positions has increased. We see that in many countries 
that have witnessed an increase of female managers, we also find a stark growth in 
employment rates per se, such as in Malta, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Norway, Sweden and Iceland. Thus, in our analysis we need to find a way of distinguishing 
between highly educated women and the overall female workforce.  
 
Ϯ.Ϯ WoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt patteƌŶs aĐƌoss Euƌope 
 
Women are still responsible for the majority of the domestic work and childrearing 
(Brines, 1994, p.653; Bianchi et al., 2012; Dotti Sani and Treas, 2016). And even though the 
labour force participation rate of women between 25 and 54 years has risen on average in 
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the European Union from 57.3 percent (EU-27) in 2000 to 64.4 percent in 2015, women are 
still underrepreseŶted oŶ the laďouƌ ŵaƌket Đoŵpaƌed to the ƌoughlǇ ĐoŶstaŶt ŵeŶ͛s 
employment rate of 76 percent (European Labour Force Survey data).  First, the following 
section explores differences in employment rates for highly educated women and the general 




2.2.1 Gendered differences in employment rates  
 
Figuƌe Ϯ.ϱ oŶ the Ŷeǆt page illustƌates ǁoŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ ŵaƌket paƌtiĐipatioŶ ƌates iŶ 
2000 and 2016 across the European Union. 2016 was chosen as the latest year since this is 
the most recent data available. 2000 was chosen as the year for comparison because it allows 
a comparison over a substantial amount of time and secondly, data was available for a large 
number of countries in contrast to earlier years such as 1990. Still, there is no data available 
for 2000 for Turkey, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Switzerland and Iceland. We find that on EU-27 
average in 2016, 65 percent of all women between 20 and 64 years work in the formal labour 




Figure 2.5 Women's employment rates, in percentage, 2000 and 2016; 20 to 64 years.  
Source: Eurostat; no data available for the year 2000 for Turkey, Former Yugoslavia, Croatia, 
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However, employment rates range from less than 50 percent in Greece and Italy in 
2015 to Iceland with over 84 percent. We can identify fairly clear patterns here, similar to that 
found by Stier and Lewin-Epstein (2001)—with the Scandinavian social-democratic welfare 
states Sweden, Iceland, Norway, Denmark and Finland showing high employment rates and 
low rates in Mediterranean welfare states such as Italy, Greece and Spain. While continental 
European welfare states such as Germany, the Netherlands and Austria seem to be doing 
relatively well, the majority of Eastern European welfare states—with the exception of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—are below average. However, the particularly good 
performance of continental European countries is linked with the occurrence of part-time 
employment (see figure 2.8). 
 
What figure 2.5 is also not showing is how employment rates vary regarding 
educational backgrounds. Figure 2.2 illustrates the share of women participating in the labour 
market between 25 to 54 years old for all educational backgrounds and that for women in 
that age group with tertiary degrees in 2015. We can see that highly educated women in every 
country are much more likely to be employed than the overall female workforce. Only in 
Greece, Italy, Slovakia Spain and the Czech Republic less than 70 percent of highly educated 
women are employed. While employment rates are between 70 and 91 percent everywhere 
else, it is particularly Eastern European and Scandinavian countries that perform particularly 
well. More than 85 percent of all highly educated women in the corporatist welfare states 
such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, France and Belgium are also employed. We 






Figure 2.6 Women's employment rates by education, as percentage of women between 
25-54, 2016 
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Figure 2.7 below illustrates changes in employment rates between 2000/2001 and 
2015 and shows how different the patterns are for tertiary educated women compared to 
the overall female workforce. Generally, we can say that on average highly educated women 
are as likely to be employed in 2015 compared to 2000, while women from all educational 
background are substantially more likely to be employed.  
Figure 2.7 Changes in women's employment rates by education, from 2000 to 2015, 20 to 
64 years.  
 
Source: Eurostat; no data available for Turkey, Former Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Switzerland 
 
Especially in some Scandinavian (for example Finland, Denmark) and Mediterranean 
countries employment rates of highly educated women have decreased, whereas in 
conservative welfare regimes and some former socialist welfare states it has increased. There 
is no convergence between changes in employment rates for the two groups. Only in Sweden 
and Lithuania both the overall female workforce and highly educated women are in relative 
terms equally more likely to be employed in 2015 compared to 2000. In Finland, Poland, 
Romania, Norway, Estonia, Malta, Netherlands, France, Sweden, Latvia, Spain, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Lithuania the share of highly educated women in employment has 
increased, but not to the same extent as the share of the overall workforce (with the 
























































































































































































All ISCED 2011 levels Tertiary education (levels 5-8)
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be employed in 2015 than in 2000. In Iceland and Denmark, employment rates overall and for 
highly educated women have decreased, while in Romania and Norway only the overall 
workforce is worse off, but not the highly educated one.  
 
2.2.2 Gendered differences in the occurrence of part-time 
 
As mentioned above, some countries show high employment rates due to a high share 
of women working part-time. Figure 2.8 below illustrates part-time employment rates as a 
share of overall employment for 2015. Eurostat defines part-time based on a spontaneous 
response from the individuals whether he/she works full- or part-time – thus the definition 
of what constitutes as part-time work can vary depending on the country but also the 
individual. We can see that women across the European Union are significantly more likely to 
be working part-time than men. Part-time employment rates for women range from only 2 
percent in Bulgaria to over 25 percent in Spain to 75 percent in the Netherlands. Thus, high 
employment rates in continental European welfare states such as Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Belgium correspond with high part-time employment rates. For example, 
the Dutch with 75 percent of all employed women working part-time allows for this 
assumption. We also see that while in Eastern and to some extent Southern Europe—with 




Figure 2.8 Part-time employment rates, as percentage of the total employment, 2015 
 




2.3 Family Policies and Occupational Segregation – The Welfare State Paradox 
 
What helps us to explain these cross-ŶatioŶal diffeƌeŶĐes iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt 
rates, the occurrence of part-time work and most importantly occupational segregation? The 
section below discusses how scholars mainly agree on the association between progressive 
welfare states and high female employment rates. Additionally, they identify to what extent 
ǁelfaƌe ƌegiŵes iŵpaĐt ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ďe ǁoƌkiŶg part-time. However, in contrast to 
this and focusing on occupational segregation, Mandel and Semyonov (2006) argue that there 
is a paradox in the relationship between Western welfare states and gender inequalities, 
ǁheŶ theǇ ǁƌite the ͞saŵe ǁelfaƌe state aĐtiǀities that pƌoŵote oŶe diŵeŶsioŶ of geŶdeƌ 
equality appear to iŶhiďit aŶotheƌ diŵeŶsioŶ͟ ;ϮϬϬϲ, p. ϭϵϰϮͿ. TheǇ fiŶd that occupational 
segregation as ŵeasuƌed iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs aŶd feŵale-dominated 
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jobs is more pronounced in Scandinavian countries despite their progressive family policies 
than in liberal economies such as Canada or the United States. The authors find a 
contradiction between family policies which enable women to join the formal labour market 
on the one hand, but limit occupational opportunities and pay on the other.  Thus, they agree 
that pƌogƌessiǀe aŶd deǀeloped ǁelfaƌe states aƌe the ŵaiŶ dƌiǀeƌs foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ 
market participation (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). Their theory around the Welfare State 
Paradox is discussed in greater detail in section 2.3.2.  
 
Ϯ.ϯ.ϭ WoŵeŶ’s eŵployment and family policies – literature review  
 
How can we explain gendered differences in employment rates and part-time 
employment? Whereas it seems that for men there have to be reasons that hinder them from 
working full-time, such as the lack of full-time jobs or health problems, unemployment, school 
attendance or partial retirement (Rosenfeld and Birkelund, 1995, p.111), many women work 
part-time because of child-rearing and providing care for family members (Stier and Lewin-
Epstein, 2001). Since women still do most of the domestic work including childrearing, they 
tend to choose jobs with reduced hours in order to combine domestic and formal labour-
market work (Blossfeld, 1994; Moen, 1985).  
 
It seems crucial to understand to what extent family obligations and responsibilities 
affect formal employment and the ability to work full-time. Esping-Andersen (1990) describes 
faŵilǇ poliĐies as a ŵeaŶs to iŵpaĐt the iŶdiǀiduals͛ reliance on the family and thus argues 
that welfare states and their policies affect employment patterns. Since the late 1990s 
national political economies have faced the need to promote work-family balance and family 
policies. With women continuing to undertake the majority of household and family 
responsibilities, welfare regimes and their public policies, laws and structures are still shaping 
gender labour market outcomes. As Davis and Kalleberg argue (2006), three factors have 
caused this development:  
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1. Female labour market participation and in particular the participation rate 
of mothers increased due to various factors such as limitation of the welfare 
states because one income alone was not sufficient to provide for the whole 
family.  
2. Due to an increase of the working hours especially in highly-skilled jobs on 
the one hand and the financial obligations to provide for children on the 
other, family policies have had to be launched to actually enable the worker 
both to work and have children without cutting hours back.  
3. The decline of the traditional family model and the consequent rise of 
single-parent households have demanded investments into family policies 
in order to enable single-parents to combine work and family.  
 
As listed by Clarke (2016) and Hegewisch and Gornick (2011), these family policies 
therefore range from leave policies (maternity, paternity and parental leaves) to childcare 
support (childcare subsidies to various degrees and for various age groups) to child benefits 
and family allowances. It is important to clearly distinguish between policies as these have 
different effects on gender labour market inequalities.  
 
The female labour market participation rate is expected to be lower in countries with 
generous child benefits and family allowances (see Clarke, 2016; Blau et al., 2001; Borjas, 
2012).  This is because generous Đhild ďeŶefits aŶd alloǁaŶĐes ƌeduĐe the iŶdiǀidual͛s 
incentive to return back to the labour market. As women are more likely to be looking after 
the child and furthermore are also more likely to be employed in a lower wage job, this effect 
is largest for women (Jacobsen, 1998). Blau et al. (2001) also find that tax subsidies have a 
similar effect in that they reduce the incentive for the second earner to work full-time and 
thus fosters the male breadwinner model in that it strengthens the division of labour between 
the spouses (Clarke, 2016).  
 
Hegewish and Gornick (2011) find that the impact of leave policies is not 
straightforward, and here, education levels seem important. They argue that first of all 
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women are more likely to be in the labour force before having children if paid leave is 
provided. Additionally, not only are women more likely to work before they have children if 
leave is provided, but they also are more likely to return after childbirth, even if leave is just 
paid for a short amount of time. In the United States, Joesch (1997) however finds that 
women have higher rates of return to work if leave is paid and also that women with higher 
educational levels have higher rates of returning to work. This is because highly educated 
women tend to have higher paid jobs, and therefore, face a stronger financial incentive to 
return back to their job that is better paid than maternity leave (Hegewisch and Gornick, 
2011).  
 
IŶǀestigatiŶg the iŵpaĐt of paƌeŶtal aŶd pateƌŶitǇ leaǀe oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt 
patterns, the effect on gender labour market inequalities seems to be insignificant for two 
ƌeasoŶs. Fiƌst of all, ďeĐause ͞oďligatoƌǇ leaǀe is ƌaƌe͟ ;HegeǁisĐh aŶd GoƌŶiĐk, ϮϬϭϭ, p. ϭϮϳͿ, 
take-up rates for parental and paternity leaves are low for fathers. While there has been an 
iŶĐƌease of ŵeŶ͛s use of paƌeŶtal leaǀe, shaƌed eŶtitleŵeŶts still aƌe takeŶ ďǇ ŵotheƌs iŶ the 
majority of cases. Additionally, while women take their maternity leave in one block and 
therefore interrupt their career full-time for a certain amount of time, fathers are more likely 
to take flexible leave in smaller instalments and thus stay connected to their workplace. 
Therefore, parental and paternity leave cannot be expected to significantly impact labour 
market inequalities.  
 
While scholars question whether the provision of public childcare has led to an 
iŶĐƌease of ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt ƌates oƌ ǁhetheƌ ǁoŵeŶ fiƌst joiŶed the laďouƌ ŵaƌket due 
to a change in norms and economic conditions and then lobbied for childcare provision (Leira, 
ϭϵϵϮͿ, the sigŶifiĐaŶĐe of ĐhildĐaƌe foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt is uŶdeŶiaďle. ChildĐaƌe aŶd 
long-teƌŵ Đaƌe aƌe ĐƌuĐial iŶ oƌdeƌ to iŶĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ ŵaƌket paƌtiĐipatioŶ ;see foƌ 
example Adema and Whiteford, 2007). This is because childcare, especially for children under 
3 years old, helps families to balance work and care (Misra et al., 2011). High costs of childcare 
due to no or limited public provision discourages especially women with lower wages from 
staying in the labour market, while highly educated women are less dependent on the public 
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provision of childcare due to higher incomes. What is more, the availability of childcare 
matters as well and available childcare positively impacts employment rates. In a nutshell, 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s aŶd ŵotheƌs͛ eŵployment rates are expected to be higher in countries with 
subsidised and available childcare. Clarke (2016) also highlights the idea that the provision of 
puďliĐ ĐhildĐaƌe iŶdiƌeĐtlǇ iŶĐƌeases ǁoŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ ŵaƌket paƌtiĐipatioŶ as it Đƌeates joďs iŶ 
the childcare sector that tend to be female-dominated.  
 
Instead of analysing the impact of separate family policies on gender labour market 
inequalities, many scholars have used use family policies typologies to examine the impact of 
poliĐies oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ ŵarket outcomes. (e.g., Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), Leitner 
(2003), Saraceno and Keck (2010), Gornick and Meyers (2003), Bambra (2004), Kröger (2011), 
Gornick et al. (1997), Mandel and Shalev (2009), Sainsbury (1996), Korpi (2000), Korpi et al 
(2013) and Lohmann and Zagel (2016).) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism typology by 
Esping-Andersen (1990) for example distinguishes welfare regimes according to their 
iŶstitutioŶal settiŶgs of the ͞iŶteƌ-Đausal tƌiaŶgle͟ of state, ŵaƌket aŶd faŵilǇ iŶ iŶdustƌial 
countries (Esping-Andersen, 1999:35) and their degree of de-familiarisation. De-
faŵiliaƌisatioŶ desĐƌiďes the eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh ͞poliĐies that lesseŶ iŶdiǀiduals͛ ƌeliaŶĐe oŶ the 
faŵilǇ; that ŵaǆiŵize iŶdiǀiduals͛ ĐoŵŵaŶd of eĐoŶoŵiĐ ƌesouƌĐes iŶdepeŶdeŶtly of familial 
oƌ ĐoŶjugal ƌeĐipƌoĐities͟ ;EspiŶg-Andersen, 1999: p.45). The variety of welfare regimes with 
different institutional arrangements (Orloff, 1993) leads to a variety of employment-
supportive family policies and consequently different degrees of familialism. According to 
Esping-Andersen (1999), the idea of de-familialisation closely relates to de-commodification, 
since it aims to commodify women first by making them less dependent on their husband in 
order to de-commodify them, in a second step, from the market. Key actors in providing 
support outside of the family are the state but also the market and third sectors. While liberal 
and conservative welfare regimes show residual levels of family policies, the social-
democratic countries provide more extensive family policies. The liberal regimes argue that 
it is the ŵaƌket͛s dutǇ to pƌoǀide suppoƌt, ǁhile the ĐoŶseƌǀatiǀe ƌegiŵes iŶsist oŶ pƌeseƌǀiŶg 
the family as the main provider of support (van der Lippe and Van Dijk, 2002). This does not 





However, despite the complexity of the various family policy typologies, all typologies 
have limitations and are therefore not applied to this research. For example, welfare regimes 
as established by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) are based on an initial set of only 18 
countries. The approach has been criticised heavily (see also Bambra, 2007) for overlooking 
crucial differences between countries that fall in the same groups, such as Japan and Italy 
according to the initial work of Esping-Andersen (1990). Additionally, scholars argue that 
adding more variables to the analysis will cause country clusters to change substantially.  
 
Korpi et al. (2013) and Lohmann and Zagel (2016) on the other hand do not define 
exclusive country clusters, and therefore, do not assume homogeneity within specific groups 
of countries. However, both approaches have both methodological and theoretical 
limitations when applied in policy analysis. From a methodological point of view, whilst the 
theoretical concepts are complex and sound, the operationalisation of the concepts is 
problematic. Certain variables such as family taxation and subsidies are rather limited in 
describing the extent of policies supporting the male breadwinner model. Because the data 
used in this case is binary, it can only indicate whether or not countries provide tax incentives 
for main breadwinner households or not, but do not go into any further detail. Even if these 
data limitations did not exist, the indices would still be problematic if used as independent 
variables for comparative research. In the example of this thesis, family policy typologies and 
indices could easily be applied to examine whether or not there is an association between the 
geŶdeƌ gap iŶ top positioŶs aŶd LohŵaŶŶ aŶd )agel͛s ;ϮϬϭϲͿ ;de-)familiarised countries or 
countries that fall into Korpi et al.͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ tǇpologǇ of dual-earner, dual-carer and traditional 
clusters. However, we would not know what specific element of the indices was driving 
significant associations or what policy was suppressing any significant associations. As this 
thesis aims to also provide policy recommendations, not being able to find a specific policy 
affecting the gender gap would be problematic. From a theoretical point of view, any typology 




In summary, family policies indices and typologies are limited as they assume 
homogeneity within clusters, include only specific range of policies, aggregate policies that in 
combination with others that might either suppress effects or exaggerate them and lastly 
occasionally use problematic data. Consequently, this thesis looks at family policies separately 
in order to identify associations clearly between policies and the gender gap in top positions. 
A full discussion of the various family policies discussed here can be found in Appendix A. 
 
2.3.2 Empirical evidence for the Welfare State Paradox 
 
This section reviews the theoretical association between separate family policies and 
hierarchical occupational segregation and presents scholarly empirical evidence for these 
links. 
 
Extensive paid maternity leaves and the long absence from work for example can put 
employers in the private sector off from hiring women in the first place or from hiring them 
for upper-level positions following also Human Capital Theory (Becker, 1964). Human Capital 
TheoƌǇ ;HCTͿ is defiŶed as ͞the stoĐk of kŶoǁledge aŶd skills aĐcumulated by an individual 
aŶd is aĐƋuiƌed thƌough eduĐatioŶ, tƌaiŶiŶg aŶd eǆpeƌieŶĐe͟ ;Peƌales, ϮϬϭϯ, p. ϲϬϮͿ. Due to 
domestic work and children in particular women are likely to interrupt their work and career. 
With more generous maternity leaves, the incentives to return to the labour market after 
childbirth are lowered. Family responsibilities in combination with extensive family policies 
therefore lead to less work experience, training and therefore to a disadvantage in the labour 
market (Polachek, 1981). Skills depreciation due to career interruptions and less work 
experience and less training, are expected to be particularly detrimental for highly skilled jobs 
as employers find it hard to manage temporary absences. Employers, expecting women to 
have discontinuous careers, penalise female applicants of highly skilled and thus highly paid 
jobs (Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011; Summers, 1989). Additionally, the segregation into 
͞ǁoŵeŶ-fƌieŶdlǇ͟ joďs that alloǁ foƌ easǇ ƌetuƌŶs afteƌ ŵateƌŶitǇ leaǀe ĐaŶ ƌeduĐe ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
wages in these occupations due to a crowding-out effect into female-dominated jobs. This 
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means that women are pushed into specific jobs that allow easy return to employment. 
However, others such as Van der Meulen Rogders (1999) and Waldfogel (1997) argue that 
maternity leave can also help women to build up continuity of employment with one 
employer and thus helps strengthen the ties and connections between female employee and 
employer, which then could help increase wages. Empirical studies (e.g., Bertrand, Goldin and 
Katz, 2010; Ruhm, 1998; Waldfogel, 1999; as cited by Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011) find that 
generally long leaves are associated with motherhood penalties—i.e., that long leaves reduce 
ŵotheƌs͛ eaƌŶiŶg aŶd thus iŶĐƌease the geŶdeƌ paǇ gap. However, maternity leave could 
potentially also help women to build up tenure and continuity with one employer, and thus, 
strengthen their position in the labour market. This can, in the long run, help them to reach 
top positions and higher pay (Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011). In contrast to this, others (e.g., 
Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007; Petersen and Saporta 2004; Spence 1973; Gangl and Ziefle, 
2009) find evidence for the belief of employers that investments into training are more risky 
for female employees and that provision, promotions or remunerations pay off better for 
workers without expected career interruptions due to pregnancy. Hansen (1995, p. 3) sums 
this pheŶoŵeŶoŶ up aŶd states: ͞if ǁoŵeŶ haǀe soĐial ƌights that do Ŷot applǇ to ŵeŶ oƌ aƌe 
seldom used by men, and the practices of these rights are unprofitable for the employers, 
eŵploǇeƌs ŵaǇ Đhoose to disĐƌiŵiŶate agaiŶst feŵale joď appliĐaŶts͟. Paternity leave on the 
other hand aims to equalise parenting roles, and in addition, may influence employer 
discrimination. This is because employers may be less likely to discriminate against mothers 
if men are also likely to take up leave after childbirth (Nepomyaschy and Waldfogel, 2007; 
Tanaka and Waldfogel, 2007).  
 
Policies that discourage women from working full-time are also expected to hinder 
women from reaching top positions as part-time employment has been shown to be 
associated with low-level jobs (see section 2.2.1). As discussed previously, child allowances 
and tax subsidies foster the male breadwinner model and discourage the second earner from 
working full-time (Blau et al., 2001; Clarke, 2015). Since women are more likely to be the 
second earner and to be working part-time, these policies are expected to increase 
occupational segregation. Even though part-time arrangements can help to combine work 
and family duties, thus enabling women to participate in the labour market, it can, at the 
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same time, hinder women from reaching the top (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005). Personal 
characteristics of women working full-time versus part-time explain the variation in earnings. 
For example part-time workers tend to be less educated, older, in a relationship and with 
several children, working in small companies and in temporary jobs with low job tenure 
(Manning and Petrongolo, 2008).  
 
While Mandel and Semyonov (2006; 2009) do not directly question the impact of the 
provision of childcare on occupational segregation, they see an indirect effect. This indirect 
effect or second side of the welfare state paradox in achieving gender labour market equality 
lies iŶ the state͛s ƌole as aŶ eŵploǇeƌ aŶd pƌoǀideƌ of childcare services and a large public 
sector associated with it. Even though childcare enables women to go into the labour market, 
as well as provide employment opportunities in the public services due to its wide range of 
female-dominated jobs and flexible working arrangements, it has, at the same time, fostered 
the development of these female-dominated niches with their traditionally lower-paid and 
less lucrative positions. (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). Yaish and Stier (2009) argue that the 
gender gap in job authority—measured as obtaining a supervisory role—is higher in countries 
with a large share of women in the public sector. They explain this association with the 
tendency of women to choose routine non-manual service occupations (also see Hansen, 
1995; Wright et al., ϭϵϵϱ; Chaƌles aŶd GƌuskǇ, ϮϬϬϰͿ. Theƌefoƌe, ďǇ pƌoǀidiŶg ͞ǁoŵaŶ-
fƌieŶdlǇ͟ joďs, the state oŶ the oŶe haŶd offeƌs eŵploǇŵeŶt oppoƌtuŶities to women that 
otherwise would not have engaged in the formal economy (Gornick and Jacobs, 1998). 
However, it reinforces vertical segregation as men continue to choose high authority jobs, 
whereas women opt for less driven careers that allow them to combine paid work and family 
responsibilities more easily instead of committing fully to a job with high authority (Mandel 
and Semyonov, 2005; Okun et al., 2007; Stier and Yaish, 2008).  
 
According to the welfare state paradox, large public sectors such as in Sweden and 
Denmark have not only decreased women economic prospects, but also they have hardened 
the traditional division of labour between the spouses. As mentioned before in progressive 
welfare states, women are underrepresented in managerial (lucrative) positions (Mandel and 
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Semyonov, 2006) because they are more likely to work part-time and take time off for 
childcare. Important here is that according to the welfare state paradox theory, both leave 
poliĐies aŶd ĐhildĐaƌe pƌoǀisioŶs seeŵ to deĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to be managers. The 
authors suggest that this might be due to the strong emphasis of the state on caretaking, 
which does not only encourage women to take time off, but also to move into occupations 
that are more mother friendly. Also, Mandel and Semyonov (2006) argue that countries with 
extensive childcare systems have large public sectors and thus create a mother-friendly 
atmosphere that pushes women into less lucrative and less powerful positions such as jobs in 
the provision of childcare services.  The authors examine this empirically through the use of 
the welfare state intervention index, and its impact on women in managerial and lucrative 
positions. The welfare state intervention index includes paid maternity leave, the percentage 
of children between 0 and 6 years in publicly funded childcare, and the public welfare sector 
as a share of the total. Their findings suggest that progressive and developed welfare policies 
and a large public sector indeed help women to enter the labour market but lead to a 
segregation of the labour market into female- and male-dominated occupations and an 
underrepresentation of women in managerial positions (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006).  
 
Although the theory has provided an interesting perspective on welfare states and 
their role in reducing or increasing gender equality, there are some limitations. First of all, the 
welfare state intervention index combines two key policies that might contradict each 
other— namely, leave and childcare policies. As discussed before, maternity leave helps 
women to enter the labour market, but long and paid maternity leave makes employers more 
ƌeluĐtaŶt to hiƌe ǁoŵeŶ aŶd also deĐƌeases ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŶĐeŶtiǀes to ƌetuƌŶ to ǁoƌk ƋuiĐklǇ. 
Childcare, on the other hand, is supposed to help women combine work and family and thus 
help them to stay in the labour market (Misra et al. 2011).  
 
The seĐoŶd pƌoďleŵ ǁith MaŶdel aŶd “eŵǇoŶoǀ͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ studǇ is that ĐhildĐaƌe 
policies need to be distinguished between childcare coverage for under 3-year-olds and for 
older children, as particularly childcare for under 3-year-olds seems to help women to enter 
the labour market. However, because the majority of studies do not examine vertical 
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segregation, these assumptions need to be questioned first before combining policies into 
one single indicator. Lastly, combining three indicators into one index does not allow the 
ƌeseaƌĐheƌs to ĐleaƌlǇ ideŶtifǇ ǁhiĐh eleŵeŶt affeĐts ǁoŵeŶ͛s positioŶ iŶ the laďouƌ ŵaƌket 
ŵost. CoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, MaŶdel aŶd “eŵǇoŶoǀ͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ aƌguŵent that family policies are 
detƌiŵeŶtal foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to ;luĐƌatiǀeͿ ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs aŶd thus leads to a ǁelfaƌe 
state paradox needs to be tested using a more detailed approach.  
 
Lastly, Mandel and Sermyonov (2006) use exclusively aggregate data. As discussed 
before in this thesis, using aggregate data can be problematic as it masks or exaggerates 
composition effects. 
 
2.3.3 Questioning the Welfare State Paradox: Empirical evidence 
 
Korpi, Ferrarini and Englund (2013) question this welfare state paradox. Instead of 
creating a welfare state index measuring only maternity leave arrangements and childcare, 
they compose three different profiles of family policies in order to measure not only 
generosity, but also the quality of the welfare state. As discussed before, Korpi et al. (2013) 
distinguish between policies supporting the traditional family, the dual earner dimension or 
the dual-Đaƌeƌ ŵodel ;see seĐtioŶ ϯ.ϭ.ϮͿ. The authoƌs aƌgue that ͞ŵajoƌ diffeƌeŶĐes aŵoŶg 
earner-carer and other policies in woŵeŶ͚s ĐhaŶĐes to eŶteƌ top eaƌŶiŶgs ƋuiŶtiles ĐaŶŶot ďe 
fouŶd͟ ;ϮϬϭϯ, p. ϯϮͿ aŶd that geŶeƌallǇ Đƌoss-ŶatioŶal diffeƌeŶĐes iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to 
lucrative managerial positions is small.  While generous family policies have a particularly 
positive effect on bringing women without tertiary education into work, the authors find no 
sigŶifiĐaŶt effeĐt of faŵilǇ poliĐies oŶ highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt ƌates. Hoǁeǀeƌ, 
women seem to have better access to top positions in earner-carer countries, namely those 
with generous child care and leave policies as opposed to under market-oriented welfare 
regimes—those where state funded family policies are meagre. Despite disagreeing with the 
welfare state paradox, Korpi et al. (2013) also find that traditional family policies such as child 
allowances and taxation subsidies seem to disadvantage women in this context. On the other 
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hand, countries with earner-carer policies such as publicly provided childcare do not hinder 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đaƌeeƌ peƌspeĐtiǀes. IŶ teƌŵs of the eŵeƌgeŶĐe of ͞feŵale ghettos͟ oƌ feŵale-
dominated occupations, Korpi et al. (2013) argue that progressive family policies have helped 
women to have continuous careers and have improved employment situations for women 
with lower levels of education without penalising highly educated women.  
 
Clarke (2015) also finds limited evidence for the welfare state paradox. He examines 
the iŵpaĐt of faŵilǇ poliĐǇ pƌofiles folloǁiŶg Koƌpi͛s et al. ;ϮϬϭϮͿ defiŶitioŶ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s shaƌe 
in managerial positions for 20 OECD countries from 1985-2010. He finds that maternity leave 
may reinforce vertical segregation and hinders women from obtaining managerial positions. 
However, he argues that there is a positive impact of progressive dual-earner family policies—
such as shared parental leave or extensive childcare—on female labour market participation 
ƌates. Moƌe speĐifiĐallǇ, ŵateƌŶitǇ leaǀes seeŵ to hiŶdeƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đaƌeeƌ peƌspeĐtiǀes, 
ŵeasuƌed iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to high eaƌŶiŶgs aŶd ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs, Ǉet fiŶds Ŷo eǀideŶĐe 
for the assumption that particularly highly educated women are penalised by generous family 
policies or any other family policy profiles.  On the one hand, Misra et al. (2012) find that 
leaǀes ĐaŶ haǀe a positiǀe effeĐt oŶ ŵotheƌs͛ eŵploǇŵeŶt, houƌs aŶd ǁages, ďut long leave 
show the opposite effect. On the other hand, widely accessible public childcare helped 
increase mothers wages. Because pay and occupational segregation highly overlap, we can 
expect similar results for vertical segregation. Consequently, we can assume that despite a 
vast amount of theoretical and empirical work, more research on occupational segregation 
and family policies is needed. What is more, because childcare and leave policies are highly 
diverse and numerous, but can have opposing effects, we need to clearly distinguish between 
the duration and pay of leaves, and also between particular childcare policies. Previous 
studies have aimed to aggregate policies for comparative purposes. However, because indices 
are based on assumptions made for the oǀeƌall feŵale ǁoƌkfoƌĐe oƌ foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
employment or pay but not for vertical segregation, theoretical explanations for the impact 




2.4 Limitations of previous studies and research questions 
 
Although as identified above, there are several studies that examine the relationship 
between family policies and gender inequalities in the labour market, this section discusses 
four key limitations of the presented studies that need to be addressed. First of all, only a few 
studies so far have focused on the emergence of vertical segregation. Secondly, studies in 
general—both on vertical segregation, but also on other dimensions of gender inequalities— 
have used macro-level aggregate data ŵaiŶlǇ. ThiƌdlǇ, to the authoƌ͛s kŶoǁledge Ŷo studǇ 
focuses on highly-skilled women, namely those with tertiary education. Instead, the female 
workforce is largely treated as a homogeneous group. Fourthly, studies examining the impact 
of family policies on vertical segregation tend to apply indices or typologies in order to 
measure family policies. The following section addresses these shortcomings in greater detail.  
 
2.4.1 Vertical segregation and macro versus micro level data 
 
As seen in the previous sections, the link between family policies, on the one hand, 
and labour market participation rates and part-time rates, on the other hand, have been 
examined by numerous studies. While scholars argue whether welfare regimes can be 
associated with female employment rates or not, the general agreement is that family policies 
such as generous maternity leaves can be linked with the increase of female employment 
rates. However, as discussed in section 2.3, there is no straightforward connection between 
other family policies and occupational segregation. Consequently, we need to understand 
better how and whether family policies impact occupational segregation. For various reasons, 
occupational segregation needs to be measured differently than in the presented papers. This 
thesis argues that we need to focus on vertical segregation and also on micro-level data.  
 
As discussed before, the gender pay gap is a result of both the types of jobs women 
tend to do and the level these jobs are situated within the organisational hierarchies (Burchell 
et al., 2014). However, vertical and horizontal segregation are two quite different concepts 
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and therefore need to be distinguished when trying to decide on the key dependent variable. 
Horizontal segregation, for example, is unsuitable for a cross-national comparison because 
measurements focus too much on aggregate macro-level data and also, horizontal 
segregation and namely the gender-related choices for occupations are due to a number of 
factors including cultural factors, choices made during schooling etc., that we cannot fully 
take into account. Despite this, researchers so far have mostly focused on measuring 
horizontal segregation and the pay gap. The Duncan and Duncan Index of Dissimilarity 
(Duncan and Duncan, 1955)  expresses the distribution of men and women in all occupations, 
whereas the Hakim Sex-Ratio calculates the sex-ratios within the single occupations and then 
compares these with the overall sex-ratio of the workforce. Despite few differences, the 
indices show similar patterns for cross-national variation in horizontal segregation (Hakim, 
1992, p. 131). Burchell et al. (2014) express horizontal segregation in a similar way as 
presented in figure 2.6 and figure 2.7. Nevertheless, neither the Duncan and Duncan Index 
nor the Hakim sex-ratios seems suitable to capture occupational segregation as they use 
highly aggregated data with expected compositional effects, and apply arbitrary weighting. In 
addition, both indices rely heavily on occupational classification and the chosen base 
population. Findings based on horizontal segregation indices can be misleading and fail in 
ƌepƌeseŶtiŶg geŶdeƌ iŶeƋualities as the eǆaŵple of JapaŶ shoǁs. EǀeŶ though JapaŶ͛s laďouƌ 
market is known for being male-dominated with high pay differentials, and both horizontal 
and vertical segregation (Matsuura, 1980; Nakanishi, 1983) the indices show low scores of 
occupational segregation. Therefore, vertical segregation can even occur if there are low 
levels of overall occupational segregation. Hakim (1992) argues that this is due to problems 
with occupational classifications and the level of aggregation in the data. Consequently, 
indices based on aggregated data fail to represent the heterogeneity of the society and 
cannot capture segregation. 
 
Of the studies that examined vertical segregation, they measured it using macro-level 
data. Using aggregate macro-level can be problematic due to composition effects. This is 
because using aggregate data can mask effects of policies on individuals in the labour market. 
We Ŷeed to ďe aďle to distiŶguish the puƌe effeĐt of a ǁoƌkeƌ͛s geŶdeƌ fƌoŵ otheƌ poteŶtial 
causes of not reaching top positions. Misra et al. (2012) suggest that due to the complex 
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relationship between single family policies, on the one hand, and family policies and 
individual-level factors, on the other, studies examining only macro-level data are limited as 
they fail to control for individual or job attributes.  The authors therefore suggest examining 
both the impact of separate family policies and vertical segregation while controlling for 
individual-level attributes by applying hierarchical multilevel models. 
 
Using individual-level data would allow the researcher to distinguish between 
occupational levels in much greater detail. This is particularly useful as this dissertation does 
not aim to answer what makes women choose one occupational level over the other, but 
rather what hinders women from reaching top positions. This is of crucial interest as top 
positions do not only represent status, but also power and earnings. When referring to 
ǁoŵeŶ iŶ top positioŶs, this disseƌtatioŶ applies the ĐoŶĐept of the ͞glass ĐeiliŶg͟. The teƌŵ 
glass ĐeiliŶg heƌe desĐƌiďes ͞a tƌaŶspaƌeŶt ďaƌƌieƌ that kept ǁoŵeŶ fƌoŵ ƌisiŶg aďoǀe a 
certain level in corporations. It applies to women as a group who are kept from advancing 
higheƌ ďeĐause theǇ aƌe ǁoŵeŶ͟ ;MoƌƌisoŶ et al. 1987, p. 13, as cited in Baxter and Wright, 
ϮϬϬϬ, p.ϮϳϲͿ. Thus, folloǁiŶg FeƌŶaŶdez ;ϭϵϵϴͿ the glass ĐeiliŶg ƌelates to ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to 
top occupational levels. As described by Cotter et al. (2001), other definitions of glass ceiling 




2.4.2 Focus on typologies and indices 
 
Another limitation of previous studies is the way family policies are captured. 
Examining the hypothesis of the welfare state paradox, Mandel and Semyonov (2006) for 
eǆaŵple eǆaŵiŶe the iŵpaĐt of faŵilǇ poliĐies oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ƌeaĐh luĐƌatiǀe 
managerial positions, managerial positions in general and female-typed occupations. Key 
independent variables here are the Welfare State Index, a summative index including 
maternity leave, publicly funded childcare for 0-6 year olds and public welfare sector as a 
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share of the total. Questioning the findings of Mandel and Semyonov (2006), Korpi et al. 
(2013) also examine the impact of family policies on managerial positions, the gender wage 
gap and women in corporate boards. However, in contrast to choosing a single dimensional 
index such as the welfare state index, they create family policy profiles. Here, they examine 
the impact of general, dual-earner or earner-carer policies on vertical segregation. As 
discussed in section 2.3, the relationship between family policies as captured by typologies 
and indices and gender labour market outcomes does not always correspond with the 
findings on the impact of single-family policy variables on gender labour market outcomes.  
 
Summarizing the findings of Clarke (2015), we find that while family policy typologies 
combining several family policies do not necessarily correlate with gender labour market 
outcomes, family policies examined separately do seem to impact gender labour outcomes. 
Therefore, studies such as Mandel and Semyonov (2006) and Korpi et al. (2012) are limited 
as they fail to assess the highly complex relationship between the wide range of different 
family policies and gender labour market outcomes.  
 
LastlǇ, sĐholaƌs suĐh as ChuŶg ;ϮϬϭϳͿ suggest that ǁe ͞Ŷeed to ďe Đautious about 
exactly what we are measuring when we examine family policy indicators, especially when 
usiŶg siŶgle oƌ Đoŵposite iŶdiĐatoƌs͟ ;ChuŶg, ϮϬϭϳ, p.ϭϲͿ. The authoƌ eǆaŵiŶes hoǁ ŶatioŶal-
level family policies affect company-level schedule control. She finds the effect found for 
generous leave policies is different from what is found for generous public childcare provision. 
This study also provides another example of how different policies do not necessarily lead to 
the same results. 
 
This thesis therefore does not only include single measurements on leave and 
childcare provisions, but also a whole range of indicators. Various measurements of paternal, 
parental, maternity, well-paid and unpaid leaves, childcare provisions and public spending are 
included. Thus, empirically this thesis aims to analyse the impact of family policies on 
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ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶ Đoŵpaƌed to ŵeŶ͛s aŶd to ĐleaƌlǇ estaďlish ǁhat poliĐies 
significantly impact the gender gap in top positions.  
 
2.4.3 Focus on overall female workforce vs highly skilled women 
 
Lastly, a key assumption of the Welfare State Paradox is that family policies harden 
the glass ceiling. Korpi et al. (2013) disagree with this and state that particularly women with 
lower levels of education have benefitted from family policies. Mandel and Shalev (2009) also 
find that occupational segregation follows different patterns for highly educated women than 
for women with lower levels of education. Nieuwenhuis (2014) finds that family policies affect 
highly educated women differently than lesser educated women. This is also reflected by the 
discussion in section 2.2 that highlighted how employment rates for highly educated women 
had not changed much, whereas for women with lower levels of education it had increased 
substantially. Highly educated women are more likely to be employed, but the motherhood-
employment gap seemed to be bigger. Consequently, and in contrast to previous studies, the 
sample of this thesis is limited to women with tertiary education only in order to exclude the 
possibility that family policies only decrease the relative number of women and men in top 
positions because actually they enabled workers with medium and low levels of education to 
join the labour market and thus reduce the relative share of highly educated workers. From 
a methodological point of view, narrowing down the sample to only tertiary-educated 
individuals allows us to avoid potential dilution effects by researching the possibility that a 
decline in top-positions for women is due to the overall increase of the female workforce— 
espeĐiallǇ iŶ the less luĐƌatiǀe joďs. BǇ doiŶg so, ǁe eǆĐlude the possiďilitǇ that ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
career perspectives have only decreased because the overall size of the female workforce has 
increased and thus reduced the share of women in top position that have already been part 
of the workforce before.  
 
Following the literature presented but also the limitations of previous research, this 




Research QuestioŶ ϭ: Does ǁoŵeŶ’s likelihood to ďe eŵploǇed iŶ a top positioŶ ƌelatiǀe 
to ŵeŶ’s vary across countries and if so, to what extent? 
 
Based on descriptive findings in section 2.2, we can see that women are disadvantaged 
in every developed economy in terms of pay, hours worked and the occurrence of part-time 
employment. Additionally, even using the aggregate macro-level definition of vertical 
segregation, we find that women across Europe are less likely to be in a top position 
compared to men.  Similarly, even when using a new definition of the gender gap in terms of 
vertical segregation into top positions and even when other factors are controlled for. Thus, 
the following hypothesis H1.1 is derived. 
 
Hypothesis H1.1 Women in Europe generally are less likely to reach top positions. 
 
In addition to the overall discrimination women face when aiming for top positions, 
we also need to understand to what extent the gender gap differs between countries. While 
we see that based on macro-level data women in Eastern European countries seem to be less 
disadvantaged than in Mediterranean countries, we cannot say that the variation between 
ĐouŶtƌies is aĐtuallǇ sigŶifiĐaŶt. Theƌefoƌe, this thesis aiŵs to also test ǁhetheƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
likelihood of reaching top positions is statistically significant – again having controlled for a 
number of other individual level factors. Based on previous studies and the descriptive figures 
we gathered in the previous section, the project comes to the following hypothesis H1.2.  
 
Hypothesis H1.2 The impact gender has on reaching top positions varies significantly 





What is ŵoƌe, ǁe do Ŷot kŶoǁ ǁhetheƌ aŶ iŶĐƌease iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s shaƌe iŶ top positioŶs 
is due to ǁoŵeŶ͛s ďetteƌ aĐĐess, aŶd thus, ŵoƌe geŶdeƌ eƋualitǇ oƌ ǁhetheƌ this is siŵplǇ 
due to the fact that more women have joined the labour market between 2000 and 2015 as 
discussed earlier. Because the absolute number of women participating in the labour market 
increased, the relative chance to reach top positions has increased as well and might be 
causing an  improvement in terms of vertical segregation. Because we know from figure 2.3 
that employment rates for highly educated women have declined slightly on average, 
especially in social-democratic and Mediterranean welfare states, whereas women from 
lower educational backgrounds generally are more likely in every country to be employed in 
2015 than in 2000. Thus, we can say that while more women in general have entered the 
labour market, the share of highly educated women in the labour market has declined slightly.  
 
Therefore, we need to distinguish clearly between educational backgrounds and hold 
the level of human capital constant. By looking only at highly educated women, the models 
aim to exclude the possibility that cross-national variations in the gender gap are due to 
different level of qualifications. Changes in vertical segregation particularly can be due to an 
actual change in the labour market that causes higher levels of gender equality and thus 
iŵpƌoǀes ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs iŶ aďsolute teƌŵs. But ĐhaŶges ĐaŶ also ďe 
due to the fact that more women have joined the labour market in recent years, which 
influences their chances to access top positions. What is more, as shown in the previous 
section family policies do not necessarily have the same influence on women across different 
educational levels.  In sum, this leads to hypothesis H1.3:  
 
Hypothesis H1.3 Cross-national variation of the gender gap in to positions is different 
for highly educated women than the general female workforce, even after controlling 
for educational levels in the latter model.  
 
To sum up, we need to examine drivers for cross-national variations in employment 
rates and occupational segregation in order to understand patterns. What is more, we need 
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to analyse why highly educated women are affected differently than women from lower 
educational backgrounds.  
 
Following the literature reviewed in section 2.3, the second research question arising 
is:  
Research question 2: How do family policies at a national level affect tertiary educated 
ǁoŵeŶ’s likelihood to aĐhieǀe top positioŶs at the iŶdiǀidual leǀel ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ’s? 
 
From what has been gathered in section 2.3.1 based on previous literature, H2.1 
expects that generous maternity leave makes employers more reluctant to hire women, 
especially in top positions, as it discourages women from returning to work shortly after 
childbirth.   
 
Hypothesis H2.1: Long and generous maternity leave is associated with a wider gender 
gap.  
 
For the gender gap in top positions this means that women in countries with generous 
maternity leaves are less likely to reach top positions as they are discouraged from returning 
to work after childbirth quickly due financial incentives. This, in return, means for employers 
that a female worker poses the risk of longer career interruptions than a male colleague. First 
of all, we can expect that because women on generous maternity leaves are missing out on 
experience and training whilst on leave, this reduces their human capital and therefore lowers 
their chances to compete with men for top positions. Secondly, women in countries with 
generous maternity leaves are also more likely to face discrimination, i.e., motherhood 
penalties. They also may be less likely to be hired for positions from the start that could in the 
future help them to reach top positions or are less likely to be promoted as much as men.  
 
Hypothesis H2.2: Generous and long paternity leaves are associated with a smaller 




On the other hand, this project expects that that generous paternity leave is linked 
with lower gender gaps in top positions. This is because paternity leave in contrast to 
maternity leave pushes men to be more involved in family responsibilities and thus the 
traditional division of labour between the spouses is softened. With men taking up more 
responsibilities, women are more likely to reconcile work and family, and thus, they are more 
likely to reach top positions. Additionally, it is expected to make employers less likely to 
discriminate against mothers if fathers also take time off work for childcare responsibilities 
(Nepomnyasch, Waldfogel, 2007).  
 
Hypothesis H2.3: Generous parental leave measured in compensation is associated with 
a wider gender gap.  
 
H2.3 focuses on the link between parental leave and the gender gap. Because the 
minimum and maximum period for parental varies substantially between mothers and 
fathers, mothers still take up the majority of parental leave (Ray, Gornick and Schmitt, 2010). 
Thus, generous parental leave is expected to widen the gender gap in the same way as 
maternity leave. Therefore, employers are more reluctant to hire women.  
 
 
Hypothesis H2.4: Extensive publicly funded childcare and therefore expenditure on 
childcare indirectly is associated with a wider gender gap. 
 
H2.4 addresses one of the key arguments of the Welfare State Paradox in that it 
questions the role of childcare. This hypothesis argues that extensive publicly funded 
childcare hinders women from reaching top positions as it correlates with a large public 
sector. Women are overrepresented in public sectors anyways and underrepresented in 
private sectors, unless controlled for as in the models for this thesis. Consequently, this 
discrepancy in the representation between public and private sector employment leads to 
women in the private sector having relatively lower chances to reach managerial positions 
than men. According to Mandel and Semyonov (2006), the negative impact of childcare on 
vertical segregation is due to the strong emphasis of the state on caretaking in the concerned 
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countries, which does not only encourage women to take time off but also to move into 
occupations that are more mother friendly and allowing them flexibility. As expenditure on 
childcare can be associated with high coverage of childcare, we can expect high levels of 
expenditure to also increase the gender gap.  
 
Hypothesis H2.5: Childcare allowances are associated with a wider gender gap. 
 
H2.5 focuses on the impact financial incentives have on the division of labour. Both 
childcare allowances and tax allowances and deductions aim to support care at home and 
thus are likely to protect the traditional division of labour between the spouses. 
Consequently, we can expect the gender gap to be higher in countries with generous 
allowances.  
 
Hypothesis H2.6: Traditional family policies are associated with a wider gender gap. 
 
According to H2.6, in countries with policies supporting the traditional division of 
labour between the spouses, women are less likely to access top positions. In familiarised 
countries dependencies between family members are strengthened by reducing economic 
and social consequences of providing care. 
 
As discussed in this Chapter, the iŵpaĐt of faŵilǇ poliĐies oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top 
positions is not straightforward. Thus, the question remains what else other than family 
policies can help explain cross-national variation of the gender gap. The next Chapter 
introduces literature that aims to solve this puzzle by examining the impact of labour market 




Chapter 3: Labour market institutions and occupational gender 
segregation 
 
The previous section highlighted how family policies can help explain gender labour 
market inequalities. In particular, the gender gap in employment rates, the occurrence of 
part-time employment and horizontal segregation can be explained largely by cross-national 
variation in societal norms and family policies. However, as established by Mandel and 
Semyonov (2006), Estevez-Abe (2005) and others, we cannot fully explain cross-national 
variation in vertical segregation of progressive welfare states such as Denmark lagging behind 
countries such as the United Kingdom or Latvia. Thus, the question remains, what can help us 
to understand the gender gap in managerial and high-status position other than family 
policies?  
 
This Chapter introduces key literature linking labour market and cross-national 
variation in vertical segregation as labour market institutions. The literature review points out 
strengths and limitations of the literature and distinguishes between two theoretical 
approaches – one arguing that labour market institutions such as unions and collective 
ďaƌgaiŶiŶg help pƌoŵote ǁoƌkeƌs͛ iŶteƌests aŶd thus ĐaŶ help deĐƌease the geŶdeƌ gap. Heƌe 
however, scholars such as Häusermann and Schwander (2010) also discuss the potentially 
negative effect of strong unions on gender labour market inequalities as the core workforce 
represented by unions tends to be male and thus women are at risk of being outsiders. A 
second body of literature (Estevez-Abe et al., 2011) focuses on the role of EPL and 
unemployment benefit generosity and skills specificity. The key argument here is that more 
regulated and protected labour markets with a strong focus on specific skills solidify the glass 
ceiling, as women are less likely to invest in specific skills and thus are less attractive to 
employers. The more protected workers are and the more difficult hiring and firing becomes, 
the more employers prefer hiring men over women as women pose higher risks to employers 




Due to the limited amount of literature available on vertical segregation, inequalities 
closely linked with gendered hierarchies such as the gender pay gap and the occurrence of 
part-time employment are included and it is highlighted how concepts are borrowed in order 
to understand vertical segregation. The reason for going beyond welfare regime and family 
policy and gender inequalities literature is that neither family policies nor welfare regime 
typology can explain cross-national variation in occupational segregation (see for example 
Estevez-Abe, 2006; Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). However, a growing body of literature 
suggests that it is Ŷot oŶlǇ faŵilǇ poliĐies that aƌe dƌiǀiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt patteƌŶs, ďut 
other institutional factors pertaining to labour markets that can explain gendered patterns of 
labour market outcomes (see for example Dieckhoff et al., 2015; Estevez-Abe et al., 2009; 
Buchmann and Charles, 1995; Schaefer et al., ϮϬϭϭͿ. EŵploǇeƌs͛ ďehaǀiouƌ aŶd laďouƌ ŵaƌket 
opportunities seem to be more important than the generosity of public policies. While vertical 
segregation has not been approached a lot from a labour market institution perspective, 
scholars have analysed the dynamics between labour market institutions and outcomes for 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt, such as skill profiles or unions and the gender pay gap, employment 
opportunities and hours worked. Due to the interconnected nature of gender labour market 
inequalities (see Chapter 2.1), we need to apply these concepts in order to understand 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶderrepresentation in managerial positions.  
 
While there have been various studies on the impact of family policies on vertical 
segregation (see Chapter 2) and on the impact of labour market institutions on employment 
rates, part-time employment and the gender pay gap, only a few scholars have examined the 
dynamics between labour market institutions and vertical segregation. However, in the 
literature we can find two main arguments – one focusing on the importance of human capital 
and skill profiles and the other one focusing on the relevance of unions and collective 
bargaining.  
 
The following section explains the theoretical concepts of key studies in the area of 
labour market institutions and gender inequalities. It aims to identify the key theoretical and 
empirical connections that have been made so far, highlighting how concepts can be 
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borrowed in order to explain vertical segregation. I have identified two main theoretical 
approaches in order to capture the impact of labour market institutions on gender inequality 
– oŶe is a ĐoŶfliĐt appƌoaĐh of iŶdustƌial ƌelatioŶs folloǁiŶg Koƌpi͛s Poǁeƌ ‘esouƌĐe TheoƌǇ 
and picking up the arguments made by Dieckhoff et al. (2015). The other one is based on 
Human Capital Theory and the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach focusing on the role of 
labour market institutions in supporting certain skill profiles.  
 
3.1 Conflict theory  
 
This section discusses one side of the argument that is based on the Power Resource 
Theory (PRT) (see Korpi, 1974). It focuses on the impoƌtaŶĐe of uŶioŶs oƌgaŶiziŶg ǁoƌkeƌs͛ 
interests. According to PRT, welfare states are influenced by power that is mobilised by wage 
earners. This influence is exerted by political parties or interest organisations such as labour 
unions. Employees, according to the PRT, are the protagonists; employers are the antagonists 
or consenters to developments of welfare states. This is because unions help workers to work 
collectively. While scholars largely agree that men seem to benefit from strong unions, they 
disagƌee oŶ the eǆteŶt uŶioŶs iŵpƌoǀe ǁoŵeŶ͛s positioŶ ǁithiŶ the laďouƌ ŵaƌket.  
 
Focusing on conflicts between these groups and consequently on industrial relations, 
Schäfer et al. (2012) find that stronger unions contribute to a more evenly distributed 
occupational hierarchy. In other words, strong unions seems to help in reducing the amount 
of precarious low-ǁage joďs aŶd thus iŶĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to ŵediuŵ-wage 
employment, which leads to less polarised labour markets. By reducing wage inequalities 
generallǇ, stƌoŶg uŶioŶs ƌeduĐe ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes of falliŶg iŶto loǁ-wage and low-skilled 
work. Consequently, strong unions promote gender-egalitarian distribution of wages and by 
doiŶg so, should help to deĐƌease ǀeƌtiĐal segƌegatioŶ. “Đhäfeƌ͛s et al. (2012) findings go hand 
in hand with studies examining the gender wage gap, where strong unions were linked to 
smaller wage gaps. The logic behind this is as follows: Mandel and Semyonov (2005) argue 
that in countries with strong unions, wage bargaining is more centralized and coordinated 
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between social partners. Unions seek to decrease inter-industry and inter-firm wage 
differentials. By doing so, they automatically decrease the gender pay gap since women tend 
to be employed in low-wage occupations and benefit from the wage bargaining of strong 
unions. In particular, unions fight for minimum wages and a decrease of wage disparities and 
therefore aim to improve the situation of the lower tail of the working population. Generally 
speaking, Mandel and Semyonov (2005) state that wage bargaining in coordinated economies 
reduces overall wage inequality by both increasing the minimum pay levels and restricting 
wages at the top (p. 953). The stronger the unions, the more coordinated the economy. Wage 
bargaining is more centralized, income inequalities reduce and the smaller the gender pay 
gap becomes due to the accumulation of women in the lower tail of the working population. 
However, as argued by Bertola et al. ;ϮϬϬϳͿ, ǁhile stƌoŶg uŶioŶs iŵpƌoǀe ŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt 
outcomes, they are potentially harmful for women due to the dualised nature of the labour 
market.  
 
Labour market dualisation theories support the idea that the workforce is not equally 
represented by unions or covered under collective bargaining agreements. Building upon 
insider-outsider theory (see Blanchard and Summers, 1986, 1987; Lindbeck and Snower, 
1988, 1989), Emmenegger et al. (2012) state that the labour market is divided between 
outsiders and insiders, with little mobility between the two. They define insiders as people 
with access to standard employment, who are unionized, in secure employment, protected 
by labour laws and have access to social security. Outsiders are either unemployed or working 
in atypical employment with lower levels of social protection coverage and limited political 
representation (Davidsson and Naczyk, 2009). Social protection for example includes 
employment protection and unemployment benefits. Palier and Thelen (2010) argue that 
CMEs with their high-skill equilibria, such as Germany and France with their relatively strong 
unions and centralized bargaining systems, have undergone a change in the most recent 
Ǉeaƌs. IŶ oƌdeƌ to adjust to a ͞ŵoƌe Đoŵpetitiǀe iŶteƌŶatioŶal eĐoŶoŵiĐ ĐoŶteǆt͟ ;iďid, p. 
139), CMEs have experienced a dualisation of their workforce by protecting core highly skilled 
workers and therefore failing to cover all citizens in terms of employment protection or work 
contracts. Moreover, in these CMEs the outsider group is gendered, and women are 
overrepresented. Häusermann and Schwander (2010) argue that atypical employment is 
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gendered in many countries and that, especially in continental Europe, these new types of 
employment are the norm rather than the exception for women (see also, Esping-Andersen 
1999).   
 
According to theories on the segmentation of the labour market, the industrial sector 
that used to play the undisputed key role in wage negotiations for the whole workforce has 
lost its leading role when the industrial sector started adjusting its workforce as a response 
to crises in the 1970s and 1980s (Palier and Thelen, 2010). Companies reduced the size of 
their workforce and increased the productivity of the remaining workforce by encouraging 
internal flexibility and intensification of work. Therefore, lower paid jobs disappeared or were 
outsourced, and new types of (atypical) jobs emerged with more flexibility and less security: 
outsider jobs. For unions, this means that their power decreased due to the shrinking 
traditional core of the workforce that women were no longer a part of. This is due to the 
incentive of unions to protect the core workforce. In the course of wage or working condition 
bargaining, unions accept the emergence of outsiders such as women, low-skilled labour 
market entrants and older workers. The high restrictions on wages imposed by unions 
prevents firms from paying employees less than minimum wage. This leads to a decrease of 
low paid jobs. Employers are, however, not willing to pay higher wages for low-skilled, labour 
market entrants, older workers or women since they deem them to be less productive, 
resulting in either higher unemployment for these workforces, or these groups of workers 
being employed in non-standard employment contracts (Esping-Andersen and Regini, 2000). 
Consequently, the actions of unions that aim to protect the insiders have a negative impact 
on labour market outcomes for women (Häusermann and Schwander, 2010).  
 
Bertola et al. (2007) also find that, for vertical segregation in the labour market, unions 
can have a negative effect. Analysing data from 17 OECD countries from 1960-96, the authors 
examine the impact of labour market institutions on the employment patterns of young 
people, women and the elderly. Labour market institutions here include wage-setting 
structures, employment protection and unemployment protection. They find that influential 
unions have no impact on women-men employment differentials. However, women seem to 
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be more likely than men to be unemployed when unions have a strong role. Bertola et al. 
(2007) suggest that strong unions assist women in joining the labour market. However, at the 
saŵe tiŵe theǇ Đause ǁages to iŶĐƌease, ǁhiĐh Đƌeates ͞high ǁage flooƌs͟ that aƌe less 
accessible for women. This increases vertical segregation because it pushes women into 
finding employment in unregulated sectors or the public sector.  
 
 
Therefore, we can expect that if women are represented by unions in large numbers, 
then unions will try to address gender inequalities and discrimination. This could either be 
done by orgaŶisiŶg ǁoƌkeƌs͛ iŶteƌests to push foƌ legislatioŶ that taĐkles iŶeƋualities, oƌ ďǇ 
demanding family-centric policies. The European Trade Union Confederation, for example, in 
its Action Programme on Gender Equality 2016-2019 (ETUC, 2016) commits to specific actions 
iŶ fouƌ keǇ aƌeas that addƌess geŶdeƌ iŶeƋualities, oŶe of theŵ ďeiŶg ͞taĐkle the ĐhalleŶge of 
work-life ďalaŶĐe͟ ;ϮϬϭϲ, p. ϰͿ. WaǇs to addƌess ǁoƌk-life conflicts according to ETUC are to 
͞loďďǇ foƌ iŶǀestŵeŶt iŶ ĐhildĐaƌe aŶd soĐial Đaƌe, iŵpƌovement in the pay and employment 
ĐoŶditioŶs foƌ ǁoƌkeƌs iŶ these seĐtoƌs foƌ good ƋualitǇ puďliĐ seƌǀiĐes͟ ;ϮϬϭϲ, p. ϲͿ. Otheƌ 
ŵeaŶs aƌe to addƌess ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶdeƌƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ uŶioŶs aŶd ĐoŵpaŶies͛ deĐisioŶ-
making boards by, for example, organising meetings with female union leaders to share 
experiences and ideas.  
 
However, Dieckhoff et al. (2015) challenge these assumptions and argue that the 
efforts of unions can have a different impact on the female workforce than on the male 
workforce.  In their study, they examine the impact of labour market institutions on a range 
of employment statuses including employment, unemployment and inactivity, distinguishing 
between female and male workers. Comparing 18 European countries from 1992-2007, the 
authors find that stƌiĐteƌ eŵploǇŵeŶt pƌoteĐtioŶ legislatioŶ has a positiǀe iŵpaĐt oŶ ŵeŶ͛s 
likelihood of being in permanent full-time employment. At the same time, strict EPL decreases 
occurrences of temporary and self-employment of men which is in line with Roman et al.͛s 
(2011) finding that stricter EPL reduces the amount of precarious jobs and quasi self-
employment that aims to reduce non-wage labour costs. Thus, Dieckhoff et al. (2015) suggest 
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that stricter EPL is beneficial to the male workforce as it increases permanent full-time 
employment, while at the same time it decreases self-employment.  
 
WoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt status, oŶ the otheƌ haŶd, does Ŷot seeŵ to ďe affeĐted so 
much by a change in EPL. Stricter EPL does slightly reduce the risk of temporary employment 
and part-time jobs for women. However, it does not seem to have any impact on regular full-
time employment – neither positively or negatively (Dieckhoff et al., 2015).  
 
 Dieckhoff et al. (2015) empirically examine the relationship between the coordination 
and the strength of unions measured in collective bargaining coverage on the one hand and 
standard employment and unemployment on the other hand. They state that both the effects 
of strong unions on gender equality depend on the level of coordination. High levels of 
collective bargaining coverage (hereafter CBC), used here to represent the strength of unions 
iŶ the ĐouŶtƌǇ, haǀe a positiǀe iŵpaĐt oŶ ďoth ŵeŶ aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt ;ϮϬϭϱ, p. ϳϬͿ. 
The authors find that collective bargaining coverage positively impacts the employment 
status for both men and women. In other words, their results show that influential unions do 
not push women out of permanent full-time employment for the sake of protecting the male 
core workforce. High collective bargaining coverage iŶĐƌeases ǁoŵeŶ͛s full-time employment 
rates and lower unemployment and part-time rates, particularly in countries with medium 
levels of coordination.  
 
Thus, Dieckhoff et al. (2015) question, for example, labour market segmentation 
theories for assuming that because women tend to be employed in clearly female-dominated 
sectors, which tend to be less well represented by unions than typical male-dominated 
occupations. However, the authors argue that occupations cannot be clearly distinguished 
between outsiders and insiders. Consequently, the labour market is not as clearly dualised, 
aŶd uŶioŶs͛ ǁoƌk ĐaŶ ďe ďeŶefiĐial to ďoth ŵeŶ aŶd ǁoŵeŶ. IŶ faĐt, ǁe fiŶd iŶsideƌs aŶd 
outsiders within same occupations, which shows that it is not occupation alone that decides 
whether someone is an outsider or insider, but quality of their employment. Hence, strong 
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unions do not necessarily cause employment loss for women or gendered dualisation since 
high levels of corporatist structures could also lead to more gender equality, as certain 
female-dominated occupations may benefit the same way from collective bargaining as male-
dominated jobs. This idea goes back to the evidence found by Blau and Kahn (1995) that 
centralized bargaining structures reduce overall income inequality, including gender pay gaps. 
 
These findings are in line with Dickens (2000), who argues that collective bargaining 
alloǁs ĐeƌtaiŶ ǁoŵeŶ to haǀe a ǀoiĐe, theƌefoƌe alloǁs ǁoŵeŶ͛s Ŷeeds to ďe ƌepƌeseŶted iŶ 
wage bargaining processes or general tri-partite dialogues and therefore improves gender 
laďouƌ ŵaƌket outĐoŵes. With Calŵfoƌs aŶd Dƌiffill͛s ;ϭϵϴϴͿ ideas oŶ the huŵp-shape 
relationship between centralisation and real wages/ unemployment in mind, this seems 
logical. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) argue that strong unions in highly centralized economies 
have a positive effect on balancing out real wages versus unemployment. In decentralized 
economies, where there are more but weaker actors involved, unions only operate at the 
individual firm or plant level and have limited power since wage negotiation is not centralized 
at a national level. Therefore, their effect on real wages or unemployment is extremely limited 
and is effectively driven by the market. In medium centralized economies, unions are 
stronger, but less cooperative and less reasonable, pushing higher wages at the expense of 
unemployment. Logically, we can assume higher levels of disputes and therefore lower level 
of coordination in these cases, assuming that strong unions and firms clash. Higher levels of 
CBC in medium centralized economies lead to less coordination, which leads to less 
reasonable actions and more unemployment due to a lack of tri-partite dialogues. Following 
the assumption of Calmfors and Drifill (1988), in highly centralized or decentralized 
economies, unions are either strong enough to negotiate reasonably and therefore avoid 
massive disputes or they are so weak at the national level that there are basically no disputes. 
Consequently, for the average male worker, more coordination and stronger unions have a 
positive impact on employment, which not only Driffill and Calmfors (1988), but also 
Dieckhoff et al. (2015) also discovered. 
The study mentioned earlier by Schäfer et al. (2012) finds supportive evidence for this 
hypothesis. TheǇ fiŶd that uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ iŶĐƌeases ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to aĐĐess high status 
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occupations. It is not only union membership and density that seem to matter, but also the 
strength of coordination and collective bargaining. 
 
However, key limitations of studies mentioned so far are that the majority of scholars, 
with the exception of Schäfer et al. (2012), examine the dynamics between labour market 
institutions and employment statuses such as employment rates, part-time employment and 
the pay gap. With Power Resource Theory and dualisation theories focusing mainly on 
workers in low-skilled low-wage occupations, they neglect the impact unions and 
employment protection legislation can have on employees in managerial occupations. Thus, 
assumptions and findings made by previous studies need to be revisited, and it must be 
examined whether these are valid for highly educated women and the gender gap in 
managerial positions.  
 
3.2 Varieties of Capitalism and occupational segregation  
 
According to the previous section, labour market outcomes are affected by how 
workers are organised in order to represent their interests and put employers under pressure. 
However, the second stream of literature highlights how gender inequalities can be the result 
of labour market institutions valuing specific skills more than general skills. The most notable 
comparative study here has been conducted by Estevez-Abe (2005) who argues that national 
skill pƌofiles aƌe the keǇ dƌiǀeƌ foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶdeƌƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs. IŶ 
her comparative work on national skill profiles and occupational segregation, Estevez-Abe 
(2005) finds that in countries relying on firm-specific skills, women are even less likely to 
become managers than in countries with rather general skill profiles. Her theoretical 
framework is based on the Varieties of Capitalism approach (VoC) by Hall and Soskice (2001), 
a cross-national typology comparing national political economies according to their labour 




These result from interconnected institutional complementarities such as labour 
relations and corporate governance, labour relations and the national training system, 
corporate governance and inter-firm relations (Hancké et al., 2007: p.5). In contrast to the 
PRT, the VoC focuses on the employers in the institutional setting of political economies. In 
other words, various labour market and welfare state institutions are not developed in 
isolation, but as a package of arrangements to support a certain skill formation and 
employment strategy (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  
 
Taking the ideas of the Human Capital Theory further, Estevez-Abe (2005, 2008) 
aƌgues that theƌe is aŶ assoĐiatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đaƌeeƌ/eŵploǇŵeŶt aŶd Đoŵpaƌatiǀe 
institutional advantages. She examines not only different levels of skills within the labour 
market, but types of skills and explores their impact on gender segregation (see Estevez-Abe, 
2005; Estevez-Abe, 2007; Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Hall and Soskice, 2001). In doing so, 
Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) identifies three different types of skills within labour markets: 
general skills, industry-specific skills and firm-specific skills. These skills crucially differ in their 
͞poƌtaďilitǇ aĐƌoss eŵploǇeƌs, the loĐus of tƌaiŶiŶg, aŶd atƌophǇ ƌate͟ ;Esteǀez-Abe, 2007, 
p.70). These observations lead to the following: because industry-specific and general skills 
are not only valuable inside the one single company, but also of use outside this firm, they 
show a high level of portability since other employers will appreciate them. In contrast to 
that, firm-specific skills are only acknowledged by and valuable for the current employer. 
Furthermore, they are mostly provided via on-the-job training and therefore usually not 
certified. For skill investment, this means that workers take on a high risk when training in 
specialised skills that can be only used for a specific firm. Therefore, if employers want 
workers to take up skill investments, they need to organise and fund the training in order to 
encourage workers to acquire specific skills. This provides justifications as to why employers 
would support stronger employment protection legislation as this also provides workers with 
protective mechanisms to maintain their job, rather than be against it. 
 
In contrast to that, general and industry-specific skills are mostly provided via off-the-
job training or school-based education taking place at schools or vocational schools. If skills 
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training is undertaken in the context of an apprenticeship, skills are made certifiable and 
acceptable in a wide range of areas (Estevez-Abe, 2007). The atrophy rate – the third 
distinctive feature – measures how far skills can become outdated and be overhauled. That 
can happen in rapidly growing sectors such as engineering or in managerial jobs. Service skills, 
on the other hand, show a low tendency of becoming obsolete. Consequently, employers 
relying on firm-specific skills are more likely to promote employment protection in order to 
bind workers to them and establish long-term working relationships and to protect skill 
investments. In CMEs with managers that value sector specific skills, unemployment benefits 
will be developed so as to protect skill investments from devaluation in times of 
unemployment. In other words, if unemployment benefits are generous, workers are not 
forced to accept a job that does not meet their level of qualification and skills. Thus, 
unemployment benefits prevent skills from being downgraded and allow workers to search 
for adequate employment. This also encourages workers to invest into sector specific skills in 
the first place as these do not narrow down potential employment opportunities, and are 
more likely to pay off. 
 
In liberal economies with a focus on general skills, however, employers would not be 
interested in limiting labour market flexibility, as there is no need for skill protection via social 
protection. In other words, whereas LMEs foster general skills with high levels of portability, 
low atrophy rates and on-the-job training, the high level of portability and atrophy increase 
the flexibility of workers on the labour market and work as an insurance against 
unemployment in case of recession since general skills are not limited to one industrial sector. 
CMEs, with their high levels of EPL and the incentive to protect core workers and their skills, 
have developed specific skill profiles on a high level with incremental rather than radical 
innovations at the expense of flexibility and mobility.  
 
These three features – the atrophy rate, the portability across employers and the locus 
of training – have a different impact on women and men (Estevez-Abe, 2005). Firstly, women 
are more likely to invest in general skills due to their higher portability. Estevez-Abe (2005) 
argues that women take the risk of potential career interruptions due to family 
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responsibilities- i.e., childbirth and child rearing, and thus are less likely to invest in firm-
specific skills, tending to invest in sector or general skills that allow them to find a job more 
easily after returning from a break. Even if women would like to invest in firm-specific skills, 
due to the discriminatory view of employers, women may not be able to access such skills 
training.  Apprenticeship-based vocational education seems to be particularly problematic for 
women, which explains why we find a high share of men in apprenticeship-based occupations 
(Estevez-Abe, 2005). The reason for this is because employers tend to hire men over women, 
seeing the apprenticeship as a long-term investment and aiming to make this investment pay 
off as much as possible, and women are perceived as more likely to leave (albeit temporarily).  
 
Secondly, in countries with a long tradition of specific skill profiles, strong employment 
protection aims to value the accumulation of human capital more than liberal market 
economies with their general skill profiles. Due to career interruptions, this emphasis on 
human capital accumulation makes the gap between men and women even more 
detrimental, and leads to an underrepresentation of women in senior, managerial positions.  
 
Thirdly, strong employment protection can make hiring and firing of workers more 
costly and less flexible. Thus, faced with higher costs, employers prefer men to women as the 
latter impose a higher risk of career interruptions. If a country introduces generous family 
policies – ͚loŶg leaǀes͛ - in addition to employment protection, the risk for employers is even 
higher when hiring a woman because of the increased likelihood of longer breaks. Therefore, 
Estevez-Abe (2005) argues, not only does strong employment protection lead to more 
discrimination against women and an increase of vertical segregation, but it also causes 
women to leave the private sector and join the public sector as an alternative. Public sector 
eŵploǇŵeŶt is desĐƌiďed as ŵoƌe ͞shelteƌed͟, iŶ that it pƌoteĐts ǁoŵeŶ aŶd disadǀaŶtaged 
groups from exploitation (see Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1994). Historically, the 
governments understand the public sector as serving as an example of employment 
conditions for the private sector, with regard to wages and representation of disadvantaged 
groups such as ethnic minorities and women (Llorens, 2007; Goldfarb and Heywood 1982; 
Krislov 1967; Miller 1996; Mosher, 1982). Consequently, women are highly overrepresented 
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in the public sector. This then results into occupational gender segregation between the 
private and public sector, causing the private sector to become even more male-dominated 
over time.  
 
To sum up, according to Estevez-Abe (2005), EPL and skill investments are institutional 
complementarities. Employers in coordinated economies have higher incentives to hire 
skilled workers due to stricter EPL because EPL encourages both employers and employees to 
build up long-term employment relationships with high job security that pays off in a highly 
specialised skilled workforce. However, because women face different risks and living 
situations than men, they are more likely to interrupt their careers. Although it could be 
assumed that high EPL works as a shelter for women interrupting their career for childbearing 
and rearing, Estevez-Aďe ;ϮϬϬϱͿ fiŶds that EPL ĐaŶ aĐtuallǇ haƌŵ ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt 
situatioŶs. “he aƌgues that high eŵploǇŵeŶt pƌoteĐtioŶ ͞is iŶsuffiĐieŶt to safeguaƌd ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
investments iŶ speĐifiĐ skills͟ ;ϮϬϬϱ, p.ϭϵϮͿ. While stƌoŶg eŵploǇŵeŶt pƌoteĐtioŶs oŶ the oŶe 
hand minimize the risk for workers to invest in specific skills, the same policies foster the 
discrimination of women on the other hand, because women face different risks than men 
such as pregnancy and child-rearing responsibilities; they are more likely to interrupt their 
employment relationship. Even if the employer does not have to account for paid leave, they 
haǀe to deal ǁith the ͚͞teŵpoƌaƌǇ ŵaŶpoǁeƌ slaĐk͛ Đaused ďǇ ǁorkers taking leave. 
Moreover, when absences are long - a year or longer - employers also need to manage the 
sŵooth ƌeiŶtegƌatioŶ of ǁoƌkeƌs ǁheŶ theǇ ƌetuƌŶ͟ ;Esteǀez-Abe, 2006: 152).  In other words, 
employers are more likely to hire men because the risk of losing the investment in training is 
lower as men are not expected to quit (Estevez-Abe, 2007) and costs due to high EPL are less 
imposing. For men in CMEs, EPL and specific skills are institutional complementarities to help 
build up a long-term work relationship between employers and employees and to protect 
theiƌ skill iŶǀestŵeŶts. ͞Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁheƌeas stƌoŶg eŵploǇŵeŶt pƌoteĐtioŶ faĐilitates ŵale 
investments in specific human capital, it exacerbates employer discrimination against 
ǁoŵeŶ͟ ;MaŶdel aŶd “halev, 2009, p. 165; Estevez-Abe, 2005). In CMEs, employers cannot 
lay-off new mothers; in addition they also find it harder to replace them temporarily due to 
the specificity of the skills and the strict EPL. Consequently, in countries with specific skill 
profiles, social protection such as EPL and family policies can lead to an increase of employer 
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discrimination against women (Mandel and Shalev, 2009, p. 166). Estevez-Abe (2005) 
supports this claim by arguing that the underrepresentation of women in managerial 
positions is linked to strict EPL and skill specificity that does not only discourage women from 
investing in human capital but also discourages employers from hiring women who are 
perceived to be more likely to interrupt their career, thus skill investments in women are 
more risky. 
 
Despite this argument of EPL being problematic for women, Dieckhoff et al. (2015) 
fiŶd Ŷo eŵpiƌiĐallǇ sigŶifiĐaŶt iŵpaĐt of EPL oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt. EǆaŵiŶiŶg the 
relationship between the coordination and the strength of unions measured in collective 
bargaining coverage on the one hand and standard employment and unemployment on the 
other hand, they find no evidence to support Estevez-Aďe͛s aƌguŵeŶts.  While ŵeŶ ĐleaƌlǇ 
benefit from strong employment protection, women do not, since the impact of stricter EPL 
on female employment is either marginal or not significant at all. In contrast to that stands 
Esping-AŶdeƌseŶ͛s ;ϭϵϵϵͿ aƌguŵeŶt that high EPL shelteƌs those ǁho aƌe iŶ eŵploǇŵeŶt aŶd 
therefore strengthens the position of insiders. Esping-Andersen argues that women and 
young people, being outsiders, are therefore the victims of strong EPL rigidities, and the 
association between female unemployment and EPL is statistically significantly positive 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 137). These findings challenge labour market segmentation 
theories that deem women to be the outsiders due to their discontinuous careers and the 
resulting job discrimination. On the other hand, the findings also disagree with the 
assumption that protective institutions help women to stay in their jobs and have careers. 
Linking industrial relations with gender labour market inequality via strong EPL and 
consequently higher labour (turnover) costs does not seem to be significant as there seems 
to be more involved in the process of discrimination of employers against women here.  
 




In summary, scholars have found evidence for both theories – the importance of 
stƌoŶg uŶioŶs aŶd ĐolleĐtiǀe ďaƌgaiŶiŶg oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt aŶd the impact of skill 
profiles and EPL on gender inequalities. With regard to the main research question of this 
thesis – the impact of family policies and labour market institutions on vertical segregation – 
however, we face several problems and limitations when examining these studies: First of all, 
the majority of studies choose employment rates, unemployment or part-time occurrence as 
the dependent variable. Some studies examine the gender pay gap. But only few studies such 
as by Schäfer et al. (2012) and Estevez-Abe (2006) examine how labour market institutions 
affeĐt ǁoŵeŶ͛s positioŶ iŶ the oĐĐupatioŶal hieƌaƌĐhǇ ďǇ, foƌ eǆaŵple, aŶalǇsiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
underrepresentation in managerial positions. What is more, among these few studies on 
vertical segregation, but even when examining other gender labour market inequalities, the 
empirical findings are rather mixed: First of all, scholars have been applying mainly 
aggregated data focusing on macro-level data only. In addition to that, the dynamics of 
institutions that are all interrelated and nested within each other has methodologically not 
been taken into account. Additionally, the key study undertaken by Estevez-Abe (2005) shows 
several limitations. Data used, especially on the share of vocational training and education to 
measure skill profiles, is outdated, and vertical segregation as measured by women in 
managerial positions seems rigid and neglects to include women in high-status professional 
occupations. Defining the share of female managers at the macro-level thus does not only 
neglect potential composition effects, but also narrows down the sample without justifying 
this. Following Estevez-Aďe͛s keǇ aƌguŵeŶt of skill pƌofiles, ǁe also Ŷeed to iŶĐlude ǁoŵeŶ 
in highly professionalised jobs that require the accumulation of human capital, and thus 
investment in skills. Furthermore, not only employment protection serves as a tool to protect 
skills investments, but also the generosity of unemployment protection (Estevez-Abe et al., 
2001). What is needed is a holistic approach capturing the impact of unemployment and 
employment protection on highly professionalised women holding continuing public sector 
employment. Consequently, the following research question needs to be examined:  
 
Research Question 3: What else, otheƌ thaŶ faŵilǇ poliĐies affeĐt ǁoŵeŶ’s likelihood to 




More specifically, we need to understand how exactly institutional complementarities 
impact highly educated women. We know from the literature that in countries with 
representative unions *as measured by high union density) men seem to be more likely to 
reach top positions than in countries with fragmented unions. While some scholars argue that 
women are overrepresented among outsiders and crowded out by strong unions that only 
represent men (Schwander and Häusermann, 2010), others (Dieckhoff et al., 2015) argue that 
unions are beneficial for female and male workers as they reduce overall inequalities in the 
labour market. Because this thesis particularly focuses on highly educated individuals and the 
gender gap in managerial positions, it could be assumed that labour market dualisation is not 
a key concern for the highly educated workforce. However, as argued by Häusermann and 
Kurer (201ϰͿ it is paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ǁoŵeŶ that foƌŵ the gƌoup of ͞high-skilled outsideƌs͟ aŶd 
therefore a lack of union representation can be expected to be detrimental for highly 
educated women as well as for women in low skilled jobs. Thus, the following hypothesis is:  
 
Hypothesis H3.1 Strong unions and wider collective bargaining coverage is associated 
with a smaller gender gap. 
  
Strong unions representing only the core workforce seem to have a detrimental 
impact on the outsider workforce by further increasing labour market inequalities. If unions 
are strong – as indicated by collective bargaining coverage – but do not represent the overall 
workforce, we can expect the gender gap to be higher. Therefore, the next hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis H3.2 The gender gap is expected to be higher in countries where unions are 
strong but only represent a small share of the workforce. High union density combined 
with lower collective bargaining coverage is associated with a wider gender gap, 




Moving onto the second part of the literature presented, which is focusing on the 
impact of skill specificity and social protection on occupational segregation, we need to 
examine how labour market institutions affect human capital and how this influences both 
eŵploǇeƌs͛ aŶd eŵploǇees͛ deĐisioŶs. Heƌe, the keǇ theoƌǇ is ĐeŶtƌed aƌouŶd skill 
accumulation and the protection of skills. As argued by Estevez-Abe (2005, 2007), we can 
assume that countries with specific skill profiles value firm-specific skills. Fƌoŵ aŶ eŵploǇee͛s 
perspective, the investment in specific skills is risky if career interruptions are likely. This is 
because specific skills change rapidly and do not allow for long career interruptions. Secondly, 
the training of skills is gender-biased as argued by Estevez-Abe (2005) and discourages 
women from taking specific skills up. Lastly, the portability of firm-specific skills is low 
between employers and thus opposes the risk of unemployment. Because women are more 
likely to interrupt their career for example for caring responsibilities or childbirth, Estevez-
Abe (2005) assumes women choose occupations that allow them to opt out and come back 
easilǇ. What is ŵoƌe, fƌoŵ aŶ eŵploǇeƌ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe, the iŶǀestŵeŶt iŶ fiƌŵ-specific skills 
only pays off if employment relationships are long and the employee can be tied to the 
company. Thus, in countries with specific skill profiles, employers might prefer a male 
employee over a female employee who poses a risk of career interruptions or might not 
return at all after childbirth. Thus, we need to test the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis H3.3: A focus on firm specific skill is associated with a wider gender gap. 
What is more, skill investments and social protection such as employment protection 
legislation can be seen as institutional complementarities. Employment protection aims to 
reduce the risk of employees to invest into their skills. Thus, employment protection makes 
it harder for the employer to lay off workers, which is why employers prefer hiring men in the 
first place due to the higher risk of career interruptions of female workers. Women are 
disadvantaged as they are less likely to be hired, and less likely to accumulate experience and 





Hypothesis H3.4: Strict employment protection legislation or specific skill profiles are 
associated with a wider gender gap in managerial positions. 
 
Unemployment benefit generosity and skill profiles can also be seen as institutional 
complementarities. Unemployment protection serves as a tool to protect the value of skills 
in the case of unemployment. In countries with sector specific skills that require specialisation 
but are portable within a sector, generous unemployment benefits allow workers to look for 
a new job matching their skills and qualifications. Thus, generous unemployment protection 
encourages workers to invest in occupational skills that are easily transferable, but more 
specific than general skills.  
Generous unemployment benefits however – as a second indicator for social 
protection – lower the risk of investments in specific skills and encourage employees to invest 
in more portable sector specific skills. We can therefore expect that in countries with 
generous unemployment benefits, women are more likely to invest in sector specific skills, 
ǁhiĐh ǁill theŶ iŶĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood of oďtaiŶiŶg top positioŶs. Thus, the final 
hypothesis is:  





Chapter 4: Data and Methodology  
 
As summarized in the previous Chapters, studies have shown how family policies and 
labour market institutions impact cross-national variation of gender inequalities in the labour 
market. However, there are several shortcomings in previous approaches: first of all, scholars 
so far have largely neglected the importance of vertical segregation, and mainly focused on 
employment patterns, the occurrence of part-time work, unemployment and the gender pay 
gap. However, vertical segregation and the gender gap among managerial and powerful 
position is the key driver for pay differentials. Thus, we need a comparative study examining 
the impact of family policies and labour market institutions on the gender gap in managerial 
positions. Secondly, the majority of studies use aggregate macro-level data only, which is 
potentially problematic due to three reasons. Using aggregate data, we cannot control for 
individual-level characteristics that can have a large impact on ǁoŵeŶ͛s and ŵeŶ͛s access to 
top positions. Secondly, the definition for top positions is rigid, and using for example simply 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s share among managerial positioŶ͛s does not allow specifying those occupations that 
need to be excluded or included such as for example highly professional positions. Thirdly, 
the majority of studies use either highly aggregate typologies or only few variables. This thesis 
however examines family policies separately.  
 
Consequently, from a methodological perspective, this thesis aims to investigate the 
impact of family policies and labour market institutions on the gender gap in top positions. 
Here, top positions are defined as managerial and highly professional positions measured at 
the individual-level, which allows the author to control for other individual-level and job 
characteristics. Independent variables are measured at the macro-level by using both 
summative indices and single variables for family policies and labour market institutions. 
Because both individual and macro-level variables are used, this thesis therefore suggests 
using multilevel modelling (see Hox, 2002).   
 
Thus, this thesis examines three main aspects: the cross-national variation of ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
share in top positions relative to ŵeŶ͛s – in other words, the gender gap in top positions; the 
 85 
 
association between family policies and women in top positions; and thirdly, the relationship 
between labour market institutions and women in managerial positions. Thus, the key 
dependent variable used in this thesis is ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood of reaching top positions relative 
to ŵeŶ͛s, which is operationalised by being in a managerial/ professional occupation. The 
year and sample of the analysis are European countries in the year 2010. Thus, the overall 
research strategy is to analyse the quantitative relationship between national level variables 
and individual labour market positioŶ͛s using multilevel analysis (see Hox, 2002). Here, 25 
variables for family policies are included – measuring individual policies and composite 
indices, and 8 variables measuring labour market institutions – again both measuring single 
policy area and composite indices. These serve as independent variables and are described 
as context-level variables throughout the thesis.  
 
The method of analysis is multilevel modelling (MLM), as for various reasons this thesis 
investigates whether context and national policies matter when examining variation between 
individuals in reaching top positions. In general, MLM examines ͞ƌelatioŶs between variables 
measured at different levels of the multilevel data stƌuĐtuƌe͟ (Hox, 2002, p. viii). Multilevel 
analysis enables us to examine data that is ͞Ŷested͟ within each other, and therefore violates 
the independence assumption statistical analyses such as ANOVA and ordinary least-squares 
(OLS) require (Peugh, 2010, p. 86). In this thesis with countries being the level-2 variable and 
individuals being our level-1, we find variation in the relative position of women between 
countries. This justifies the multilevel modelling approach (for a detailed discussion see 
Chapter 6).  
 
Regarding the independent variables, this thesis follows a more holistic approach than 
previous papers and therefore includes both summative indices and single variables, 
particularly in order to answer the second research question on how family policies affect 
vertical segregation. In contrast to scholars such as Mandel and Semyonov (2006) and Korpi 
et al. (2013), this thesis uses a wide range of family policies. This is because as discussed in 
the literature review in Chapter 3, family policy typologies heavily rely on the assumption that 
countries within the same group follow similar patterns. Using typologies does not allow us 
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to distinguish between the impacts of single policies. Furthermore, empirical findings are 
controversial and while some scholars find that certain family policies affect occupational 
segregation negatively, others question this paradox. Thus, grouping policies together is 
problematic, as one element of the index might have a reverse effect compared to another 
policy. The wide range of policy indicators also allows us to disaggregate typologies in order 
to identify specific drivers and to check the validity of these typologies when compared with 
single indicators.  
 
With regards to the third research question – the impact on labour market institutions 
on the gender gap in top positions, this thesis uses both single variables and indices. Based 
on the literature presented in Chapter 3, this thesis includes measures for union strength and 
representation, but also for employment and unemployment protection and skill specificity. 
Following Estevez-Abe et al. (2001), the models for example include three indices measuring 
skills and social protection, namely employment protection legislation, unemployment 
benefit generosity and intensity of vocational training and education. In addition to this, the 
models also include four indicators measuring institutional labour market characteristics, 
namely union density, ǁoŵeŶ͛s union membership and density, and collective bargaining 
coverage. This approach again is supposed to clearly distinguish the impact of single variables 
on ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to reach top positions, but also to test two different theoretical 
approaches in understanding labour market institutions against each other – corporatist and 
Gendered VoC.  
 
The analysis of the dependent variable, but also of the relationship between the family 
policy and labour market indicators, is done through a two-level regression model taking into 
account the nested data structure of individuals embedded in countries (Hox, 2002). In other 
words, first of all this thesis examines the dependent variable – the gender gap in top 
positions, across 28 European countries using individual-level data and controlling for 
numerous individual and job-level characteristics. This first part of the analysis is conducted 
using random intercept and random slope models, in order to understand how first of all 
iŶdiǀidual͛s access to top positions varies across countries, taking into account control 
 87 
 
variables. Furthermore, assessing whether or not gender has a statistically significant impact 
on an iŶdiǀidual͛s chance to obtain a top position. Then, random slope models are introduced 
in order to see whether gender gap – ǁoŵeŶ͛s access to top positions relative to ŵeŶ͛s, varies 
between countries. In other words, random slope models allow us not only to see how much 
iŶdiǀiduals͛ access to top positions varies across countries, but more importantly how 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s access, relative to ŵeŶ͛s, varies across countries with gender being the key 
dependent variable in the models. Basically, while random intercept models show us whether 
across 28 countries gender has a positive or negative impact on access to managerial 
positions, random slope models allow us to see whether the impact of gender varies across 
countries, or whether women are equally advantaged or disadvantaged in every country 
having controlled for individual-level variables. While the cross-national variation of ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
share in top-positions is discussed comparing random intercept and random slope models, 
the latter models focus on the cross-national variance in ǁoŵeŶ͛s relative position.  
 
In a second step, the analysis adds cross-level interaction terms to the random slope 
models, aiming to explain why the gender gap varies between countries. Here, the 
explanatory cross-level interaction terms stem from the national and thus the context level. 
All context level variables are discussed in Chapter 2 and include a range of family policies and 
labour market institutions. Because data on the explanatory context-level variables is not 
available for every country, the number of countries in the analysis varies. Thus, for each 
random slope model with cross-level interaction terms, the empty model and random 
intercept models are rerun for the purpose of comparison. This is because the overall aim of 
the analysis is to examine whether family policies or labour market institutions can help 
explain not why iŶdiǀiduals͛ access to top positions varies across countries, but why the 
gender gap varies. In other words, can family policies and labour market institutions help us 
to understand why women are underrepresented more in some countries than in others?  
Before running the analysis, the following Chapter introduces both the data and the 
method used in greater detail. Section 3.1. starts with the description of the data, its size and 
sample by clarifying the countries and year covered for both the dependent and independent 
variables. Section 3.2. outlines the dependent variable – that is, the measurement of ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
chances to reach top positions and thus the dependent variable, while seĐtioŶ͛s 3.3. and 3.4. 
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focus on national context variables, namely family policies, as well as the indicators for labour 
market institutions and control variables covered. Lastly, section 3.5. explains multilevel 
modelling chosen for the analyses of the project, and presents the specific models and 
research design. 
 
4.1 Data sources – an overview  
 
The following Chapter provides information about the data used for this thesis, and 
summarises key decisions made regarding the samples used in the analysis – namely what 
countries and years to include in the analysis.  
 
4.1.1 Individual-level data  
 
Due to the multilevel approach of this thesis, several datasets are used for the analysis. 
For the dependent variable – the gender gap in top positions, the fifth wave of the European 
Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) is applied. The EWCS is a survey carried out by Eurofound 
every five years, interviewing both employees and self-employed people on their working and 
employment conditions.  This fifth wave includes data from 44,000 workers from 34 European 
countries. The interviews were collected in 2010 and besides EU27 countries also Norway, 
Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Albania, Montenegro and 
Kosovo are included. During this time, about 216 million people were employed in EU27 
countries, which serves as the main reference area of the survey. Thus, figures from the EWCS 
are based on a representative sample of European workers, but not on the whole population 
and serve as estimates (Eurofound, 2012). Before explaining the reasons for selecting the 





As a key contribution, the dependent variable is not only limited to vertical 
segregation and individual-level data, but in this thesis, the sample is also limited to 
individuals with tertiary education only. The importance of class when examining the 
structure of gender inequalities in the labour market, but also when examining the 
association mainly between family policies and occupational segregation, has been 
overlooked in previous studies, as discussed in Chapter 3.2 and pointed out by Korpi et al. 
(2013). The authors argue that ͞ǁhile major negative family policy effects for women with 
tertiary education are difficult to find in countries with well-developed policies supporting 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s employment and work-family reconciliation, family policies clearly differ in the 
extent to which they improve opportunities for women without university eduĐatioŶ͟ (p.1). 
They state that we need to look at women without a university degree differently since the 
female employment rate is lower for them then for well-educated women. This is due to 
different family policies impacting higher-paid female professionals differently than lower-
earning women.  
 
From a methodological point of view, narrowing down the sample to only tertiary-
educated individuals allows us to avoid potential dilution effects, by researching the 
possibility that a decline in top-positions for women is due to the overall increase of the 
female workforce – especially in the less lucrative jobs. By doing so, we exclude the possibility 
that ǁoŵeŶ͛s career perspectives have only decreased because the overall size of the female 
workforce has increased, and thus reduced the share of women in top position that have 
already been part of the workforce before. While the number of highly educated women in 
the labour market stayed constant, more women with lower levels of education have joined 
the labour market. However, highly educated women are still more likely to be working. Thus, 
both groups reacted differently to external factors and need to be examined separately. This 
also becomes clear when comparing the share of highly educated women among managers/ 





4.1.2 Family Policy data  
 
Data on family policies stems largely from the Multilinks project and its online 
database for social policy indicators. While for the purpose of this thesis only family policy 
indicators are of interest, the overall aim of Multilinks is to examine how social context affects 
social integration, well-being and intergenerational solidarity in Europe. Multilinks collects 
data on 30 European countries between the years of 2004 and 2009, and indicators range 
from childcare, education, family benefits, pensions, long-term care and legal obligations to 
support (Keck and Saraceno, 2012). Data for the family policy typology developed by 
Lohmann and Zagel (2015) also stems from the Multilinks database.  
 
In addition to the Multilinks database, this thesis also uses data on family policies from 
Eurostat, more specifically from the EU-SILC project. EU-SILC was launched in 2003, and data 
first was only collected for 12 EU-15 member states: Estonia, Norway and Iceland. From 2005 
onwards, all EU-25 member states including Norway and Iceland participated in the EU-SILC 
survey. In 2006, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Switzerland joined and Croatia in 2010.  EU-
SILC is based on a sample of the population and minimum effective sample sizes are defined. 
While for EU15 member states, the sample size for cross-sectional data needs to cover 
156,000 individuals living in 80,000 private households (3250 for Luxembourg and 8250 for 
Denmark). For the 10 countries that joined in 2004, the minimum effective sample size is 
95,000 individuals living in 41,000 private household's. Data is collected via the telephone, 
face-to-face interviews, computer- or paper-assisted personal interviews and other methods 
(Eurostat, 2015). Data stems from 2009 in order to take a lag effect into account.  
 
Lastly, family policy indicators also stem from the OECD Family Database. This 
particular database consists of data from national and international databases within the 
OECD and external organisations. It covers 70 indicators ranging from data on the structure 
of families, labour market position of families, public policies for families and children, and 
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child outcomes. Data for 2009 is available for up to 35 countries from the EU and/or OECD 
including 22 European states.  
 
4.1.3 Labour market institutions data  
 
With regards to indicators for labour market institutions, data stems from four 
different comparative databases. One is the Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade 
Unions- Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts ICTWSS. It was collected in 34 
countries between 1960 and 2012 and covers all EU and OECD members (Visser, 2016). Data 
stems from various national sources and comparative studies such as Pochet and Fajertag 
(2000) and Pochet, Keune and Natali (2010). As well as the Industrial Relations in Europe 
reports of the European Commission (2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012) and 
publications of the European Social and Economic Committee, the European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, and the European Industrial Relations 
Observatory (EIRO).  
 
Data also stems from the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset, which provides 
macro-level data on institutional features of social insurance programs in 33 countries.  
Another comparative database used is the UNESCO Institute for Statistics data. This database 
covers up to 157 countries and data stems from international sources such as organisations 
like the OECD and Eurostat, and national sources. 
 
Lastly, the OECD database for employment indicators is used as a source, which like 
the Family Database includes data for 35 OECD member states including a large amount of 
European countries. Employment indicators stem from international and national 





4.2. Measuring top occupations – data and sample 
 
As argued in Chapters 2 and 3, previous studies linking gender labour market 
inequalities with family policies and labour market institutions, have focused firstly on 
aggregate data on the macro-level indicators, such as employment rates, and secondly on 
women of all educational backgrounds. In contrast to employment rates, vertical segregation 
cannot be explained by prevailing welfare regime typologies, and has been widely neglected 
by labour market researchers for the sake of the pay gap. Vertical segregation in this paper is 
examined by comparing ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to be in managerial and senior professional 
occupations relative to ŵeŶ͛s.  
 
By using this different definition of vertical segregation based on individual-level data 
and individuals with tertiary education only, this thesis therefore takes a different 
methodological approach than previous studies. The following section summarises how 
vertical segregation is measured. Then, the rationale behind using individual-level data over 
aggregate macro-level data is explained in greater detail in section 4.2. For clarification, this 
thesis expands the regular definition of managerial positions by adding senior professional 
occupations. Whilst the rationale for this will be explained below, for the reader, the 
occupations included are mentioned at this point.  
 
Managerial occupations include: 
➢ Chief Executives, Senior Officials and Legislators;  
➢ Administrative and Commercial Managers;  
➢ Sales, Marketing and Development Managers;  
➢ Hospitality, Retail and Other Services Managers 
 




➢ Science and Engineering Professionals;  
➢ Health Professionals (excluding Nursing and Midwifery Professionals and 
others health professionals);  
➢ Teaching Professionals (only including Higher Education Teachers);  
➢ Business and Administration Professionals;  
➢ Legal, Social and Cultural Professionals 
 
Examining vertical occupational inequalities, two issues need to be addressed: firstly, 
the use of either macro- or individual-level data and secondly, observing the distribution of 
women across occupational levels or more specifically ǁoŵeŶ͛s access to top positions in the 
labour market relative to ŵeŶ͛s. This dissertation examines the latter – ǁoŵeŶ͛s access to 
high-status occupations (see Schaefer et al., 2011), often referred to as the glass ceiling (see 
for example Baxter and Wright, 2000; Fernandez, 1998; Cotter et al. 2001) using individual-
level data.  
 
Using individual-level data also allows the researcher to distinguish between 
occupational levels. This is particularly useful as this thesis does not aim to answer what 
makes women choose one occupational level over the other, but rather what hinders women 
from reaching top positions compared to the chances for men. This is of crucial interest, as 
top positions do not only represent status, but also power and earnings. When referring to 
women in top positions, this thesis applies the concept of the ͞glass ĐeiliŶg͟; as described by 
Cotter et al. (2001), this term refers to gendered differences in terms of levels of authority 
and positions in the corporate hierarchy.  
 
From the European Working Conditions Survey 2010, the dependent variable derived 
from the variable measuring ƌespoŶdeŶts͛ is occupation levels. This variable follows the 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). ISCO-08 is preferred over the older definition ISCO-88 because ISCO-08 
distinguishes general managers and corporate managers in greater details by dividing them 
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into 12 administrative and commercial managers; 13 Production and Specialised Services 
Managers; 14 Hospitality, Retail and Other Services Managers. Secondly, supervisory 
occupations are now classified following the nature of work more closely, in order to highlight 
potential differences between work done by supervisors on the one hand and supervised 
workers on the other hand (ILO, 2012). According to ISCO-08, jobs across different 
establishments, industries and countries are hereby grouped according to the nature of the 
work in a comparable framework. At it͛s most aggregated level, ISCO-08 distinguished 
between:  
Table 4.1 ISCO-08 major groups  
ISCO-08 at the most aggregate level 
1. Managers 
2. Professionals 
3. Technicians and Associate Professionals 
4. Clerical Support Workers 
5. Services and Sales Workers 
6. Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Workers 
7. Craft and Related Trades Workers 
8. Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers 
9. Elementary Occupations 
1. Armed Forces Occupations 
Source: ILO, 2012 
 
As highlighted previously, this thesis aims to investigate the gender gap in top 
positions, or in other words ǁoŵeŶ͛s relative likelihood to reach top positions compared to 
ŵeŶ͛s. In order to capture hierarchies between the occupational groups, we need to look 
closely at the composition of the so-called 1-digit ISCO groups and focus here mainly on the 
first two groups – managers and professionals, as they include the jobs requiring the highest 
skill and therefore qualification levels (ILO, 2012). Managers at 3-digit disaggregated level 




Table 4.2 ISCO 3-digit disaggregation of major group managers 
ISCO-08 code and title 
11 Chief Executives, Senior Officials and Legislators 
111 Legislators and Senior Officials 
112 Managing Directors and Chief Executives 
12 Administrative and Commercial Managers  
121  Business Services and Administration Managers 
122  Sales, Marketing and Development Managers 
13 Production and Specialised Service Managers 
131 Production Managers in Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
132 Manufacturing, Mining, Construction and Distribution Managers 
133 Information and Communications Technology Services Managers 
134 Professional Services Managers 
14 Hospitality, Retail and Other Services Managers 
141 Hotel and Restaurant Managers 
141 Other Services Managers
 
 
As mentioned earlier, ISCO-08 in contrast to ISCO-88 focuses more on the nature of 
work in order to highlight potential differences between work done by supervisors on the one 
hand, and supervised workers on the other hand (ILO, 2012). Therefore, employees with 
supervisory duties that distinguish them clearly are included in the major group with 
managers in the following areas: Manufacturing, construction, mining, retail, cleaning and 
housekeeping, farming and administration. However, for the purpose of this thesis, which to 
some extent follows the Human Capital argument, not simply managerial positions seem 
relevant, but rather employment relations and conditions. Thus, both immediate rewards in 
terms of the salary and long-term or prospective benefits such as career opportunities are 
relevant. A useful tool in order to distinguish occupations within the same ISCO-08 group is 
the European Socio-economic Classification (ESeC) that divides occupations into classes. Class 
1, called ͞higheƌ salaƌiat͟, captures large employers, higher-grade professionals, as well as 
administrative and managerial occupations. Contracts are distinguished according to extent 
eŵploǇees͛ work may be monitored and controlled, and how specific skills and knowledge of 
technical and organisational tasks are to the employer. Applying this concept to the ISCO-08 
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managerial occupations only and therefore leaving out ͞PƌoduĐtioŶ and Specialised Service 
MaŶageƌs͟, leaves us with the following occupations that we can identify as class 1:  
 
Table 4.3 Definition of dependent variable ͞MaŶageƌial oĐĐupatioŶs͟ based on ISCO and 
ESeC  
ISCO-08 code and title ISCO-08 code and title 
11 Chief Executives, Senior Officials and Legislators 
111 Legislators and Senior Officials 
1111 Legislators 1113 Traditional Chiefs and Heads of Villages 
1112 Senior Government Officials 1114 Senior Officials of Special-interest 
Organisations 
112 Managing Directors and Chief Executives 
1120 Managing Directors and 
Chief Executives
  
12 Administrative and Commercial Managers 
121  Business Services and Administration Managers 
1211 Finance Managers 1212 Policy and Planning Managers 
1213 Human Resource Managers 1219 Business Services and 
Administration Managers 
122 Sales, Marketing and Development Managers 
1221 Sales and Marketing 
Managers 
1222 Advertising and Public Relations 
Managers 
1223 Research and Development 
Managers 
  
14 Hospitality, Retail and Other Services Managers 
141 Hotel and Restaurant Managers 
1411 Hotel Managers 1412 Restaurant Managers 
142 Retail and Wholesale Trade Managers 
1420 Retail and Wholesale 
Trade Managers
  
141 Other Services Managers 
1431 Sports, Recreation and 
Cultural Centre Managers
1439 Services Managers 
Not Elsewhere Classified
 
However, for three reasons, this thesis also includes senior professional occupations 
in its dependent variable. Firstly, according to ESeC, not only managerial occupations fulfil the 
criteria of the higher salariat, but also certain senior professional occupations, such as lawyers 
or university teachers. Secondly, from a rather technical point of view, there is an already an 
existing overlap between the main gƌoup͛s managers and professionals, as it is sometimes 
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hard to decide whether specific skills are required at the legislative, administrative or 
managerial level, or whether skills need to be directly applied. This leads to problems in the 
ISCO, but also illustrates the second reason for including both major groups. This paper aims 
to examine whether generous family policies hinder women from reaching the top. The 
hypothesis here is that firstly, in generous welfare states, employers are more reluctant to 
hire women due to the potential of career interruptions and the loss of investment.  However 
secondly, women in countries with less generous family policies are more reluctant to 
accumulate specific skills that would qualify them for top positions, if work-family 
reconciliation policies are not available. Thus, not only hierarchies in terms of power are 
important, but also the level of qualification needed for a specific occupation. Consequently, 
this thesis includes both managers and senior professionals as to a large extent the latter 
requires skills at the top ISCO skill level. The following occupations are captured by main group 





Table 4.4 ISCO 3-digit disaggregation of major group professionals  
ISCO-08 code and title 
code 
21 Science and Engineering Professionals 
211 Physical and Earth Science Professionals 
212 Mathematicians, Actuaries and Statisticians 
213 Life Science Professionals 
214 Engineering Professionals (excluding Electrotechnology) 
215 Electrotechnology Engineers 
216 Architects, Planners, Surveyors and Designers 
22 Health Professionals 
221 Medical Doctors 
222 Nursing and Midwifery Professionals 
223 Traditional and Complementary Medicine Professionals 
224 Paramedical Practitioners 
225 Veterinarians 
226 Other Health Professionals 
23 Teaching Professionals 
231 University and Higher Education Teachers 
232 Vocational Education Teachers 
233 Secondary Education Teachers 
234 Primary School and Early Childhood Teachers 
235 Other Teaching Professionals 
24 Business and Administration Professionals 
241 Finance Professionals 
242 Administration Professionals 
243 Sales, Marketing and Public Relations Professionals 
25 Information and Communications Technology Professionals 
251 Software and Applications Developers and Analysts 
252 Database and Network Professionals 
26 Legal, Social and Cultural Professionals 
261 Legal Professionals 
262 Librarians, Archivists and Curators  
263 Social and Religious Professionals 
264 Authors, Journalists and Linguists 
265 Creative and Performing Artists 
 
Based on ESeC, but also on the classification if ISCO-08 itself, we cannot consider all 
occupations in this category as a top position. According to the ILO, one of the achievements 
of ISCO-08 compared to ISCO-88, is to also acknowledge the nature of the work and not only 
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qualification levels. While this makes sense from an empirical perspective, it is problematic in 
order to test the skill investment and recruitment argument. Since we are interested in 
whether family policies create barriers, as employers might be more reluctant to hire and 
train women for highly skilled jobs due to expected career interruptions, the nature of work 
matters, but more than this, the level of skills required also matters. The ILO (2007) highlights 
that for two sub-groups in the main group, professional occupations with the same nature of 
work, but different skill levels, are classified as professionals – that is teachers and health 
professionals. However, since for example qualifications for primary teachers clearly differ 
from those for university teachers, or between professionals and associate professional 
nurses and midwives, it was decided to not include nursing and midwifery professionals and 
teaching professionals with the exception of university and higher education teachers from 
the dependent variable. Thus, primary, secondary and vocational education teachers are not 
included. This also corresponds with the ESeC recommendations (see also Rose and Harrison, 
2007). In addition to this, ESeC also excludes librarians, archivists and curators; social work 
and counselling and religious professionals; authors, journalists and linguists; creative and 
performing artists. This leaves us with the following professional occupations in addition to 




Table 4.5 Definition of dependent variable ͞PƌofessioŶal and managerial oĐĐupatioŶs͟ 
based on ISCO and ESeC  
ISCO-08  Title ISCO-08  Title 
21 Science and Engineering Professionals 
211 Physical and Earth Science Professionals 
2111 Physicists and Astronomers 2113 Chemists 
2112 Meteorologists 2114 Geologists and  
Geophysicists
212 Mathematicians, Actuaries and Statisticians 
2120 Mathematicians, Actuaries  
and Statisticians
  
213 Life Science Professionals 
2131 Biologists, Botanists,  
Zoologists and  
2133 Environmental  
Protection Professionals
2132 Farming, Forestry and  
Fisheries Advisers
  
214 Engineering Professionals (excluding Electrotechnology) 
2141 Industrial and  
Production Engineers
2145 Chemical Engineers 
2142 Civil Engineers 2146 Mining Engineers,  
Metallurgists and  
2143 Environmental Engineers 2149 Engineering Professionals  
Not Elsewhere Classified
2144 Mechanical Engineers   
215 Electro-technology Engineers 
2151 Electrical Engineers 2153 Telecommunications  
Engineers
2152 Electronics Engineers   
216 Architects, Planners, Surveyors and Designers 
2161 Building Architects 2164 Town and Traffic Planners 
2162 Landscape Architects 2165 Cartographers and  
Surveyors
2163 Product and Garment  
Designers
2166 Graphic and  
Multimedia Designers
22 Health Professionals 
221 Medical Doctors 
2211 Generalist Medical  
Practitioners 
2212 Specialist Medical  
Practitioners 
223 Traditional and Complementary Medicine Professionals 
2230 Traditional and  
Complementary  
  
224 Paramedical Practitioners 
2240 Paramedical Practitioners   
225 Veterinarians 
2250 Veterinarians   
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Table 4.3 cont.  
ISCO-08  Title ISCO-08  Title 
226 Other Health Professionals 
2261 Dentists 2265 Dieticians and Nutritionists 
2262 Pharmacists 2266 Audiologists and  
Speech Therapists
2263 Environmental and 
Occupational Health and 
2267 Optometrists and  
Ophthalmic Opticians
2264 Physiotherapists  2269 Health Professionals  
Not Elsewhere Classified
23 Teaching Professionals 
231 University and Higher Education Teachers 
2310 University and  
Higher Education Teachers
  
24 Business and Administration Professionals 
241 Finance Professionals 
2411 Accountants 2413 Financial Analysts 
2412 Financial and Investment 
Advisers 
  
242 Administration Professionals 
2421 Management and Organisation 
Analysts 
2423 Personnel and Careers 
Professionals 
2422 Policy Administration 
Professionals 
2424 Training and Staff 
Development Professionals 
243 Sales, Marketing and Public Relations Professionals 
2431 Advertising and Marketing 
Professionals 
2433 Technical and Medical Sales 
Professionals (excluding ICT) 
2432 Public Relations Professionals 2434 Information and 
Communications 
25 Information and Communications Technology Professionals 
251 Software and Applications Developers and Analysts 
2511 Systems Analysts 2514 Applications Programmers 
2512 Software Developers 2519 Software and Applications 
Developers and Analysts 
2513 Web and Multimedia 
Developers 
  
252 Database and Network Professionals 
2521 Database Designers and 
Administrators 
2523 Computer Network 
Professionals 
2522 Systems Administrators 2529 Database and Network 




Table 4.3 cont.  
ISCO-08  Title ISCO-08  Title 
26 Legal, Social and Cultural Professionals 
261 Legal Professionals 
2611 Lawyers 2619 Legal Professionals Not 
Elsewhere Classified 
2612 Judges   
263 Social and Religious Professionals 
2631 Economists 2633 Philosophers, Historians and 
Political Scientists 
2632 Sociologists, Anthropologists 




In order to grasp whether family policies only affect ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to reach 
powerful positions that require high qualifications, or whether they also affect ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
chances to reach high-skilled jobs in general, all models are tested both for the dependent 
variable being managers and professionals, and just managers. Managerial positions include 
Chief Executives, Senior Officials and Legislators; Administrative and Commercial Managers; 
Sales, Marketing and Development Managers; Hospitality, Retail and Other Services 
Managers (see table 4.3). Professional and managerial positions include the aforementioned 
ones in addition to Science and Engineering Professionals; Health Professionals (excluding 
Nursing and Midwifery Professionals and others health professionals); Teaching Professionals 
(only including Higher Education Teachers); Business and Administration Professionals; Legal, 
Social and Cultural Professionals [as listed in table 4.4]. For both dependent variables, a 
dummy variable is created with top positions being 1 and all others being 0. Table 4.6 





Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables ͞ŵaŶageƌial oĐĐupatioŶs͟ and 
͞professional and managerial oĐĐupatioŶs͟ 





1 Managerial Occupations/ 
higher salariat 
12,930 0.46 .299 .458 0 1 
2 Managerial and Professional 
Occupation/ higher salariat 
12,930 0.46 .085 .279 0 1 
 
To summarise, the author applies both the regular definition of managerial positions 
and additionally a wider definition of top positions that also includes senior professionals. 
Both definitions follow the idea that senior professionals for the purpose of this research are 
to be treated similarly to managers. This is because both managers and senior professionals 
as listed in the paragraph above, both have similar characteristics such as a lower risk to be 
made redundant, less short-term fluctuation of income, a better prospect of a rising income, 
greater security, greater authority and control over employees (Rose and Harrison, 2007). For 
example, a retail manager is expected to have comparable levels of security, chances of career 
progression, authority and control as a senior business and administration professional. 
Consequently, adding senior professionals to the definition simply widens the definition of 
top positions and should be considered as complimentary to the existent definition of 
managerial positions. This is why in the course of this thesis both definitions are used 
interchangeably, especially because from a methodological point of view, the wider definition 
of top positions also offers a greater sample size.  
4.3 Control Variables 
 
The selection of control variables follows that of previous papers on vertical 
segregation. Control variables are be age, migration, part-time work, the presence of 
(preschool) children, living with a partner, company size, public sector and training experience 
based on previous studies of occupational segregation (e.g., Mandel and Shalev, 2009; 
Burchell et al., 2015; Dolado et al., 2002, 2003, Maume, 1999; Schäfer et al., 2012). Table 4.7 
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illustrates the descriptive statistics for the control variables. Schaefer et al. (2011) is 
particularly helpful as the authors have a similar approach towards investigating vertical 
segregation by looking at managers only from a multilevel perspective. A key individual-level 
characteristic in their study is gender. Since this thesis aims to examine cross-national 
differences the gender gap in managerial positions, the key independent variable is gender, 
as we try to understand whether the extent to which women are disadvantaged in accessing 
top positions varies across countries. Based on the literature presented in Chapter 2, we can 
expect gender to significantly impact eŵploǇees͛ chances to be in a managerial, or managerial 
and professional occupation. In other words, women seem to be disadvantaged in every 
country included. However, the extent to which gender affects career peƌspeĐtiǀe͛s seems to 
vary across countries. Based on cross-national differences illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3, we 
can assume that the gender gap varies significantly across countries.  
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Table 4.7 Descriptive statistics for 19 control variables in 28 countries for multilevel models 
 Variable N Missing % Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 Age  12,930 0.00% 41.39 11.48 16 89 
2 Age2 12,930 0.00% 1845.17 997.54 256 7921 
3 Having children  12,930 0.00% 0.35 0.48 0 1 
4 Having a partner 12,930 0.00% 0.68 0.47 0 1 
5 Youngest child in preschool 12,930 0.00% 0.17 0.38 0 1 
        
6 Part-time employed 12,659 2.14% 0.23 0.42 0 1 
7 Migrant 12,009 7.67% 0.15 0.35 0 1 
8 Industry sector 12,826 0.81% 0.11 0.31 0 1 
9 Construction  12,826 0.81% 0.04 0.18 0 1 
10 Transport sector 12,826 0.81% 0.03 0.17 0 1 
        
11 Financial Services  12,826 0.81% 0.06 0.24 0 1 
12 Public Administration  12,826 0.81% 0.09 0.29 0 1 
13 Education  12,826 0.81% 0.21 0.40 0 1 
14 Health Sector 12,826 0.81% 0.14 0.35 0 1 
15 Other Services  12,826 0.81% 0.19 0.40 0 1 
        
16 Paid training  12,912 0.14% 0.45 0.50 0 1 
17 Small Company  12,654 2.18% 0.64 0.48 0 1 
18 Large Company 12,654 2.18% 0.13 0.34 0 1 





Additionally, all models control for age as a scale variable, as the assumption is that 
age serves as an indicator for experience and thus human capital, which is likely to affect 
eŵploǇees͛ likelihood to be in a higher positions (see Holst et al., 2010; Schäfer et al., 2012). 
Age here is measured both as a scale variable using data from the EWCS 2010, as well as 
quadratic in order to check for a curvilinear relationship between age and top positions 
(Schäfer et al., 2012).  
 
Besides age, the models also control for paid training as we can expect that employers 
only invest into employees if they want to increase their human capital, and therefore their 
value to the company. More than this, in order to bind them more tightly.  This variable is a 
dummy variable, 1 meaning the employee received paid training on the job at work. The 
question in the EWCS 2010 survey was as following: Q61: over the past 12 months, have you 
undergone any of the following types of training to improve your skills or not? Possible 
answers are: [A]training paid for or provided by your employer; [B] by yourself if self-
employed; [C] training paid for by yourself. Thus, only a positive answer to option A is coded 
as 1, the rest are coded as 0 (reference group).  
 
The models also control for working part-time, as first of all, women are more likely 
to be working part-time than men and secondly, part-time workers are less likely to be 
promoted. This is not due to gender only, but also due to ͞oƌgaŶisatioŶal costs for promoting 
part-time ŵaŶageƌs͟ (Baxter and Wright, 2000, p. 283). Thus, we need to hold part-time work 
constant, as otherwise results will be biased. Here, the EWCS distinguishes between part-time 
and full-time employment by defining part-time between 1 and 30 hours per week and full-
time everything above. Again, a dummy variable is created with 1 being working 1 to 30 hours, 
and 0 being full-time and thus over 30 hours a week. Moreover, we need to control for the 
presence of (young) children, as childbirth is one of the main reasons for gendered differences 
in pay and occupational hierarchies (Hewlett, 2002). This is because women choosing to take 
time off their job in order to look after their children consequently miss out on work 
experience and thus are less attractive to an employer.  Studies examining the family penalty 
by comparing women with and without children, find that even after controlling for education 
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and work experience, women with children earn less than women without (Fuchs, 1988; 
Korenman and Neumark, 1992; Waldfogel, 1997, as cited by Waldfogel 1998).  England et al. 
(2016) find that this motherhood penalty in terms of wages is highest for highly educated 
women. In addition to that, mothers also seem to be less likely to have successful careers as 
argued by Goldin (1997). This is also due to mothers being more likely to be working part-
time and not full-time. Additionally, mothers tend to be employed in more female-dominated 
occupations, as Burchell et al. (2015) argue. The variable used in the EWCS is from a 
household grid providing information on the presence of children in the household and their 
age. If there is a child living in the household that is younger than 18 years old, the dummy 
variable is coded 1, otherwise remaining at 0. Furthermore, there is an additional variable 
created for the presence of children in preschool age. Preschool age here is defined as 0 to 5 
years old and again a dummy variable is created with 1, indicating a preschool child is present 
in the household and labelled 0 if there is no child in that age group living in the household.  
 
Controlling for a partner living in the household can test for ͞additioŶal resources and 
possible pooling within the household͟ (Schäfer et al., 2012, p. 17). Thus, we can expect that 
couples in a relationship split their resources and split care-taking responsibilities and other 
household work. However, as discussed in Chapter 2.4, we cannot expect the division of 
labour between the spouses to be equal. What is more, while we find that men in high 
positions tend to be married, we do not find the same for women (Schaefer et al., 2012). 
Thus, the author expects a partner living in the household, does not have the same impact on 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s career as for ŵeŶ͛s. Here, again, the household grid from the EWCS is used which 
asks specifically for persons living in the household and the relationship  of those to the main 
respondent. If the respondent indicates that a ͞spouse/paƌtŶeƌ͟ lives in the household, a 
created dummy variable is coded 1.  
 
The model also includes whether migration status impacts ǁoŵeŶ͛s career 
perspectives, as migrants are more disadvantaged than natives in the labour market, as 
argued by Schäfer et al. (2012) and Zegers de Beijl (2002). The question in the EWCS here is 
as follows: Q1 Were you and both of your parents born in this country? Options here are: 1 
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yes; 2 no; 7 not applicable; 8 DK/no opinion; 9 Refusal. Thus, a dummy variable was again 
created with a negative answer ͞Ŷo͟ being coded 1 and a positive one being coded 0.  
 
What is more, when examining the impact of labour market institutions and policies 
on vertical segregation, we need to distinguish between different sizes of companies. Pierre 
and Scarpetta (2004) for example argue that especially medium-sized and small innovative 
firms are affected most negatively by employment regulations. Additionally, the authors 
argue that while prime-age men do not seem to be affected by labour market regulations 
such as strict EPL, ǁoŵeŶ͛s employment prospects are affected negatively (see also Chung, 
2009; Chung 2014; Holst et al, 2009, as cited in Schäfer et al., 2012). The EWCS addresses this 
matter by asking: ͞Qϭϭ How many people in total work at your workplace (at the local siteͿ?͟ 
Potential answers are:  1 (interviewee works alone); 2-4; 10-49; 50-99; 100-249; 250-499; 500 
and over; no opinion; refusal. A dummy variable for large companies is created with 1 being 
more than 250 employees, and another dummy variable for small companies with less than 
50 employees as, following common European definitions for company sizes (see for example 
Wagner, 1995; Lukács, 2005).  
 
Additionally, as we know that particularly in Scandinavian countries women tend to 
be employed in the public sector, where organisational hierarchies are different than in the 
private sector (see for example Llorens et al., 2007), we need to exclude the possibility that 
our results are biased due to an overrepresentation of women in top positions in the public 
sector. Thus, a dummy variable again is created with 1 being employed in the public sector. 
The relevant question in the EWCS 2010 is: ͞ QϭϬ Are you working in the …?͟ Potential answers 
are: private sector; public sector; joint private-public organisation or company; not-for-profit 
sector, NGO; other; DK/no opinion (spontaneous); refusal (spontaneous). Public sector in this 
case includes central and local administrations, health and education and excludes firms 





What is more, this thesis also controls for sectors, as we want to focus on vertical and 
not on horizontal segregation. Horizontal segregation describes the emergence of largely 
non-manual female and manual male dominated jobs (see Charles and Grusky, 1995; Grusky 
and Charles, 1998; Burchell, 2002). It can therefore be assumed that women are more likely 
to be in education than in the industry sector for example to have a managerial position. Thus, 
we control for the following sectors as defined by the Statistical classification of economic 
activities in the European Community, abbreviated as NACE: industry sector; construction; 
transport sector; financial services; public administration; education; health sector and other 
services. Again, dummy variables are created for each sector. Coding is based on the EWCS 
question ͞Qϵ What is the main activity of the company or organisation where you ǁoƌk?͟.  
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4.4 Measuring Family Policies 
 
One of the contributions this thesis aims to make, is to examine the relationship 
between family policies and ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to reach top positions. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the specific objective is to research the existence of a welfare state paradox as 
identified by Mandel and Semyonov (2006). Examining the hypothesis of the welfare state 
paradox, the authors examine the impact of family policies on ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to reach 
lucrative managerial positions, and managerial positions in general and female-typed 
occupations. Key independent variables here are the Welfare State Index, a summative index 
including maternity leave, publicly funded childcare for 0-6 year olds and public welfare sector 
as a share of the total. Questioning their findings, Korpi et al. (2013) on the other hand also 
examine the impact of family policies on managerial positions, the gender wage gap and 
women in corporate boards. However, in contrast to choosing a single dimensional index such 
as the welfare state index, Korpi et al (2013) distinguishes between different dimensions of 
family policies – i.e., they examine the impact of traditional family, dual earner or earner carer 
policies on vertical segregation. Lohmann and Zagel (2015) on the other hand create family 
policy indices that are not mutually exclusive and allocate countries to either one or the other 
group, but rather allow countries to vary in their degrees of familiarisation and de-
familiarisation.  
 
In contrast to Korpi et al. (2013), Zagel and Lohmann (2015) and others, this thesis 
only includes measurements of family policies that may have a different impact, not indices 
and typologies as these do not allow the researcher to establish what policies have an impact 
on the outcome variable. Additionally, typologies assume countries to fall neatly into certain 
groups which do not reflect the heterogeneity of family policy profiles across countries. 
Consequently, only separate measurements of paternal, parental, maternity, well-paid and 
unpaid leaves, childcare provisions and public spending are included. All variables and their 
descriptive statistics are listed in table 4.8. Thus, empirically this paper aims to analyse the 
impact of family policies on ǁoŵeŶ͛s access to top position compared to ŵeŶ͛s.   
Table 4.8 Descriptive Statistics for context level variables 
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maternity leave in 
weeks (Multilinks, 
2011) 






compensation as a 
share of earned 
income (Multilinks, 
2011) 








available to mothers 
(Multilinks, 2011) 
11,291 28 14.96 5.22 3.26 40.50 
Parental leave 
net duration in 
months 
Net duration of 
parental leave in 
months (Multilinks, 
2011) 





Duration of parental 
leave payment in 
months (Multilinks, 
2011) 





compensation as a 
share of earned 
income (Multilinks, 
2011) 






(Multilinks, 2011) 10,945 27 8.02 7.62 0.00 31.21 
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Table 4.8 cont.  










Leave in days 
Duration of 
paternity leave in 
days (Multilinks, 
2011) 





compensation as a 
share of earned 
income (Multilinks, 
2011) 







time in months 
weighted by 
payment level)  
(Multilinks, 2011) 
10,945 27 1.32 1.11 0.00 4.29 
Well-paid 
Leave  
Lenght of leave 
(maternity and 
parental) with an 
income replacement 
through benefits of 
60 percent or more 
(Multilinks, 2011) 
11,291 28 8.64 7.41 0.00 26.10 
Unpaid Leave The sum of 
maternity leave and 
parental leave minus 
the months of paid 
leave (based on 
Lohmann and Zagel, 
2015) 
11,291 28 8.82 9.21 2.00 40.00 
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on childcare services 
per child aged under 
six (OECD Family 
Database) 
9,444 22  0.82 0.43 0.13 1.90 
Full-time 
childcare for 
older children  
Availability of formal 
childcare 30 hours or 
more from 3 years to 
compulsory school 
age as a percentage 
over the population 
of the age group 
(Eurostat, 2017) 
11,291 28 51.30 21.43 12.00 84.00 
Part-time 
childcare for 
older children  
Availability of formal 
childcare 1 to 29 
hours from 3 years 
to compulsory 
school age as a 
percentage over the 
population of the 
age group  (Eurostat, 
2017) 
11,291 28 32.19 20.62 3.00 77.00 
Full time 
Childcare for 
under 3 year 
olds  
Availability of formal 
childcare 30 hours or 
more for children 
under 3 as a 
percentage over the 
population of the 
age group  (Eurostat, 
2017) 
11,291 28 17.49 12.77 0.00 65.00 
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Table 4.8 cont.  











under 3 year 
old  
Availability of formal 
childcare 1 to 29 
hours for children 
under 3 as a 
percentage over the 
population of the 
age group  (Eurostat, 
2017) 
11,291 28 12.45 9.53 0.00 41.00 
No childcare 
under 3 year 
olds 
No availability of 
childcare services 
for children under 3 
as a percentage over 
the population of 
the age group  
(Eurostat, 2017) 
11,291 28 70.18 16.26 27.00 98.00 
Childcare 
allowance for 1 
Child  
As share of net 
average income 
(Multilinks, 2011) 
11,291 28 4.07 2.42 0.00 10.00 
Childcare 
allowance for 3 
children 
As share of net 
average income 
(Multilinks, 2011) 




under 3 year 
olds 
Full-time childcare 
usage of children 
under 3 years old 
(Multilinks, 2011) 




Childcare usage for 
3-6 year olds  
(Multilinks, 2011) 




0-2 years  
Enrolment rates of 
under 3 years in 
formal childcare 
(Multilinks, 2011) 
11,291 28 28.90 16.68 2 73 
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Indicators were selected based on the literature reviewed in Chapter 3 and reflect 
measures for family policies used. Additionally, as the thesis aims to check whether 
summative indices deliver the same results as single indicators, all the components to the two 
family policy typologies included are examined separately. The following section first explains 
how the elements included in the two family policy typologies. Then, the single policies both 
relevant to the typologies and the analysis are examined in greater detail. The policies here 





Maternity, paternity and parental leave 
 
Maternity leave is measured in three ways – the length of maternity leave, the level 
of compensation and the effective weeks of paid maternity leave (Multilinks, 2011). The 
duration of maternity leave is the maximum length measured in weeks and expressed the 
time mothers have before and after childbirth off work. The level of compensation is defined 
as Cash benefit during maternity leave in percentage of income before taking up leave, and is 
calculated on the basis of the net income of an average worker in the respective year. Both 
indicators multiplied then provide the duration of effective weeks of maternity leave in order 
to express the total leave-time in weeks weighted by payment level.  
 
Paternity leave is measured using the same approach. Paternity leave describes the 
maximum amount of days fathers are entitled to after childbirth. The level of compensation 
is measured by the average cash benefit during the leave in percentage of the income before 
taking up the leave. Effective paternity leave is again duration and level of compensation 
multiplied.  
Parental leave is measured in four ways – net parental leave, parental leave payment 
duration, compensation level and effective leave. Net parental leave describes the maximum 
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length of leave for both parents. The duration of payment captures the number of months 
benefits are paid for. The level of compensation again is defined as cash benefit during 
maternity leave in percentage of income before taking up leave, and is calculated on the basis 
of the net income of an average worker in the respective year. 
 
Well-paid and unpaid leave  
 
In order to assess whether leave provides a generous income replacement and thus 
encourages parents to take leave, the indicator for well-paid leave measures the length of 
leave with an income replacement through benefits of 60 percent or more. The indicator 
takes both maternity and parental leave into account. In contrast to that, the duration of 
unpaid leave measures the duration of leave entitlements without any income replacement. 
The variable is constructed using Multilinks (2011) data as the sum of maternity leave and 
parental leave minus the months of paid leave. Data for well-paid and unpaid leave stems 
from Multilinks (2011) database and provides data for the year 2009.  
 
Childcare – coverage and usage  
 
This thesis includes various indicators for childcare and aims to take into account 
different age groups covered, but also the generosity of hours and lastly both availability and 
usage. The indicator for full-time childcare for older children is defined as the availability of 
formal childcare; 30 hours or more from 3 years to compulsory school age as a percentage 
over the population of the age group (Eurostat, 2017). Part-time childcare for older children 
on the other hand includes the availability of formal childcare; 1 to 29 hours from 3 years to 
compulsory school age (Eurostat, 2017). Full-time and part-time childcare for under 3 year 
olds follows the same definition applied to the age group of 0 to 2 year olds. Eurostat here 
defines as formal arrangements, four types of childcare: education at pre-school, education 
at compulsory school, childcare at centre-based services outside school hours and childcare 
at day-care centres. Data here stems from EU-SILC and is for the year 2008.  
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Childcare usage on the other hand does not express availability of arrangements for 
childcare and early education, but the actual enrolment rates. Here, data is included to show 
the usage of pre-primary and primary education for children aged 3-5 years as a percentage 
of all children in the age cohort, the usage of formal childcare arrangements for children aged 
0-3, and the share of children full-time cared for in formal childcare arrangements for 30 
hours or more a week. By including both availability and enrolment rates, the thesis aims to 
take into account both the political will to offer childcare arrangements, and the will of the 
individual and the society in question to make use of these offers.  
 
Childcare expenditure  
 
While the previous indicators for childcare usage and availability describe how 
individuals access and use publicly provided childcare, childcare expenditure measures the 
extent to which governments invest into the provision of childcare. Following the arguments 
made in section 3.1.1, investments into the childcare sectors are associated with a large public 
sector (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). This is the second side of the welfare state paradox – 
by investing into public services the state indirectly promotes occupational segregation as 
women tend to be employed in the public sector. Mandel and Semyonov (2006) argue that 
this has negative implications on pay as female-dominated occupations tend to be lower paid 
than mixed or male-dominated ones.  
 In order to assess how much governments spend on childcare services, this thesis 
uses OECD data on public expenditure on early childhood education and care covers all public 
spending (in cash or in-kind) towards formal childcare and early education services. This 
includes day-care services such as crèches, day care centres, and family day care and pre-
primary education services such as kindergartens. While this covers generally children from 0 
to 5, the OECD takes into account cross-national differences in compulsory age in school 
entry, and adjusts the age range covered in this indicator accordingly. Public expenditure on 
early childhood education and care is expressed as a percentage of GDP.  
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In order to assess the financial investment the government makes into childcare, the 
thesis also includes indicators for childcare allowances both for 1 child and for 3 children. 
Here, childcare allowance is measured as a share of monthly net average income for either 1 
child or 3 children in the year 2009.  
 
4.5 Measuring Labour Market Institutions  
 
Few scholars such as Estevez-Abe (e.g. 2005), England (2005), Morgan (2005), 
Dieckhoff et al. (2015) and others, have analysed the direct impact of labour market 
institutions on various dimensions of gender labour market inequality. However, what is 
missing is a cross-national comparative study of how labour market institutions impact 
vertical segregation, namely ǁoŵeŶ͛s chances to reach top positions. Based on the presented 
studies in Chapter 3, the following section introduces the indicators used to measure labour 
market iŶstitutioŶ͛s at a context level. These can be distinguished between indicators aiming 
to operationalise conflict theory on the one hand, and an approach based on a gendered 
version of varieties of capitalism on the other hand. All variables and their descriptive 
statistics are listed in table 4.9.  
 119 
Table 4.9 Descriptive statistics for context level variables – labour market institutions  





Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
Trade union 
density rate 
Net union membership as a 
proportion of wage and 
salary earners in 
employment (ICTWSS) 




Share of employees 
covered by collective 
bargaining agreements 
relative to the overall 
number of wage and salary-
earners (ICTWSS) 






Percentage share of 
females in total 
membership (ICTWSS) 




Union density rate of 
females (ICTWSS)  
8,023 18 35.46 22.90 7.2 73.4 
Skill profiles 
Skill profiles as in 
vocational training 
intensity; the share of an 
age cohort in either 
secondary or post-
secondary vocational 
training (Unesco, 2016) 
 
11,291 28 30.18 10.53 10.09 47.43 
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Table 4.9 cont.  





Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
WoŵeŶ’s 
skill  profiles 
WoŵeŶ͛s vocational 
training intensity; the share 
of an age cohort in either 
secondary or post-
secondary vocational 
training (Unesco, 2016) 




Index includes replacement 
rate for single and for 
families, the qualification 
period needed to qualify 
for benefit; the duration of 
benefit entitlement; the 
waiting days to start 
receiving benefit after 
becoming unemployed; 
and the percentage of the 





12,158 27 10.13 5.17 3.6 32.2 
Employment 
Protection 
Summative index capturing 
strictness of regulations on 
dismissals and the use of 
permanent contracts 
ranging from legislation, 
court rulings to collectively 
bargained conditions of 
employment or customary 
practice (OECD, 2013). 
10,233 24 2.31 0.45 1.26 4.13 
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Gendered Varieties of Capitalism approach  
Following the Varieties of Capitalism argument presented in Chapter 3, we expect labour 
market institutions to serve as institutional complementarities. Thus, we need to include 




Following the idea of Estevez-Abe, Soskice and Iversen (2001) and of the OECD indicators 
of employment protection legislation, this thesis uses employment protection based on 
strictness of employment protection legislation for regular employment, strictness of 
employment protection legislation for individual and collective dismissals, and strictness of 
employment protection legislation for temporary employment. The data examines EPL and the 
costs and procedures of dismissing individual workers or groups on the one hand, and hiring 
workers on either fixed-term or temporary contracts on the other hand. The three indicators 
include 21 variables that measure employment protection. The following indicators are included 
in the EPL index: notification procedures, delay involved before notice can start, length of the 
notice period at 9 months tenure, length of the notice period at 4 years tenure, length of the 
notice period at 20 years tenure, severance pay at 9 months tenure, severance pay at 4 years 
tenure, severance pay at 20 years tenure, definition of justified or unfair dismissal, length of trial 
period, compensation following unfair dismissal, possibility of reinstatement following unfair 
dismissal, maximum time to make a claim of unfair dismissal, definition of collective dismissal, 
additional notification requirements in case of collective dismissals, additional delays involved in 
case of collective dismissals, other special costs to employers in case of collective dismissals, valid 
cases for use of fixed-term contracts, maximum number of successive fixed-term contracts, 
maximum cumulated duration of successive fixed-term contract, types of work for which 
temporary work agency (TWA) employment is legal, restrictions on the number of renewals of 
TWA assignments, maximum cumulated duration of TWA assignments 
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TWA: authorisation or reporting obligations, as well as equal treatment of regular and 




Data measuring the generosity of unemployment benefits comes from the 2014-03 
version of the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset. Here, we use the unemployment 
generosity index consisting of the replacement rate for single  parents and for families. The 
qualification period as in weeks of insurance needed to qualify for benefit; the duration as in 
weeks of benefit entitlement excluding times of means-tested assistance; the waiting days 
measured in days one must wait to start receiving benefit after becoming unemployed, and the 
percentage of the labour force insured for unemployment risk are also utilised. Generous 
unemployment benefits are considered as functional equivalents to EPL in terms of skill 
protection (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). Whereas EPL is considered to protect firm-specific skills, 
unemployment benefits protect industry specific skills and increase employment security within 
the industry. As Estevez-Abe et al. (2001, p. 28) argue, ͞the industry in a country with high 
unemployment and low employment protection becomes functionally equivalent to the firm in 
a country with low unemployment and high employment pƌoteĐtioŶ.͟ By including both EPL and 
UB, we can therefore check the gendered VoC approach, which argues that by protecting 
investments into specific skills and long-term working relationships , generous UB and EPL can 
lead to discrimination against women. Whereas countries with an industry specific skills profile 
enables workers more flexibility in terms of job opportunities, yet firm-specific skills are limiting 




Skill profiles  
 
Being aware of the connection between labour market institutions and skill profiles, we 
need to measure whether economies rely on specific or general skills. The assumption is that in 
countries with general skill profiles, the need for the protection of skill investments is not as 
urgent as in countries with specific skills (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). In CMEs with more specific 
skills profiles, employers have a higher motivation to support employment-friendly family 
policies in order to maintain the working relationship with their employees and avoid 
interruptions. Following Iversen and Soskice (2001), this thesis looks at the intensity of vocational 
training assuming that ͞the profile of skills is likely to vary in accord with the structure of a 
ŶatioŶ͛s educational sǇsteŵ͟ (Iversen and Soskice, 2001, p. 889). Since the original data is the 
average of the years 1980 to 1997, the author updated following Cusack, Iversen and Rehm 
(2005) and Iversen and Soskice (2001). Additionally, Philipp Rehm, who originally calculated skill 
specificity scores, was contacted via email in order to check whether calculations were made 
correctly. When scores were calculated, the author also contacted Torben Iversen to get hold of 
the original dataset used to calculate training intensity using UNESCO data.   
The author calculated vocational training activity by the percentage of people in 
secondary vocational training in relation to all those in secondary school age cohort, plus the 
number of people in postsecondary vocational training as a percentage to everyone in the 
postsecondary school age cohort (see data in Appendix B, table B.1). The results also reflect the 
skill profile definitions made by Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice (2001, p.67).  Additionally, the 
intensity of vocational training and education is also calculated for women only in order to 
distinguish clearly between skill profiles between genders. While this thesis looks at European 
countries only and the dataset provided by Iversen includes some non-European OECD countries, 
the author decided to replicate the vocational training intensity score for the same countries and 
similar years Iversen did to compare the results. The figure below compares the replicated score, 
labelled Kleinert Data 2000, with the most recent data that could be taken from IǀeƌseŶ͛s score 
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from 1997. The replicated score uses 2000 data as this was the oldest data available at the 
UNESCO database.  
 
Figure 4.1 Intensity of Vocational Skill Training – Score Replication  
 
 
There are some discrepancies between the replicated score and the original Iversen data.  
 
These might either be due to the selection of data (in the case of Australia) ,or due to 
significant changes in the VET systems which would be very interesting also regarding to the VoC 
argument of skill formation. I have attached an excel file with my raw data and a comparison of 
our measurements (sheet 2). I hope this is of interest for you. 
  
1. Australia: Here, the replicated score is higher than IǀeƌseŶ͛s data. Based on the 
replicated score, Australia is one of the countries with the highest incidence for 
vocational training. In this particular case, IǀeƌseŶ͛s most recent data is from 1992. Thus, 







US Spain Ireland UK Denmark Netherlands Finland Australia
Kleinert Data 2000 Most recent year of Iversen score
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2. Austria: Here, the replicated score and the Iversen data match. Using the average score 
for vocational training from Soskice and Iversen (2001) however, we see that the 
summative average of 1980-1997 was much lower at around 20 points. Austria 
illustrates that vocational skill intensity changes over time due to changes in the VET 
system and therefore data needs to stay updated.  
3. Ireland: The replicated score indicates that Ireland might have experienced a positive 
trend in terms of VET investment between 1997 and 2000. The same might be the case 
for France.  
 
Using an updated version of the data for skill intensity, it is therefore another contribution 
of this thesis.  
 
 
Conflict Theory and labour market dualisation  
According to empirical findings, which seek to examine the conflict between labour and 
capital, unions crucially shape policy outcomes. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, we know 
that labour market institutions seem to affect women differently than men. Therefore, the 
hypothesis is that unions and their collective bargaining power can help us to understand cross-
national variation in the gender gap in top positions.  In order to test the hypotheses made in 
Chapter 2, we need to include the following indicators:  
 
Trade union density rate  
 
Data on trade union density is from the Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade 
Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts ICTWSS. It was collected in 34 countries 
between 1960 and 2012 and covers all EU and OECD members. With regards to the two 
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theoretical approaches – the gendered Voc and the conflict theory, applying both variables allows 
us not only to measure the degree of tri-partite dialogue and therefore the level of coordination, 
but also the strength of unions and their power to protect the workforce. Union density shows 
how many workers actually benefit from these negotiations.  
 
 
WoŵeŶ’s percentage of trade union members:  
 
The analysis includes data on ǁoŵeŶ͛s percentage of trade union members for the year 
2010 from the ICTWSS database. However, there is no recent data available for France (Carley, 
2004), which is why we can only use data from 1997 for French membership data. Also, due to 
the high levels of union fragmentation in France, this score is only representative for one of the 
five major trade unions, the French Democratic Confederation of Labour and stems from 
EuƌofouŶd͛s observatories on industrial relations (EIRO). It needs to be noted here, though, that 
measuring ǁoŵeŶ͛s percentage of trade union members is not capable of actually measuring 
dualisation and only aims to capture who is represented by unions.   
   
Collective bargaining coverage 
 
Data on collective bargaining coverage stems from ICTWSS as well, and further indicates 
the share of employees covered by collective (wage) bargaining agreements as a proportion of 
all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining. ICTWSS also adjusts the 
data based on the assumption that some sectors are excluded from the right to bargain. Thus, 




4.6 Selection of countries and reference year 
 
Undertaking cross-national comparative research, several decisions regarding the 
selection of countries and the year had to be made. Selecting countries as contextual frameworks 
for this thesis is – besides clearly defined geographical borders, mainly based on two factors: 
comparability regarding their political institution, administrative and legal factors; and secondly 
based on pragmatic factors as a result of limited data availability and limited resources. For this 
thesis, the following 28 European countries are included in the analysis: Austria, Albania, 
Bulgaria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
However, due to a lack of data of macro-level data on labour market institutions and family 
policies, models discussed in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and 6 range from analysing 22 to 28 countries. 
Thus, both the number of countries and the number of individuals is discussed for every model.  
 
European countries have been chosen for the analysis because their political institutions, 
administrative and legal characteristics are highly comparable. This is also due to their 
membership in supranational organisations requiring convergence in the listed areas (Hantrais, 
1999). Examples are the Council of Europe, the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In case of the European Union for example, 
membership countries have to meet the EU requirements in terms of standards and rules and 
comply with values defined in the Copenhagen Criteria by the European Council in 1993. In terms 
of institutional requirements, these Đƌiteƌia͛s ensure a democratic political and legal system 
respecting human rights and protecting minorities. Additionally, member states are expected to 
have a functioning and competitive market economy and to be able to support the integration 
of a political, economic and monetary union. With these clearly defined criteria, membership in 
the EU serves as a straightforward and suitable selection criterion for the cases. Besides their 
political, legal and administrative systems, the EU countries have traditionally also been 
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compared in terms of their welfare states (see Chapter 2.1. and 2.2.) by scholars such as Esping-
Andersen (1990), Korpi (2000), and Orloff (1993) and regarding their political economy (see 
Hancke et al. 2007). The selected countries represent not only the Esping-AŶdeƌseŶ͛s welfare 
state typology (1990) with liberal, corporatist and social democratic welfare regimes. It also takes 
the distinction between market types into account with liberal market economies (LME), 
continental and Scandinavian coordinated market economies (CME). As suggested by Schaefer 
et al. (2011) and Charles and Grusky (2004), the countries also include both advanced post-
industrial European economies and rather less advanced economies. Thus, the EU member states 
serve as an appropriate conceptual framework in order to compare political and social 
institutions, alongside economic systems.  
 
What is more, selecting EU countries facilitates cross-national comparisons due to the 
vast amount of data collected on the member states, candidate countries such as Albania, or 
members of the European Economic Area such as Norway. Both micro- and macro-level data on 
Europe is accessible for researchers. The decision to choose European countries over OECD 
countries for example therefore was also made based on the availability of macro-level data on 
family policies and labour market institutions (see Chapter 3.3. and 3.4.). Since the selection of 
countries was not random and data in the countries selected cannot be representative for other 
countries, the results can only be applied to the countries included, not for the wider population.   
 
In terms of the year included in the analysis, this thesis is looking at cross-sectional data 
for around the year 2010, not longitudinal. The limitations of this approach are discussed in 
section 3.5. The reason to choose the year 2010 was made due to both pragmatic reasons, but 
also due to the expansion of family policies in the 2000s (see Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2014). 
Germany, Norway and Ireland for example experienced dramatic changes in their family policies 
(ibid.). Choosing an earlier year would therefore not take any of these changes into account and 
would not reflect the current situation of the welfare state sufficiently. The author would have 
preferred examining data from a more recent year in order to discuss the present situation of 
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ǁoŵeŶ͛s labour market position, family policies and labour market institutions. However, data 
on family policies was not available to the same extent for a more recent year than it was for 
around the year 2010. This thesis could have also included a longitudinal analysis comparing 
vertical segregation over years. However, for two reasons the author decided against a 
longitudinal perspective. As discussed in Chapter three, despite dramatic increases in ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
overall employment rates, we find that on average occupational segregation between non-
managers and managers/ professional relative to ŵeŶ͛s remained the same. Secondly, a 
longitudinal comparison does not seem to offer any additional gain to the analysis, as whilst the 
change over time seems to be interesting, there does not seem to be substantive change in the 
cross-national discrepancies in occupational hierarchies between genders despite increasing 
female employment rates. Thus, a detailed cross-sectional analysis for the year 2010 is preferred 
over a longitudinal analysis.  
 
However, this thesis also takes into account that changes in the behaviour and practice 
of social actors potentially lags behind changes in the institutional framework or cultural ideas 
(See Pfau-Effinger (2012). Thus, we need to assume that despite significant changes in family 
policies and labour market institutions, ǁoŵeŶ͛s employment situatioŶ͛s does not change 
simultaneously. This is even more the case for gendered hierarchies than for employment rates, 
as the human capital that is required for top positions needs to be accumulated first.  
 
Time lags 
Time lagged effects in this particular context of ǁoŵeŶ͛s career progressions and policies 
or institutions are of course to be considered. This is because women who are currently in top 
positions or are about to reach a managerial or senior professional position are not necessarily 
affected by family policies or changes in the labour market. As illustrated in Chapter two of this 
thesis, family policies have been introduced since the 1990s in the vast majority of developed 
economies. At the same time, many countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and the UK have 
substantially changed their family policies from fairly passive, to progressive in the past decade 
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and are therefore considered as ͞path-shifteƌs͟ (Morgan, 2013: 2). Because some of these 
changes such as the implementation of a right to a place in childcare in Germany have only 
recently taken place, and effects of these policies on ǁoŵeŶ͛s career progression can therefore 
not be measured yet. The author takes this time-lagged effect into account by using data on 
family policies and labour market institutions that is older than the data on the dependent 
variable.  
 
Even though there does not seem to be a general agreement in comparative research on 
how many years labour market outcomes are lagging behind political and institutional changes, 
according to Clarke (2016) scholars tend to allow for one (Ruhm, 1998: 301; Pettit and Hook, 
2005: 788; Thévenon and Solaz, 2013: 27) or two years (Misra et al, 2011: 147). Consequently, 
while data for the dependent variable stems from the year 2010, the independent variables on 
family policies and labour market institutions include data from the year 2008, in order to allow 
policies and institutional changes time to have an impact on gender labour market outcomes. By 
approaching time lagged effects in this way, the author takes into account that policies take time 
to be implemented and to actively change ǁoŵeŶ͛s career progressions. At the same time, the 
author is also aware that career progressions take place over several years. This means that 
family policies measured in 2008 might not have had any impact on women who are already in 
top positions. On the other hand, whilst changes in family policies occur and path dependency 
needs to be questioned, the author mitigates this risk by both taking as many family policies into 
account as possible and to also apply welfare regime typologies to avoid two aspects: a 
generalisation of stickiness in terms of family policies and secondly, to overestimate how quickly 
family policies change. Thus, even if there has been a drastic change in family policies in one 
country in 2007, this change in unlikely to also have happened in many other countries at the 
same time. For our dependent variable this means that we still allow family policies at least three 
years to affect ǁoŵeŶ͛s career progression, more likely however more than this. This short 
amount of time lag does not allow the models to capture to what extent the implementation of 
family policies has helped shape decisions women made regarding their career paths in the first 
place however. This needs to be taken into account when analysing the findings.   
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4.7 Method – Multilevel modelling 
 
In contrast to studies understanding social reality as ͞ĐoŶteǆt fƌee͟ or fully ͞ĐoŶteǆt 
ďouŶd͟ (Hantrais, 1999, p. 94), this thesis aims to treat the context as an explanatory variable 
that helps to examine social reality by understanding countries as a contextual framework. Using 
countries or nations as a framework, the researcher faces several limitations. As argued by 
Hantrais (1999), national borders change and thus do not necessarily reflect cultural or 
ideological differences within countries. Comparing employment patterns, care and income 
between women in eastern and western Germany, Pfau-Effinger and Smidt (2011) for example 
find that differences between eastern and western German women can be largely explained by 
͞diffeƌeŶĐes in the cultural values and models of the family […] and their interaction with 
institutional and economic faĐtoƌs͟ (p. 217).  
 
Secondly, with countries being embedded in supranational organisations, any change in 
the membership structure causes socio-cultural change in the organisation per se. Additionally, 
the key problem for cross-national comparisons based on countries as a contextual framework is 
likely to ignore within-country differences. Jobert (1996) highlights the difficulties when 
comparing the education, training and employment in Germany, France, Italy and the UK, due to 
diversity within the countries (as cited in Hantrais, 1999), with for example Germany deciding at 
the federal state-level on education policies and thus having not one, but several education 
systems.  
 
To summarize, choosing countries as the level of observation is problematic, as cross-
national comparisons appear to be unable in taking into account within country diversity. 
However, the discussed shortcomings can be overcome by using an approach that takes 
advantages of both macro- and micro-level differences, while still associating cases with 
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commonly used identities, such as multilevel modelling (MLM). MLM is the method of choice as 
it takes into account political, legal, socio-cultural and economic systems, but at the same time 
takes social and cultural diversity of the individuals beyond their nationality into account 
(Hantrais, 1999).  
 
In general, multilevel analysis examines ͞ƌelatioŶs between variables measured at 
different levels of the multilevel data stƌuĐtuƌe͟ (Hox, 2002, p. viii). Multilevel analysis enables 
us to examine data that is ͞Ŷested͟ within each other, therefore violates the independence 
assumption statistical analyses such as ANOVA and ordinary least-squares (OLS) require (Peugh, 
2010, p. 86). However, as Peugh (2010) for example argues, not every nested dataset requires 
MLM. The key reason for engaging in multilevel modelling is the assumption of high variation at 
level-2, which is the context-level variable (schools or countries for example). Only if there is 
enough variation at level-2 or the context level, MLM can be useful. In our example with countries 
being the level-2 variable and the iŶdiǀiduals͛ job levels being our level-1, we expect high cross-
national variation in vertical segregation and not only variation between individuals. MLM allows 
us to examine not only individual determinants, but also the context factors that impact 
individual level behaviour (Muijs, 2011). Applying Peugh͛s (2010) example of MLM for 
educational data to my research question, the variation at the context level is expressed and 
calculated by the intraclass correlation (ICC) score which is the proportion of vertical occupational 
segregation that can be explained at  the country level (level-2), and the expected correlation 
between vertical segregation of two individuals from the same country. Therefore, if the ICC is 
too low or even zero, the mean of occupational levels of women does not vary much across 
countries (level-2), and therefore varies only across individuals. In this case, other statistical 
methods might be more useful. However, for this thesis the ICC is irrelevant as we are not 
interested in the variation of individuals to reach top position and whether this varies across 
countries, but more importantly whether the gender gap varies across countries. Thus, while the 
first question would require random intercept models, the second one requires random slope 
models as it will be discussed later in this section. For now this means however, that ICC is 
irrelevant to seeing whether there is a cross-national variance in the extent to which there is a 
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gender gap in obtaining top positions for workers. What is more important is the significance of 
the random slope variance, and whether the impact labour market institutions and family policies 
have on iŶdiǀiduals͛ access to managerial positions is different for women than for men. This will 
be measured by comparing explained variance in the models and by comparing logged likelihood 
changes to see whether adding more variables improves the model fit.  
 
As mentioned above, this thesis examines the potential associations between labour 
market institutions, family policies and ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to work in top jobs. Thus, in a first 
step we need to establish our null or empty model of our multilevel model. Because we take into 
account the nested nature of our data, we need to allow countries to have different means of 
our dependent variable. The dependent variable is binary – with 1 being the chances to reach a 
top position and 0 all other positions. Thus, the first model needs to indicate that individuals at 
the level 1 are nested within countries at level 2. Here, the main drawback of the analysis is the 
limited number of level-2 country cases and thus the statistical power. This issue is addressed by 
adding a maximum of two cross-level interaction terms per model.  
 
In order to show which country an individual belongs to, in multilevel models we do not 
only add the subscript i  and j to our dependent variable yij,  indicating the value the individual i 




Since this thesis only looks at two levels – the country and the individuals –, we need to 
establish a two-level model with the residual including two components – the country-level 







In this empty model, y is our dependent variable – the likelihood of an individual i nested 
within country j to obtain a top positions with  being the global average. In other words,  
is the overall mean of Y across all countries or the average chances for an individual to reach a 
top position across all included countries. uj on the other hand is the random effect component 
and shows how much in country j the likelihood of an individual to reach a top position varies 
from the global average . The average likelihood to reach a top position Y for an individual i 
nested within country j therefore is the overall mean across all countries and the additional 
random element, the group-level residual, thus . However, in this model we do not allow 
the likelihood to reach top positions  
 
Starting with the empty model, which serves as a comparison, the analysis starts with 
random intercept model with explanatory independent variables. In contrast to empty models, 
these random intercept models aim to examine whether the independent variables discussed in 
the previous sections have an impact on iŶdiǀiduals͛ likelihood to reach top positions. Because 
this thesis investigates cross-national variation of the gender gap in top positions, the key 
explanatory independent variable therefore is gender. Thus, after running the empty models, 
gender is added to the model and it will be examined whether the gender of an individual i living 
in a country j  increases or decreases the average likelihood for an individual i living in a country 
j to reach top positions. Here, we therefore allow the intercept to vary across countries 
depending on gender. In other words, does gender have an impact on iŶdiǀiduals͛ likelihood to 
reach top positions? What is more, in order to exclude the possibility that the gender impacts 
iŶdiǀiduals͛ likelihood to reach top positions only because of the individual and job characteristics 
between genders as discussed in the previous section, the models also include individual-level 
control variables. These are all summarised by in the equations. The impact individual-level 
variables have is assumed to be the same across countries and is therefore fixed for these models.  
 135 
The following equation summarizes these random intercept models with individual 
control and explanatory variables.  
 
 
However, the general assumption in this thesis, is not only that gender impacts career 
perspectives and women are disadvantaged, even after controlling for various individual-level 
characteristics. More importantly, this effect is expected to vary across countries. In other words, 
the assumption here is that the gender gap is significantly smaller or bigger in different European 
countries. WoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to reach top positions relative to ŵeŶ͛s is expected to vary 
between countries and therefore the impact gender has on access to top positions is not fixed.  
For each country, we get the following regression model.  
 
The intercept includes the following:  
 
The slope for individual 1 living in country j, is as follows:  
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Lastly, bringing both models together for all countries, we get the following random slope 
model:  
 
As indicated by j, we can see that the latter part of the equation is the random element 
which indicates that the impact individual-level variables have is allowed to vary across countries.  
These models can help us understand whether the gender gap varies across countries and 
which individual-level variables have an impact. In order to be able to address the other research 
questions however, we need to add independent context-level variables to the equations. To 
recap, this thesis aims to understand drivers of the gender gap in managerial positions, and 
further investigates to what extent family policies or labour market institutions have an impact 
on vertical segregation.  
Therefore, we now need to include the intercept variation with Z being our context level 
variables for country j.  
 
However, in this case Z only describes the impact of a context-level variable on our 
dependent variable, which is an iŶdiǀidual͛s likelihood to reach a top position. Because this thesis 
investigates whether family policies and labour market institutions affect women differently than 
men, we need to add cross-level interaction terms in order to understand how macro-level 
variables impact the effect gender has on career chances. This is summarised by the following 
equation with being the cross-level interaction term.  
In contrast to random slope models, random intercept models do not allow us to examine 
whether context variables have influence the varying impact of our key independent 




Yij 0 01 0Xij 0 1Zj u1 jXij u0 j ij
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For the random slope model with cross-level interaction, we therefore have the following 
model with Z being family policy or labour market institution variables and 01Zj being the 




4.8 Limitations  
 
Multilevel modelling allows this thesis to address the key methodological limitations of 
previous studies. This is because the models in this thesis enable us to redefine top positions at 
an individual level avoiding composition effects, and multilevel modelling also allows looking at 
the association between macro-level variables and the gender gap. However, multilevel 
modelling assumes causal directions. The models for example assume that family policies affect 
vertical segregation. The authors thus makes causal inferences that are based on assumptions 
that are the result of the literature reviewed in Chapter two to five. The models also take 
confounding factors into account by controlling for them (Goldstein, 2011). Nevertheless, when 
interpreting results we need to be aware of the fact that causality might not follow the 
assumptions we made, and thus we cannot say certainly that the independent variables cause a 
higher or lower gender gap in top positions, but only that there is an association.  
 
In terms of the data used, this thesis allows a cross-national comparison between up to 
32 countries and thus enables the researcher to draw conclusions for a wide range of countries. 
Case studies or qualitative studies on the other hand would allow for a much more detailed and 
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in-depth analysis. In order to still identify not only whether independent variables affect the 
gender gap but also which countries are affected by this association, each Chapter plots the 
random effects of ǁoŵeŶ͛s relative chances to reach top positions compared to ŵeŶ͛s with 
macro-level variables. Nevertheless, qualitative studies using interviews or focus groups would 
enable the researcher to undertake more dynamic and less restricted research, as this thesis 
depends on the availability of data and variables and cannot ask ͞fuƌtheƌ ƋuestioŶs͟. Therefore, 
the models cannot take factors into account such as discrimination or attitudes. Surveys such as 
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) could have been merged with the data used, 
but this would have reduced the number of countries and thus made multilevel modelling not 
possible.  
 
This leads to another limitation of multilevel modelling and the data used – because some 
of the variables used are only available for less than 30 countries, lack of statistical significance 
could be due to the low number of level-2 variables. Thus, the models might not capture 
significance. On the other hand, the models might exaggerate statistical significance. This is 
because this thesis is only a cross-sectional study, but has no longitudinal dimension. It does not 
take change over time into account and therefore whilst in 2010 there might be a statistically 
significant association between for example, family policies and the gender gap, this association 




LookiŶg at ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs oŶlǇ, ǁe ĐaŶ ŵake diffeƌeŶt 
observations based on results illustrated in figure 5.4. First of all, we find that every single country 
in the sample seems to make it harder for women to reach top positions with a global average of 
-.39 for highly educated individuals (table 3) and -.39 for the overall workforce (table 5.4). 
Whereas Poland, Malta, Romania and particularly Bulgaria, Latvia, Albania and Norway were 
leadiŶg ƌegaƌdiŶg highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh ŵaŶageƌial aŶd seŶioƌ pƌofessioŶal 
occupations, we cannot say the same for management only. In these eight countries – especially 
the Eastern European ones such as Romania, Latvia and Albania – ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ƌeaĐh 
managerial positions now ranges between -.33 and -.50. In the similar range, we find Portugal, 
Cyprus, Lithuania, Hungary, Finland, Denmark, Ireland, Turkey, Estonia, and Spain. The random 
effects for Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Slovakia and France are around .5 to .58 and are only 
exceeded by Slovenia, Italy, Germany and Greece.  
 
For the overall workforce, we find womeŶ͛s ƌelatiǀe likelihood to ƌeaĐh ŵaŶageƌial 
positioŶs Đoŵpaƌed to ŵeŶ͛s ƌaŶgiŶg fƌoŵ less thaŶ -.50 with the highest gender gap in Slovenia, 
Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy and Turkey. The lowest gender gaps are found in Norway, the UK, 
Belgium and Sweden. However, even here women are between -.28 and -.18 less likely than men 
to reach a managerial position. The gender gap in managerial positions varies crucially from the 
gender gap in senior professional and managerial positions. Most strikingly in Slovenia, where 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs ;-.20) is not as negative as for senior professional and 
managerial positions (-.55), the same is true for Latvia (-.12 compared to -.45), Romania (-.13 
compared to -.39) and Albania (0 compared to -.33). In the majority of other countries, the gender 
gap in managerial positions is even wider than for managerial and senior professional. Most 
striking here are Germany (-.65 compared to -.53), Greece (-.65 compared to -.52) and Spain (-
.66 to -.51), Ireland (-.60 compared to -.42), Luxembourg (-.53 compared to -.40), Cyprus (-.63 
compared to -.40), France (-.58 compared to -.40), Czech Republic (-.56 compared to -.38), 
Finland (-.70 compared to -.30), UK (-.52 compared to -.27), Norway (-.62 compared to -.29) and 
Belgium (-.46 compared to -.25). 
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Chapter 5: Cross-national variation of the gender gap in top positions  
This Chapter takes the reader through the multilevel models and highlights the need for 
individual- and job-level control variables. The research question answered in this Chapter is: To 
ǁhat eǆteŶt does ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ďe eŵploǇed iŶ a top positioŶ ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s ǀaƌǇ 
across countries? In short, indeed, all women on average are less likely to reach top positions 
compared to men. Additionally, this likelihood varies significantly across countries. Here, the 
analysis shows two additional aspects: the importance of how we define top positions and also 
the need to distinguish between educational levels as individual-level factors affect the gender 
gap of highly educated individuals differently. Another finding of this Chapter is that highly 
educated women face even greater gender gaps than women from less educated backgrounds.  
 
The previous Chapter summarised the data and methods chosen to answer the research 
questions raised in Chapter 2 and 3. The literature review has highlighted the following research 
gaps: First of all, previous research on gender labour market inequalities has focused mainly on 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt ƌates, paƌt-time and the gender pay gap. Even though gendered 
hierarchies are closely linked with the gender pay gap, vertical segregation has been neglected 
and if researched, then macro-level data was applied or generic definitions of top positions. Thus, 
this thesis defines top positions in a more distinct way as explained in section 6.2 and uses 
individual-level data from the European Labour Force Survey. Multi-level modelling – more 
specifically random intercept model – is applied as individuals are nested within countries and 
thus a multi-level data structure is given. Research questions two and three aim to understand 
whether cross-national variation of the gender gap in top positions is affected by family policies 
or labour market institutions. Because the independent variables are at the national macro-level 
and the dependent variable is at the individual-level embedded within countries, again multi-
level modelling is applied using random slope and cross-level interaction terms. Lastly, random 
slope models with cross-level interaction terms are being conducted adding both labour market 
institutions and family policies at the same time in order to test whether both mediate each 
other.  
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Therefore, before analysing the impact of any policies or institutions on the dependent 
variables as defiŶed iŶ Chapteƌ ϯ, ǁe Ŷeed to disĐuss fiƌst of all ǁhetheƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top 
positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s aĐtuallǇ does ǀaƌǇ sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ aĐƌoss ĐouŶtƌies. What is ŵoƌe, ǁe 
need to discuss how individual-level factors as defined in the previous Chapter affect the gender 
gap in professional and/or managerial occupations. The main reason for this is that the definition 
of top positions varies in several ways from previous papers on vertical segregation such as 
Schäfer et al. (2012), Hakim (1992, 2006), Fagan and Burchell (2002), Fortin and Huberman 
(2002), Estevez-Abe (2005, 2006), Mandel and Semyonov (2005) and others. In contrast to 
previous studies discussed in Chapter 2, this thesis uses individual-level data and thus does not 
apply macro-level iŶdiĐes suĐh as ǁoŵeŶ͛s shaƌe iŶ ŵaŶageƌial oĐĐupatioŶs. This alloǁs the 
author to control for numerous individual and job characteristics (see section 3.2) such as part-
time employment or household compositions. Therefore, the models acknowledge the possibility 
that observations might be due to composition effects and takes the risks of ecological fallacies 
into account. Using individual-level data also allows us to question definitions of what counts as 
a top positions and enables us to exclude or include occupations from this definitions. However, 
to the authoƌ͛s kŶoǁledge theƌe aƌe Ŷo otheƌ papeƌs usiŶg Đoŵpaƌaďle defiŶitioŶs of the geŶdeƌ 
gap, ǁhiĐh is ǁhǇ all assuŵptioŶs oŶ the iŵpaĐt of iŶdiǀidual aŶd joď ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
relative access to top positioŶs Đoŵpaƌed to ŵeŶ͛s Ŷeed to ďe ĐheĐked. LastlǇ, usiŶg iŶdiǀidual-
level data does not only enable the author to redefine the dependent variable itself and control 
for individual-level characteristics, but also allows the researcher to choose a particular sample, 
in this case highly educated individuals.  
 
The following Chapter discusses first the descriptive statistics on the gender gap as 
defined in Chapter 3. Here, the gender gap in top positions amongst highly educated individuals 
is compared to individuals from all educational levels in order to illustrate the differences 
between the two samples and to further justify choosing highly educated individuals as the 
saŵple size. Foƌ this puƌpose, ǁoŵeŶ͛s shaƌe aŵoŶg pƌofessioŶal aŶd/ oƌ ŵaŶageƌial positions 
is presented first, using individual level data but without controlling for individual and job level 
characteristics. Again, data here is presented for highly educated individuals and the overall 
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population. Because one of the key contributions of this thesis is to use individual and context 
level data, a multilevel analysis is conducted for both samples and both definitions of top 
positions. This again is to illustrate the differences between the two samples, but also to show 
step by step – and by adding key explanatory variables – how much more insight individual level 
data can give us on the gender gap. For this, the empty model is compared to a random intercept 
model using gender as the key independent variable, then a random intercept model adding all 
control variables and lastly, a random slope model is conducted to show cross-national variation 
in the gender gap. Then, to show exactly how countries differ and vary, the fixed effects are 
discussed by country. 
 
In a last step, the random effects for each country are presented in order to highlight in a 
multilevel model how much countries differ from the global average and how the variance 
component for the random slope varies.  An analysis of the results links the research questions 
back to the descriptive findings and is lastly followed by a short conclusion.  
 
5.1 Background and Research Questions   
 
The dependent variable in this thesis is the gender gap in top positions. Besides 
methodological reasons, the main reason for focusing on vertical segregation and particularly the 
geŶdeƌ gap iŶ top positioŶs is that ͞ ǀeƌtiĐal segƌegatioŶ is the keǇ issue fƌoŵ a poliĐǇ peƌspeĐtiǀe͟ 
with gendered hierarchies being the key cause for pay differentials (Hakim, 1992, p.132). 
Therefore, the overall research question of this Chapter is: 
 
To ǁhat eǆteŶt does ǁoŵeŶ’s likelihood to ďe eŵploǇed iŶ a top positioŶ ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ’s 
vary across countries? 
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Following the theoretical and empirical discussions of Chapter 2, the general assumption 
is that H1.1 Women generally are less likely to reach top positions even after controlling for 
individual and job level characteristics. What is more, H1.2 argues that the impact gender has on 
reaching top positions varies significantly across countries. In other words, the gender gap in top 
positions varies significantly across countries.  
 
However, the third hypothesis H1.3 argues that cross-national variation of the gender gap 
in to positions is different for highly educated women than the general female workforce, even 
after controlling for educational levels. This assumption is another key contribution of this thesis. 
This is based on two assumptions. The first one is that from a descriptive point of view, highly 
eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt patteƌŶs as disĐussed iŶ Chapteƌ Ϯ vary drastically from women 
ǁith loǁeƌ leǀels of eduĐatioŶ. While highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt ƌates foƌ eǆaŵple 
haǀe alǁaǇs ďeeŶ high, less eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt ƌates haǀe iŶĐƌeased dƌaŵatiĐallǇ 
over the past decades. However, both groups are subject to the same policies and institutions in 
a country, which is why we can assume that highly educated women react differently to policies 
than women with lower levels of education. Secondly, scholarly work reviewed in Chapter 2 that 
examines gendered hierarchies (see Schäfer et al., 2012) using individual level data, finds that 
eduĐatioŶ leǀels sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ iŶĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs. Thus, the 
question arises whether controlling for educational levels is sufficient as the nature of top 
positions requires a high level of skills and holding educational levels constant might not allow us 
to understand the direct impact of other individual and later on context level variables on the 
group that is most likely to reach top positions – highly educated women.  
 
Thus, there is a need to clearly distinguish between the two samples. This is done in the 
following analysis by comparing how individual level variables affect the gender gap both for 
highly educated individuals and the general workforce.  
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5.2 Descriptive statistics  
 
To begin the discussion of the descriptive statistics, we need to understand how crucially 
iŶdiǀidual aŶd joď leǀel ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs iŵpaĐt ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs. Figuƌes ϭ aŶd Ϯ 
shoǁ ǁoŵeŶ͛s shaƌe iŶ pƌofessional and/or managerial occupations across 31 European 
countries. Data is from 2010 and stems from the European Working Conditions Survey and has 
only been weighted, but not controlled for various individual-level factors.  
Figuƌe 5.ϭ WoŵeŶ’s shaƌe iŶ ŵaŶagerial and professional occupations, across 31 European 
countries, 2010
 




































































































































































































As figure 5.1 shows, across 31 European countries in 2010, in 9 countries – less than a 
third – women are overrepresented in managerial and highly professional occupations as defined 
in Chapter 3.2. If we look at the distribution of female managers and professionals across 
countries in greater detail, we can distinguish between countries with a relatively even share of 
male and female workers in top positions. These are countries where more than 40 percent of 
managers and professionals are female, but less than 60. Relatively gender-egalitarian – a ratio 
between 52 and 40 percent – are the Scandinavian countries Norway, Finland, Denmark and 
Sweden; Spain, France, the Central European states Hungary, Austria; Albania; and the Western 
European counties Belgium; and the Eastern European countries Slovak Republic, Romania and 
Slovenia. Particularly in Central Europe and the Eastern European countries, women seem to be 
overrepresented in managerial and professional occupations with a relatively high share of 
women in top positions in Poland, Latvia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and Croatia. Portugal as the 
only Mediterranean country stands out with over 61 percent of top positions held by women in 
2010.  
 
On the other side of the spectrum, we find particularly low rates of female managers and 
senior professionals in the Mediterranean states Greece, Italy, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. 
Western European countries such as Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland and Denmark show 
comparably low rates of women in top positions. The Netherlands and France are not lagging as 
far behind as their Western European neighbours, but show relatively high levels of vertical 
segregation as well. Thus, we can say that vertical segregation across Western and Southern 
Europe does not seem to follow any clear pattern. While we find that all Baltic and some Central 
European countries seem to have more women than men in top positions, Scandinavian 
countries with the exception of Denmark seem to have low level of vertical segregation with 
women and men being equally represented in top positions. On average, women in Western and 
Southern European countries with the exception of Portugal, are highly underrepresented with 
exceptionally low rates of less than a third of female managers and senior professionals in 
Greece, Italy, Germany and Czech Republic.  
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What is more, we find that including the overall population creates a very different 
picture with all Eastern and Central European countries having more than 50 percent of women 
in senior professional and managerial positions, but all Mediterranean and Western European 
economies having less than 50 % of top positions filled with female workers. The only 
Scandinavian country with more than 50 percent of women in top positions is Finland and 
Denmark for example only has 37 percent of top positions filled with women.  
Figure 5.2 Women's share in managerial occupations, across 31 European countries, 2010 
 
Source: European Working Conditions Survey (2010) 
 
If we narrow the definition of top positions down to managerial occupations only, we find 
that there is not a single country with more highly educated women in top positions than men 
(see figure 5.2). Only in Norway and Belgium, more than a third of all managers are women. In 
Cyprus, the Netherlands, Estonia, France, Sweden, Finland, Lithuania, the UK, Hungary and Malta 
roughly a fifth of all managers are women. In Luxembourg, Portugal, Latvia, Austria, Germany, 



















































































































































































women. We find less than 1 in 10 managers to be female in Czech Republic, Italy, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Albania, Romania, Greece, Croatia and Turkey. Thus, it already becomes apparent that 
the gender gap does not seem to follow any clear patterns.  
 
For the overall workforce, we find highly contrasting results with Romania for example 
having 72 percent of managers female and Croatia 63 percent. In Lithuania, Finland, Latvia, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, Austria, Czech Republic and Portugal between 44 
and 59 percent of all managers are female. Between 29 and 41 percent of all managers are female 
in Norway, UK, France, Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Albania, Slovenia, 
Ireland and Slovakia.  Turkey, Malta, Greece, Spain, Germany and Italy have the lowest share of 
women in managerial positions when examining the overall workforce.  
 
These results are surprising, as it seems that the gender gap in top positions is much more 
striking and negative when only looking at highly educated individuals. The assumption would 
have been the other way around with education and human capital being one of the key 
qualifications for managerial positions. However, it seems that education does not seem to close 
the gender gap, but even widens it.  
 
 As stated previously, the presented data ignores individual characteristics that might 
haǀe a sigŶifiĐaŶt iŵpaĐt oŶ ǁoƌkeƌs͛ likelihood to pƌogƌess in their careers. As argued by Baxter 
and Wright (2000), controlling for individual and job attributes can either decrease or increase 
the gender gap in top positions and thus impact vertical segregation. If for example women in 
Baltic countries have a common attribute that distinguishes them from men – for example higher 
levels of qualifications – then not holding this attribute constant, leads to a distortion and does 
not reflect the actual level of discrimination happening. Additionally, we need to find a way of 
comparing the cross-ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiatioŶ iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs takiŶg the 
hierarchical structure of the data used into account.  
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Table 5.1 illustrates the results of a multilevel analysis for the smaller sample – individuals 
with tertiary education. The empty model 1-ϭ, fiƌst ĐoluŵŶ, shoǁs hoǁ high aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s 
likelihood to reach a managerial or senior professional occupation is on average and how much 
this likelihood varies across countries. Generally, we can say that in 2010 individuals were less 
likely to reach managerial and senior professional positions than other positions as indicated by 
the statistically significant negative coefficient of -.77. What is more, looking at the ICC we find 
that across countries the likelihood of reaching a top position varies significantly. However, of all 
variance only two percent lies at the country level. For the purpose of this thesis, this low ICC 
however does not matter, as we are not interested in significant variance of the indiǀiduals͛ 
chances to reach the top, but in the gender gap and thus only the gender coefficient and random 
slope models are of interest.  
 
The random intercept model, second column, now includes the key independent 
individual-level variable, which is gender. We can see that as observed in figure 5.1 and 5.2, 
women on average, across our 31 countries, have statistically significantly lower chances to reach 
managerial and senior professional occupations. Adding gender as the key individual-level 
variable to explain cross-ŶatioŶal leǀel ǀaƌiatioŶ iŶ ǁoƌkeƌs͛ likelihood to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs, 
consequently leads to an even less variance explained at the country level. Nevertheless, the 
model seems to be a better fit as indicated by the change in log likelihood of 122.02 from -
6593.87 to -6471.85.   
 
Since one of the methodological contributions of this analysis is to take into account not 
only the nested data structure, but also numerous individual and job attributes, we need to 
control for age, migration, part-time work, the presence of (preschool) children, living with a 
partner, company size, public sector and training experience based on previous studies of 
occupational segregation and sectors (see also, Mandel and Shalev, 2009; Burchell et al., 2015; 
Dolado et al., 2002, 2003, Maume, 1999; Schäfer et al., 2012).  
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In a last step, fourth column of table 5.1, the model allows the impact gender has on 
eŵploǇees͛ ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh ŵaŶageƌial aŶd seŶioƌ pƌofessioŶal positioŶs to ǀaƌǇ aĐƌoss 
countries. This means that the model takes into account that female workers are not 
disadvantaged or advantaged to the same extent in every country that is included in the models. 
The random slope model shows that this assumption is correct as the variance of the impact 
gender has oŶ eŵploǇee͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs is statistiĐallǇ sigŶifiĐaŶt – as we can 
see from the statistically significant variance of the variable female across our level 2 - countries.  
Thus, ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s aƌe significantly lower on 
average, but also vary statistically significantly across countries as shown in the log likelihood but 
also significance of the random slopes variance component.  
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Table 5.1 Multilevel Analysis of managerial and senior professional occupations, tertiary 
education 
















  coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. 
Female      -0.67*** 0.04 -0.41*** 0.05 -0.37*** 0.08 
Constant -0.77*** 0.06 -0.42*** 0.06 -.94 ** 0.34 -1.00*** 0.33 
                  
Variance 
female             0.11* 0.05 
Variance 







country level  
0.02 -0.13 -0.56 -0.07 
Loglikelihood -6593.87 -6471.85 -5898.28 -5889.07 
Change in 
loglikelihood   122.02 573.57 9.21 
Note: *** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05; N=level 2=31, level 1=10,908 
 
Table 5.2 now presents the same models but for the bigger sample size – the overall 
workforce. This is done in order to provide further evidence to the idea that education levels 
crucially impact the position of men and women in the labour market and that the two samples 
should be treated separately in the later analysis. Here, we see again that the overall chance of 
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an individual to reach a managerial and senior professional position is negative and thus it is 
harder and less likely to obtain top positions compared to others. Four percent of the variance 
here is at the country level, which is more than for highly educated individuals. In addition to 
that, we again see in the next random intercept model that gender plays a significant role. It 
lowers chances to reach a top position by -.39, which is however not as negative as in figure 1 for 
highly educated individuals (the coefficient here was -.67). Thus, even though gender is 
significantly negative, the association is weaker, which confirms the observation that the gender 
gap for highly educated women is even larger.  
 
However, when we add a number of control level variables, including education level, to 
the model, gender has basically the same negative impact on access to top positions for both 
samples of around -.41 to -.42. We can see that adding control variables significantly improves 
the model and helps explain three percent more of the variance at the country level. Lastly, when 
allowing the impact gender has to vary across countries, we find again that the model significantly 
improves and what is more the cross-national variance of the gender gap is also significant. This 
means that like in table 5.1 for highly educated individuals, the impact of gender is not only 
negative, but it varies across countries. In other words, for the women in the included 31 
countries it matters significantly in which context and country they live, as gender does not seem 
to have the same impact on access to top positions across Europe. In other words, the gender 
gap in the likelihood of obtaining top position varies across countries. However, we can also see 
that the coefficient for the random slope variance of gender is smaller for the overall workforce 
with .06* than for highly educated individuals with .11* entailing that the gender gap variance 




Table 5.2 Multilevel Analysis of managerial and senior professional occupations, all 
educational levels 
















  coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. 
Female      -0.39*** 0.03 -0.42*** 0.04 -0.40*** 0.06 
Constant -1.83*** 0.06 -1.65*** 0.06 -2.14*** 0.24 -2.16*** 0.24 
                  
Variance 
female             0.06* 0.03 
Variance 
country level 0.11*** 0.03 0.11*** 0.03 0.11*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 
Variance 
individual level 3.29 
ICC/ Explained 
variance 
country level  
0.04 0.02 0.03 0.18 
Loglikelihood -13871.24 -13794.96 -10855.46 -10847.58 
Change in 
loglikelihood   
76.28 3015.77 3023.66 
Note: *** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05; N=level 2=31, level 1=35,021 
 
Focusing again on highly educated individuals as in table 5.1, in table 5.3 we find similar 
ƌesults ǁheŶ ĐoŵpaƌiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs oŶlǇ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, fiŶdiŶgs 
are not as significant as for senior professional and managerial positions combined. Again, the 
empty model 5-3-1 as illustrated in table 5.3 shows significantly lower chances for all employees 
to reach a managerial positions than other occupations. Additionally, we find a significant 
variation across countries, but only three percent of all variance lies at the country level. The 
variance at the country level for managerial jobs is slightly higher than for senior professional and 
managerial jobs. According to the random intercept model, we find that for women it is 
statistically significantly even harder to reach managerial positions than managerial and senior 
professional jobs with a coefficient of -.73 (model 5-3-2, table 5.3) compared to -.67 in model 5-
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1-2 in table 5.1. In the random slope model, we see that the impact gender has on the likelihood 
to reach a managerial position varies across countries, although the variance component is 
statistically significant only at a 0.10 level. Allowing the slope to vary, when comparing the log 
likelihood the model is improved by 3.12 but again only at a 10% significance rate.  
Table 5.3 Multilevel Analysis of managerial occupations, tertiary education 
Management (tertiary) 
  












  coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. 
Female      -0.73*** 0.07 -0.37*** 0.08 -0.39*** 0.10 
Constant -2.42*** 0.07 -2.06*** 0.07 -3.78*** 0.57 -3.79*** 0.57 
                  
Variance 
female             0.10€ 0.06 
Variance 
















Loglikelihood -3228.74 -3172.82 -2858.87 -2855.75 
Change in 
loglikelihood   55.92 313.95 3.12 
Note: *** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05; N=level 2=31, level 1=10,908 
 
 154 
Examining again the overall and not just tertiary educated workforce, we find similar but 
different results in Table 5.4. According to the empty model, it is harder to reach managerial 
positions than other occupations as indicated by the strongly negative coefficient. Five percent 
lies at the country level, which is more variance at the country level than for highly educated 
individuals. Gender again has a significantly negative effect with -.58*** which is slightly weaker 
than for the previous sample. However, again, after adding control level variables again 
controlling for educational levels, the impact of gender on managerial positions is basically the 
same for both sample sizes meaning that indeed women are less likely to reach the top, no matter 
which sample we choose. However, in contrast to table 5.3, the impact gender has on access to 
top position does not vary significantly across countries. This means that when examining the 
overall workforce and despite controlling for education, the gender gap does not vary across 
countries, meaning that women find the same obstacles in every country. In contrast to this, we 
find that when looking at highly educated individuals only, the gender gap varies significantly 
across countries.  
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  coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. 
Female      -0.58*** 0.05 -0.38*** 0.05 -0.39*** 0.06 
Constant -2.86*** 0.08 -2.60*** 0.08 -3.04*** 0.35 -3.04*** 0.35 
                  
Variance 
female             0.03 0.03 
Variance 
country level 0.18*** 0.05 0.16*** 0.05 0.21*** 0.06 0.20*** 0.06 
Variance 
individual level 3.29 
ICC/ Explained 
variance 
country level   0.05 0.11 -0.12 -0.07 
Loglikelihood -7709.08 -7633.50 -6284.07 -6283.18 
Change in 
loglikelihood   75.58 1425.01 0.89 
Note: *** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05; N=level 2=31, level 1= 35,021 
 
Looking more closely at the individual and job attributes that are controlled for in the 
random intercept and random slope models, we can see that most of the assumptions made in 
Chapter 3 are true. Table 5.5 lists all control variables both for the likelihood to reach managerial 
and table 5.6 to reach managerial and senior professional occupations. First of all we find that, 
foƌ ďoth depeŶdeŶt ǀaƌiaďles, seĐtoƌs seeŵ to ĐƌuĐiallǇ iŵpaĐt iŶdiǀiduals͛ likelihood to ƌeaĐh top 
positions. For managerial jobs for example, we find that working in any of the listed industries 
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seems to lower chances to reach top positions with education having the strongest negative 
impact, followed by the health sector, construction, the transport sector, the industry, other 
services and financial services and lastly by public administration. This is the case both for the 
overall workforce and tertiary educated individuals.  
 
However, comparing the coefficients for managerial positions with the wider definition 
of managerial and senior professional jobs, the results change slightly. For highly educated 
individuals, only education and the transpoƌt seĐtoƌ seeŵ to sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ deĐƌease iŶdiǀiduals͛ 
likelihood to reach top positions, whereas other services and health significantly improve 
chances. Working in the public sector generally seems to negatively impact chances both to reach 
managerial and/or senior professional positions. For the overall workforce however, we find that 
working in the industry, construction and financial sector – all highly male dominated – decreases 
iŶdiǀiduals͛ aĐĐess to ŵaŶageƌial aŶd seŶioƌ pƌofessioŶal positioŶs.  
 
Additionally, the company size affects both sample differently. For highly educated 
individuals aiming for managerial positions the size of the company does not seem to matter. 
However, for highly educated employees reaching managerial and senior professional levels, 
being employed at a large company has a significantly positive impact on reaching more senior 
top positions. For the overall workforce we can see that no matter which dependent variable we 
apply, individuals generally benefit from working at a large company, whereas working for a small 
company seems to significantly decrease their chances to reach a more senior position.  
As expected, part-time employment in any case hinders individuals from reaching top 
positions. What is more, for the overall workforce, paid training shows no significant effect in 
either models, while for highly educated individuals it increases chances to reach managerial 
positions (see table 5.5). Therefore, we can say that training seems to matter more for the very 
top positions and highly educated individuals. Against expectations, migration background has 
no significant impact in any of the models.  
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Another interesting finding is that the presence of children or being in a relationship have 
no impact on tertiary educated individuals. However, if we look at the overall workforce, we can 
see that having a partner significantly increases chances to reach top positions (see table 5.5 and 
5.6). While for the overall workforce having children decreases their chances to have a 
managerial and senior professional position (table 6), we find that having a child at preschool age 
significantly increases chances to reach a managerial position (table 5.5). For highly educated 
individuals, the youngest child being preschool age apparently has a significantly positive impact 
on individuals to reach managerial and senior professional jobs, while this impact is not 
significant for managerial positions only.  
 
IŶ geŶeƌal aŶd foƌ all ŵodels, age has a sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ positiǀe iŵpaĐt oŶ eŵploǇees͛ 
chances to reach top positions. As expected, part-time employment seems to hinder individuals 
from reaching top positions in general.  
 
To summarize, the majority of the selected control variables seem to have a statistically 
significant effect on either both or at least one of the outcome variables. Especially sectors, part-
tiŵe eŵploǇŵeŶt aŶd age seeŵ to sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ iŶflueŶĐe aŶ iŶdiǀiduals͛ likelihood to ƌeaĐh a top 
position. Thus, we need to control for these individual and job attributes in order to see to what 
eǆteŶt geŶdeƌ has aŶ iŵpaĐt oŶ eŵploǇees͛ likelihoods to ƌeaĐh the top. AdditioŶallǇ, ǁe ĐaŶ 
expect that after controlling for the listed variables, cross-national variation in vertical 
segregation is likely to look different than in figure 1 and 2 after having controlled for individual 
attributes. Lastly, we can already see that individual-level factors affect highly educated 
employees differently than the overall workforce. This difference is most striking for children in 
the household and partner. What is more, public sector employment seems to negatively affect 
the overall workforce, but not highly educated individuals. With regards especially to Chapter 5 
in which the association between family policies and the gender gap is discussed, these 
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differences are worth keeping in mind as they provide another justification why we need to 
clearly distinguish between education levels.  
 159 
Table 5.5 Random intercept and random slope multilevel models, managers 
  Managers (tertiary) Managers (all) 
  
Random intercept 
with individual level 
variables 
Random slope Random intercept 
with individual level 
variables 
Random slope 
 coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. 
Age  0.13*** 0.03 0.14*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.02 0.09*** 0.02 
Age2 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 
Having children  -0.03 0.10 -0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.07 
Having a partner 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.16* 0.06 0.16* 0.06 
Youngest child in 
preschool 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 Ϭ.ϭϰ€ 0.09 Ϭ.ϭϱ€ 0.09 
Part-time employed -0.59*** 0.12 -0.61*** 0.12 -0.92*** 0.08 -0.93*** 0.08 
Migrant -0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.08 
Industry sector -1.08*** 0.13 -1.09*** 0.13 -1.53*** 0.09 -1.53*** 0.09 
Construction  -1.69*** 0.23 -1.70*** 0.23 -2.74*** 0.18 -2.74*** 0.18 
Transport sector -1.68*** 0.26 -1.68*** 0.26 -2.14*** 0.18 -2.14*** 0.18 
Financial Services  -0.83*** 0.14 -0.83*** 0.14 -0.83*** 0.11 -0.83*** 0.11 
Public Administration  -0.65*** 0.15 -0.66*** 0.15 -0.52*** 0.11 -0.52*** 0.11 
Education  -2.58*** 0.20 -2.60*** 0.20 -2.25*** 0.16 -2.25*** 0.16 
Health Sector -1.86*** 0.16 -1.88*** 0.16 -1.99*** 0.13 -2.00*** 0.13 
Other Services  -0.86*** 0.11 -0.87*** 0.11 -0.90*** 0.07 -0.90*** 0.07 
Paid training  0.19* 0.07 0.18** 0.07 0.06 5.93 0.06 5.92 
Small  Company  0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 -0.22** 0.08 -0.22** 0.08 
Large Company 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.26** 0.09 0.26** 0.09 
Public sector  -0.21* 0.10 -0.20* 0.10 -0.04 0.08 -0.05 0.08 
Higher Education x x x x 0.92*** 0.06 0.92*** 0.06 
Employment status -0.74*** 0.10 -0.74*** .10 -1.73*** 0.06 -1.73*** 0.06 
Female  -0.37*** 0.08 -0.43*** 0.10 -0.38*** 0.05 -0.39*** 0.06 
Constant -4.64*** 0.56 -4.64*** 0.56 -3.04*** 0.35 -3.04*** 0.35 
Note: *** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05; N=level 2=31, level 1=10,908(tertiary)/ level 1=35,021 (all) 
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Table 5.6 Random intercept and random slope multilevel models, senior professionals and 
managers 
  Managers and Senior professionals (tertiary)  Managers and Senior professionals (all) 
  
Random intercept 
with individual level 
variables 
Random slope Random intercept 
with individual level 
variables 
Random slope 
 coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. 
Age  0.06*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 
Age2 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 
Having children  -0.14 0.07 -0.14 0.07 -0.10* 0.05 -0.10* 0.05 
Having a partner 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.12** 0.04 0.11** 0.04 
Youngest child in 
preschool 0.20** 0.08 0.22** 0.08 0.18** 0.06 0.19*** 0.06 
Part-time employed -0.55*** 0.06 -0.54*** 0.07 -0.75*** 0.05 -0.73*** 0.05 
Migrant 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.05 
Industry sector -0.11 0.09 -0.10 0.09 -0.79*** 0.06 -0.78*** 0.06 
Construction  -0.15 0.13 -0.15 0.13 -1.35*** 0.10 -1.34*** 0.10 
Transport sector -0.84*** 0.16 -0.82*** 0.16 -1.48*** 0.12 -1.48* 0.12 
Financial Services  0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 -0.21* 0.08 -0.21* 0.08 
Public Administration  0.26 0.11 0.27 0.11 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08 
Education  -1.13*** 0.11 -1.15*** 0.11 -1.40*** 0.09 -1.41*** 0.09 
Health Sector 0.31*** 0.09 0.33*** 0.09 -0.24** 0.07 -0.22** 0.07 
Other Services  0.62*** 0.08 0.63*** 0.08 0.11* 0.05 0.12* 0.05 
Paid training  0.05 3.71 0.05 3.67 0.04 8.97 0.04 8.94 
Small  Company  -0.06 0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.21*** 0.05 -0.20*** 0.05 
Large Company 0.38*** 0.07 0.38*** 0.07 0.38*** 0.06 0.39*** 0.06 
Public sector  -0.44*** 0.06 -0.43*** 0.06 -0.23*** 0.05 -0.23*** 0.05 
Higher Education x x x x 2.05*** 0.04 2.05*** 0.04 
Employment status  -0.76*** .07 -0.76*** .07 -1.35*** 0.05 -1.35*** 0.05 
Female -0.45*** 0.05 -0.40*** 0.08 -0.42*** 0.04 -0.40*** 0.06 
Constant -1.78*** 0.32 -1.83*** 0.32 -2.14*** 0.24 -2.16*** 0.24 
Note: *** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05; N=level 2=31, level 1=10,908(tertiary)/ level 1=35,021 (all) 
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What is more, with multilevel modelling we can also take the nested structure of our data 
into account and examine not only whether women on average are less likely to reach top 
positions, but more importantly how the effect gender has on career perspective varies across 
countries whilst controlling for individual and job attributes.  
 
 
Random effect models  
 
According to the random slope models in table 5.3 and 5.4, we can see that the gender 
gap in senior professional and/ or managerial positions for highly educated individuals varies 
significantly between countries, and for the overall workforce when looking at access to 
ŵaŶageƌial aŶd seŶioƌ pƌofessioŶal positioŶs. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh top 
positions are significantly dependent on the country we examine. However, which countries drive 
these significant variations? 
 
Figuƌe ϱ.ϯ illustƌates eaĐh ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s ƌaŶdoŵ effeĐts foƌ the ǁideƌ defiŶitioŶ of top 
positions – senior professional and managerial jobs both for highly educated women and the 
overall female workforce. The global average for the gender gap for highly educated individuals 
is -.37 (see table 1). Thus, we can say that on average men are 1.4 times more likely to reach 
senior professional and managerial positions compared to women with coefficients ranging from 
-.79* in Finland and -.78* in Germany (2.2 times more likely) to .10*  (0.90 odds for women) in 
Albania and .10** in Norway. For the overall workforce, the global average is -.40 (see table 2) 
with countries ranging from -.70 in Finland and -.66 in Spain to -.01 in Bulgaria and 0 in Albania. 
Here * or € indicates that the values are statistically different from the mean.  
We can see that amongst 31 European countries only in Croatia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Albania 
and Norway highly educated women seem to be more likely than men to have a managerial or 
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senior professional job, while for the overall female workforce there is not a single country where 
women are overrepresented in those jobs. We can also see how much every country varies from 
the global average of -.37 (tertiary educated sample) and -.40 (all educational levels). Only 
Poland, Malta, Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Latvia and Norway are clearly above the average for 
highly educated individuals. We also find Sweden, Austria, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Estonia above the average. Most striking are Slovenia and Slovakia which are doing much 
better than the global average and again Norway whose gender gap is much higher than the 
global average. However, while the extent of the gender gap varies, the overall tendency of 
countries in regards to how they differ from the average is similar to the smaller sample size.  
 
Figure 5.3 Random effects – WoŵeŶ’s likelihood to ƌeaĐh ŵaŶageƌial aŶd seŶioƌ pƌofessioŶal 
positions 
 
Notes: ***= p<.ϬϬϭ, **= p<.Ϭϭ, *= p<.Ϭϱ, €=p<.ϭϬ. These ǀalues aƌe statistiĐallǇ diffeƌeŶt fƌoŵ the gloďal ŵeaŶ.  
 
 
€  €  €  
€  €  €  






Figure 5.4 Random effects – WoŵeŶ’s likelihood to ƌeaĐh ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs, eduĐatioŶal 
levels  
  
***= p<.ϬϬϭ, **= p<.Ϭϭ, *= p<.Ϭϱ, €=p<.10. These values are statistically different from the global mean. 
 
As a measure of robustness check, fixed effect models were conducted. Fixed effects 
ŵodels pƌeseŶted iŶ taďle ϱ.ϳ illustƌate ǁhetheƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs ǀaƌies 
significantly from the coefficient in Germany. Thus, with Germany being the reference group we 
are looking at ordinary logistic regressions, not taking the nested data structure into account. 
However, since at a later stage the aim of this analysis is to investigate the impact of national 
level variables on individual level data, both for methodological reasons and for a better 
overview, multilevel models are preferred over logistic regression. But in order to find out 
whether the random effects as described above are significant, Table 5.7 lists the results of the 
fixed effects models using Germany as the reference group and thus illustrates this cross-national 
ǀaƌiatioŶ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, the taďle shoǁs hoǁ ŵuĐh 
in each ĐouŶtƌǇ, ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs ǀaƌies fƌoŵ ĐhaŶĐes iŶ GeƌŵaŶǇ. 
Germany was chosen as the reference group as according to figure 1 and 2 women in Germany 
are highly underrepresented in top positions without controlling for individual-level factors. 
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Looking at the first two columns that use the smaller sample of individuals with tertiary 
education only, we see that in Germany, tertiary educated women are 3.4 times less likely (-1.22 
units) likely than men to reach managerial positions; and men are 2.5 times more likely to reach 
managerial and senior professional jobs. Only in Italy and Greece women seem to be even less 
likely to reach managerial and/or senior professional positions. However, these coefficients are 
not statistically significantly different from Germany. Nevertheless, we find that in Belgium, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Austria Poland, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
Croatia, Norway and Albania women are significantly more likely to reach a managerial position 
compared to Germany. However, with the average/ constant being -3.52, it needs to be noted 
that even in Croatia and Austria with coefficients >2 women are less likely than men to reach 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt. The saŵe is tƌue foƌ ŵaŶageƌial aŶd seŶioƌ pƌofessioŶal positioŶs. Heƌe, ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
likelihood to reach top positions is statistically different from Germany in Bulgaria, Belgium, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Poland, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Croatia, Turkey 
and Albania. With the overall average being -1.45, we can see that in many countries the 
additional burden for women to reach top positions is only marginal. In Bulgaria, Latvia, Malta, 
Austria, Romania, Turkey and Albania for example, the country coefficients are >1 and thus nearly 
compensate for the negative overall average.  
 
Moving on to column three and four that list the results for the overall workforce and not 
just the tertiary educated sample, we find different results. First of all, the impact of gender on 
access to top positions in Germany is less strong with only -.80 for managers and -.74 for senior 
professionals and managers. What is more, there are fewer countries significantly different from 
Germany – i.e. less variation across countries in the gender gap in obtaining top positions. 
Whereas highly educated women in Latvia and Lithuania, Malta and the Netherlands, Poland and 
Portugal face a significantly different gender gap in managerial positions compared to Germany, 
we do not find any significant variation for the overall female workforce. Consequently, the 
gender gap in managerial positions seems to be much more homogeneous, more dependent on 
individual-level factors and less dependent on the country context for the overall workforce 
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compared to highly educated women who seem to be much more dependent on the country 
context.  
 
WheŶ ĐoŵpaƌiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to ŵaŶageƌial aŶd seŶioƌ pƌofessioŶal positioŶs to the 
previous models, we find that in the Netherlands and again Slovak Republic women face 
significantly lower gender gaps when examining the overall workforce. However, in Belgium, 
Malta, Poland, Portugal and Turkey there are no significant differences to be found for the wider 
sample, even though iŶ the pƌeǀious ŵodel ǁe see that highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top 
positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s is sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ higheƌ aŶd thus the geŶdeƌ gap sŵalleƌ. The 
observation that the gender gap in top positions seems to vary more significantly for highly 
educated women than for the overall female workforce suggests that either the models fail to 
incorporate and control for certain individual level variables or that highly educated women 
simply are more dependent on the context. In other words, women in every country and for all 
samples are less likely to reach senior professional and/ or managerial positions than men. We 
can see this from the results of the multilevel models in table 1 to 4. However, as indicated both 
by the random slope models presented in tables 1 to 4 and the fixed effects models in table 7, 
the scope of the gender gap in senior professional and/or managerial positions varies significantly 
for highly educated women. Consequently, context level factors are expected to significantly 
impact the gender gap for highly educated individuals. However, when examining the overall 
workforce, there is less variation of the gender gap and for managerial and senior professional 
positions no significant variation at all at the country level. These two observations – the 
difference between the two samples and the importance of context versus individual-level 
factors – again highlight the need for multilevel modelling. It is not only important to examine 
ǁhetheƌ geŶdeƌ has a sigŶifiĐaŶt iŵpaĐt oŶ iŶdiǀiduals͛ likelihood to reach top positions, but 
ŵoƌe iŵpoƌtaŶtlǇ ǁhetheƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌelatiǀe likelihood to ƌeaĐh ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs ǀaƌies 
across countries. In other words, we can see that women across 31 countries are not only less 
likely on average to reach the top, but that the context matters and chances to reach the top vary 
depending on the context, more specifically the country individuals live in.   
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Table 5.7 Fixed effects model - Germany as reference group 

















1#Bulgaria   1.67 1.25** 0.49 1.05*** 
1#Czech Republic   0.57 -0.18 0.66 0.01 
1#Denmark   0.59 0.23 0.27 0.29 
1#Belgium   1.32** 0.51€ 0.69* 0.29 
1#Estonia   0.42 0.51 0.17 0.29 
1#Greece   -0.35 0.25 -0.15 -0.05 
1#Spain   0.58 0.38 -0.31 -0.11 
1#France   0.53 0.21 0.43 0.17 
1#Ireland   0.63 0.02 0.24 -0.05 
1#Italy   -0.62 0.45 -0.10 0.30 
1#Cyprus   0.94 0.05 0.38 -0.05 
1# Latvia    1.42* 1.16** 0.07 0.75** 
1#Lithuania   1.00€ 0.70* 0.61 0.51€ 
1#Luxembourg   0.53 0.06 0.34 0.09 
1#Hungary   0.94 0.38 0.84 0.42 
1#Malta   1.58** 1.05** 0.48 0.42 
1#Netherlands   1.39** 0.49 0.53 0.19* 
1#Austria   2.00* 1.20* 0.74€ 0.62* 
1#Poland   1.59* 0.86* 0.52 0.56 
1#Portugal   1.37€ 0.88€ 0.29 0.33 
1#Romania   0.24 1.09** 0.31 0.82** 
1#Slovenia   0.01 0.69* -0.24 0.70** 
1# Slovak Republic   0.23 0.55 0.82€ 0.79* 
1#Finland   0.83 -0.07 0.97* -0.15 
1#Sweden   1.43** 0.62* 0.95** 0.51* 
1#United Kingdom   1.06* 0.33 0.67* 0.14 
1#Croatia   2.43* 0.77€ 1.24* 0.77* 
1#Turkey   0.61 1.30*** 0.04 0.30 
1#Norway   1.08* 0.16 0.59€ -0.06 
1#Albania   1.50€ 1.37*** 0.69€ 1.01*** 





  Note: *** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05; N=level 2=31, level 1=10,908(tertiary)/ level 1=35,021 (all) 
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5.3 Discussion  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, women are disadvantaged in the labour market; for example 
in terms of employment rates, pay and hours worked. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶdeƌƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ 
iŶ ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs aŶd thus oĐĐupatioŶal ǀeƌtiĐal segƌegatioŶ seeŵs to ďe ͞the keǇ issue 
fƌoŵ a poliĐǇ peƌspeĐtiǀe͟ ;Hakiŵ, ϭϵϵϮ, p.ϭϯϮͿ as it is the ŵaiŶ dƌiǀeƌ foƌ ǁage diffeƌeŶtials iŶ 
the labour markets. However, only few studies have examined vertical segregation or the glass 
ceiling from a detailed comparative perspective using individual-level data. Consequently, before 
examining the association between macro-level variables and vertical segregation, the first 
hypothesis of this Chapter needs to be addressed. Is there a glass ceiling – or in other words: Are 
women generally less likely to reach top positions and more specifically, does vertical segregation 
also exists for highly educated women while holding individual and job characteristics constant?  
 
The fiŶdiŶgs ĐleaƌlǇ suggest this. The glass ĐeiliŶg eǆists, as theƌe seeŵs to ďe ͞a 
tƌaŶspaƌeŶt ďaƌƌieƌ that kept ǁoŵeŶ fƌoŵ ƌisiŶg aďoǀe a ĐeƌtaiŶ leǀel iŶ ĐoƌpoƌatioŶs… It applies 
to women as a group who are kept fƌoŵ adǀaŶĐiŶg higheƌ ďeĐause theǇ aƌe ǁoŵeŶ͟ ;MoƌƌisoŶ 
et al. 1987, p. 13, as cited in Baxter and Wright, 2000, p.276). Looking back to Chapter 2, we find 
that based on macro-level data and following a general definition of management, only 33 
percent of all managers were women in 2015 in comparison to 30 percent in 2010 on EU-27 
average (see figure 2.8). While the definition of top positions here lacks precision and does not 
reflect status, for the purpose of this dissertation not simply managerial positions seem relevant, 
but rather employment relations and conditions. Thus, both immediate rewards in terms of the 
salary and long-term or prospective benefits such as career opportunities are relevant (see 
Chapter 3). Following a more specific definition of top position, we find in a first step that indeed 
women are less likely to reach top positions than men – both senior professional and/ or 
managerial positions. However, in contrast to the clear observation that women are 
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underrepresented in managerial positions following the Eurostat/ ILO definition, we find that in 
one third of the countries women are actually overrepresented in managerial and highly senior 
professional occupations as defined in Chapter 3.2. However, these findings change dramatically 
when controlling for individual-level and job factors such as sectors, part-time employment and 
age. In other words, part-tiŵe eŵploǇŵeŶt has a sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ Ŷegatiǀe iŵpaĐt oŶ aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s 
likelihood to reach a top position.  
 
Thus, we could assume that because women are more likely to be working part-time, 
holding part-time employment constant should decrease vertical segregation as differences can 
be explained by full-time versus part-time. These findings support Baxter and Wright (2000) who 
argue that vertical segregation increases for part-tiŵe eŵploǇŵeŶt due to the ͞oƌgaŶizatioŶal 
costs for promoting part-tiŵe ŵaŶageƌs͟ ;Baǆteƌ aŶd Wƌight, ϮϬϬϬ, p. ϮϴϯͿ. Age oŶ the otheƌ 
hand has a significantly positive impact and thus corresponds with the idea of the accumulation 
of human capital over time. Experience and with it human capital is likely to increase over time 
aŶd affeĐts eŵploǇees͛ likelihood to ďe iŶ a higheƌ positioŶs ;see Holst et al. , 2010 as cited in 
Schäfer et al., 2012).  
 
Sectors can play a role due to hierarchical structures that can either allow for more 
managerial positions or less. The key control variable however is gender and based on our models 
ǁe see that geŶdeƌ sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ iŵpaĐts aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s likelihood to ƌeaĐh a top positioŶ. In other 
words, having controlled for various individual and job characteristics, we find that highly 
educated women are significantly less likely to reach a senior professional and/ or managerial 
position. Additionally, we can say that individual levels such as age matter significantly and 
vertical segregation actually becomes more striking and extreme when controlling for these 




The second hypothesis H1.2 Đlaiŵs that ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs is Ŷot 
only generally lower, but also that the impact of gender and thus the gender gap varies 
significantly across countries. This hypothesis can be verified based on the random slope models, 
the fixed effects and random effect models as discussed above.  While the random slope models 
provide the evidence that the context – in this case the country – iŵpaĐts a ǁoŵaŶ͛s likelihood 
to reach a top position, the random effects also show how this impact varies across countries.  
However, results do not follow any clear patterns. As discussed in Chapter 2.1, corporatist 
Western European and Scandinavian countries have high levels of tertiary educated women in 
the labour market. Looking at pay differentials, we find that Western and some Eastern European 
countries show relatively high pay gaps, Nordic countries average levels and Mediterranean 
relatively low to medium levels.  Regarding horizontal segregation, there were no clear patterns 
visible with Baltic and corporatist countries showing high rates of women in female-dominated 
occupations and Central and Eastern European countries relatively low levels. Focusing on 
vertical segregation only, Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) and Pettit and Hook (2009), claim 
that vertical segregation does not seem to be lowest in Scandinavian countries despite high 
female employment rates and gender egalitarian policies in these countries. On the contrary, 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs seeŵs to ďe loǁeƌ iŶ soĐial democratic countries than 
in liberal regimes (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006).  Using individual-level data, Fagan and Burchell 
(2002) come to similar results, but also are unable to identify clear patterns, as especially 
corporatist European countries do not generally follow the same trend.  
 
EǆaŵiŶiŶg the ƌaŶdoŵ effeĐts peƌ ĐouŶtƌǇ foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ƌeaĐh ŵaŶageƌial 
and senior professional positions, we find some evidence for Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 
2006), but also more details than Fagan and Burchell (2002) as the country sample also includes 
Eastern European countries. With the exception of Hungary and the Czech Republic, women in 
every formerly socialist country are more likely to reach to positions than the global average. 
Additionally, four of the five countries allowing women more than men to reach the top are 
formerly socialist. Focusing on Scandinavian countries, Norway performs particularly well and 
Sweden at least better than the average. However, in Denmark and Finland women are less likely 
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to reach top positions – both compared to the global average and per se. Corporatist and liberal 
countries seem to disadvantage women the most, with Austria being the only country above the 
aǀeƌage. Thus, ǁhile these fiŶdiŶgs suppoƌt MaŶdel aŶd “eŵǇoŶoǀ͛s (2005, 2006) claim that 
Scandinavian countries are not always the leaders in terms of gender equality, they at the same 
tiŵe do Ŷot suppoƌt the idea of liďeƌal ĐouŶtƌies faĐilitatiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs.  
 
This becomes even more striking when lookiŶg at ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ƌeaĐh ŵaŶageƌial 
positioŶs oŶlǇ. Heƌe, ǁe fiŶd Ŷot a siŶgle ĐouŶtƌǇ iŶĐƌeasiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh top 
positions relative to men. The cross-national variation of gender does not follow any patterns. 
However, with regard to the hypothesis, we see a vast range of variation with Germany and 
Greece  being on the most negative and Belgium and Sweden on the least negative end of 
the speĐtƌuŵ. Thus, ǁe ĐaŶ saǇ that ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs ǀaƌǇ sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ 
between countries. However, the distribution of this variation and the range depends 
dramatically on the sample, which leads to the third hypothesis.  
 
The third hypothesis H1.3 claims that the gender gap is different among highly educated 
individuals than for the overall workforce. The assumption here is that again context matters and 
highly educated women respond differently to policies and institutions. As argued by Mandel and 
Shalev (2009), we need to distinguish between class and education in order to understand which 
context is advantageous for women and which one is not. The findings discussed in the previous 
section agree with this claim. Firstly, we can see that individual-level factors impact individuals in 
the samples differently. While for example having children and a partner significantly affect the 
likelihood of an individual to reach a top position if we only control for education, there is not 
significant effect if we narrow the sample fully down to highly educated individuals only. Thus, if 
for highly educated men and women, having children and partners does not affect their 
likelihood to have a top position, but it significantly impacts chances of individuals with lower 
levels of qualification, with regard to the later research questions, we need to narrow the sample 
down to highly educated individuals only. What is more we see that, according to the random 
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slope models, not only does education matter when it comes to our control variables;  the impact 
of the independent explanatory variable – gender – also varies significantly between the two 
samples. While we find significant cross-national variation of the gender gap among highly 
educated individuals as discussed above, we only see a smaller or even insignificant gender gap 
among the overall workfoƌĐe. This ĐoŶseƋueŶtlǇ ƌefleĐts that, ǁhile foƌ highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
access to top positions certain countries are less detrimental than others and consequently the 
context matters, the same countries might be far more or even less detrimental for the overall 
workforce.  For managerial and senior professional occupations, we find that in Norway for 
example the gender gap amongst highly educated women is much smaller than the average and 
actually women are more likely than men to have a top position. For the overall female workforce 
however, the gender gap in Norway is much higher than the global average. In contrast to this, 
in Denmark and Finland we find a much wider gender gap among highly educated employees 
compared to the overall workforce. We find similar results for access to managerial positions. In 
Norway and Sweden, the gender gap amongst highly educated women is much lower than for 
the overall female workforce, the opposite is the case for Finland.  
 
These findings show that a gender gap for the overall workforce is meaningless, as it does 
not take into account how much education matters. What seems to work for highly educated 
women does not help the overall female workforce. And we see that when only looking at tertiary 
educated women the gender gap increases and becomes more significant. Treating women from 
different educational backgrounds as if they belonged to a homogenous group would therefore 
lead to misinterpretations and would not allow examination of the causes for cross-national 
variation of the gender gap because there is not just one gender gap.  
 
What is more, these results show that particularly the countries causing the welfare state 
paradox, central to the following Chapter, show crucially different gender gaps for the two 
samples. With Norway and Sweden showing a higher gender gap amongst the general workforce, 
but particularly Finland the opposite, the Welfare State Paradox that is based on the overall 
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workforce and only controls for education needs to be revisited using highly educated individuals 
as the sample. The significance of the sample, but also the overall data leads to another important 
observation of this Chapter: The extent of the gender gap crucially depends on how we define 
top positions. Here, using individual-level data with more specific definitions of vertical 
segregation allows a more accurate picture of the gender gap. Hakim (1992) argues that this is 
due to problems with occupational classifications and the level of aggregation in the data. 
Estevez-Abe (2005) also uses macro-level data and suggests examining the share of women as 
corporate managers in order to fully capture the impact of institutions on segregation. However, 
indices based on aggregated data fail to represent the heterogeneity of the society and cannot 
capture segregation, which is why I argue that we need to instead apply individual level data. 
 
And indeed, the findings so far show that extent of vertical segregation depends crucially 
on the definition of the dependent variable. Vertical segregatioŶ as ŵeasuƌed iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s shaƌe 
in managerial occupations at the macro-level seems to be weakest in Eastern European welfare 
states and Sweden. However, we cannot say that the Scandinavian countries are doing 
particularly well and the corporatist countries are not. It seems that welfare regime theory is not 
the most useful concept to understand cross-nation variation. Again, these findings and also the 
data used follow Mandel and Semyonov (2005, 2006) and Estevez-Abe (2005). 
 
However, if we start redefining vertical segregation the results change considerably. 
MaŶageƌial oĐĐupatioŶ Ŷoǁ oŶlǇ iŶĐludes oĐĐupatioŶs of the ͞higheƌ salaƌiat͟ ;see Chapteƌ ϯ.ϭͿ 
and excludes for example service managers. Secondly, following the definition of the higher 
salariat, we can also count senior professionals as top occupations and thus widen the definition 
of top positions. Lastly, only individuals with higher education are included in the sample. Before 
controlling for individual and job characteristics, we find surprisingly low levels of vertical 
segregation with women in a third of the countries being overrepresented in top positions. 
Adding control level variables however delivers more accurate and contrasting results. For 
managerial positions only, women in every country are underrepresented in top positions. In 
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other words, vertical segregation exists in all countries, but is the least negative in Sweden and 
Belgium.  
 
Following the wider definition of vertical segregation, we can say that generally in 
Mediterranean, continental corporatist and Denmark and Finland as representatives of the 
Nordic countries women have to lowest chances to reach senior professional and managerial 
positions. On the other hand, Eastern European countries are more positive than the average for 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đaƌeeƌ peƌspeĐtiǀes.   
 
To summarize, we can say that not only the distribution around the global average 
depends on how we define top positions, but also the likelihood to reach these positions per se. 
WoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh ŵaŶageŵeŶt positions are even lower than reaching senior 
professional and managerial jobs. Moreover, the impact of gender does not seem to vary as 
significantly as for the wider definition of top positions (senior professionals and managers). This 
observation also reflects the findings of the random slope variance being more significant for the 
wider definition than for managerial positions only.  
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
The key finding of this Chapter is that the gender gap is not only more significant for highly 
educated women, but also larger than for the general female workforce. In other words, if we 
concentrate on a sample with high levels of education, it seems that gender plays an even larger 
role. 
 
Thus, we can say that in 2010 on European average women were less likely to reach both 
managerial and/ or senior professional positions. Even though coefficients differ slightly, the 
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impact gender has on our dependent variable is almost the same for both the narrow and the 
wider definition of top positions. Additionally, we find that the impact gender has on vertical 
segregation varies significantly across countries. However, it is more statistically significant for 
senior professional and managerial positions than for managerial positions only, which may be 
due to the power of the overall model and the reduced sample size of the more narrow definition. 
Most importantly, the gender gap is bigger for highly educated women in comparison to less 
educated women. These findings highlight the first contribution of this thesis. Even though the 
majority of research assumes women to be a homogenous group and only controls for education, 
this thesis tests the validity of this assumption for the gender gap amongst highly educated 
individuals. The question that remains is what can explain for the cross-national variance in these 




Chapter 6: The welfare state paradox and vertical segregation  
 
As shown in the previous Chapter, women are statistically less likely to reach top 
positions, namely managerial and senior professional positions. In addition, the author found 
that the likelihood varies significantly across the countries examined in this thesis. The next step 
in this thesis is then to answer why such cross-national variance exists. This Chapter finds that 
assumptions are not true that are based on the overall workforce when we look at individual-
level data, highly educated individuals only and also include a much wider range of family policies 
separately and not in a composite indicator. Maternity leave actually has no impact on the gender 
gap amongst highly educated individuals. Well-paid leave even seems to reduce the gender gap 
in managerial positions. The Chapter supports the claim made by Mandel and Shalev (2009) and 
Dorado et al. (2002) to be critical of the effect of policies on gender inequalities.  It also shows 
that family policy indices and typologies do not capture the association between family policies 
and the gender gap and thus shows the limitations of these aggregate ways of measuring policies.  
 
As explained in Chapter 2, the question remains why – despite progressive family policies 
– Northern welfare states still appear to have comparably high levels of occupational gender 
segregation (Estevez-Abe, 2005, p. 153). Mandel and Semyonov describe this phenomenon as 
the ǁelfaƌe state paƌadoǆ ďǇ aƌguiŶg that the ͞saŵe ǁelfaƌe state aĐtiǀities that pƌoŵote oŶe 
diŵeŶsioŶ of geŶdeƌ eƋualitǇ appeaƌ to iŶhiďit aŶotheƌ diŵeŶsioŶ͟ ;ϮϬϬϲ, p. ϭϵϰϮͿ. IŶ other 
words, family policies reinforce both gendered hierarchies within the labour market and the 
emergence of female- and male-typical jobs. Additionally, family policies interact with the 
socioeconomic position of women and affect highly skilled women differently than low skilled 
women (Mandel, 2012). While more generous welfare states demonstrably help women to enter 
the labour market, they at the same time appear to hinder women from reaching powerful 
positions (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006). However the apparent negative impact of family 
policies has been contested by various scholars. Korpi, Ferrarini and Englund (2013) for example 
question the welfare state paradox. They find no significant effect of family policies on highly 
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eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt ƌates and argue that in countries with progressive dual-career 
policies, the chances for women obtaining a high position in the private labour market is higher 
than elsewhere. Keeping these contradictory empirical results in mind, this Chapter aims to 
answer the ƋuestioŶ: Do faŵilǇ poliĐies tƌulǇ deĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s pƌospeĐts of aĐhieǀiŶg top 
positioŶs ďǇ affeĐtiŶg highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌelatiǀe likelihood to haǀe top positioŶs 
diffeƌeŶtlǇ thaŶ ŵeŶ͛s?  
 
This Chapter contributes to the recent debate on the described relationship between 
family policies and occupational gender segregation in three ways. Firstly, by looking at purely 
vertical segregation at the individual level. The author argues that vertical segregation – 
differences in levels of hierarchical position in the labour market – serves as a better proxy to 
measure gender inequalities. Firstly because, in contrast to employment rates vertical 
segregation cannot be explained by prevailing welfare regime typologies and has been widely 
neglected by labour market researchers in favour of the pay gap. However secondly, it is the main 
factor causing wage inequalities. Vertical segregation in this Chapter is looked at by comparing 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ďe iŶ ŵaŶageƌial aŶd seŶioƌ pƌofessioŶal oĐĐupatioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s.  
 
As a second contribution, the sample is limited to individuals with tertiary education only. 
This Chapter aims to investigate the impact of family policies specifically only highly educated 
women and not on the overall workforce.  This enables us to avoid potential dilution effects by 
researching the possibility that a decline in top positions for women is due to the overall increase 
of the female workforce – especially in less lucrative jobs. 
 
As a third contribution, this Chapter analyses a wide range of family policy variables. In 
contrast to Mandel and Semyonov (2006), this analysis additionally introduces more indicators 
to measure family policies, including a wide range of policies drawn from Multilinks (2011) and 
the OECD database.  Individual level data stems from the European Working Conditions Survey 
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ϮϬϭϬ.  With ǁoŵeŶ͛s aŶd ŵeŶ͛s shaƌe iŶ ŵaŶageƌial aŶd seŶioƌ pƌofessioŶal positioŶs ǀaƌǇiŶg 
across 24 European countries in 2010, this Chapter applies multi-level analysis to identify what 
hinders all workers, but particularly women, from reaching top positions by controlling for 
education and other individual-level variables.  
 
 
6.1 Background and Research Questions  
 
The key contribution of this Chapter is to examine whether family policies can help to 
explain cross-national variation of the gender gap in top positions. Therefore, theoretical 
connections and empirical findings that have been discussed in Chapter 3 need to be tested in 
order to investigate whether first of all, results can ďe applied to highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess 
to top positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s as ǁell usiŶg iŶdiǀidual-level data and a wide range of family 
policy indicators. As established in section 2.6, the overall research question for this Chapter is:  
 
How do family policies at a national level affect ǁoŵeŶ’s likelihood to aĐhieǀe top positioŶs 
at the iŶdiǀidual leǀel ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ’s? 
 
7 Research hypotheses have been established in order to fully understand how family policies 
impact the gender gap in top positions: 
H2.1 is based on the idea that generous maternity leave makes employers more reluctant 
to hire women as it discourages women from returning to work shortly after childbirth.  For the 
gender gap in top positions this means that women in countries with generous maternity leaves 
are less likely to reach top positions as they are discouraged from returning to work after 
childbirth quickly due to financial incentives. This in return means for employers that a female 
worker poses the risk of longer career interruptions than a male colleague. Thus, we can expect 
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that because first of all, women on generous maternity leaves are missing out on experience and 
training, which reduces their human capital and therefore lowers their chances to compete with 
men for top positions. Secondly, women in countries with generous maternity leaves are also 
more likely to face motherhood penalties and are less likely to be hired for positions from the 
start that could in the future help them to reach top positions.  
 
H2.2 assumes that generous paternity leave is linked with lower gender gaps in top 
positions. This is because paternity leave in contrast to maternity leave indicates that men are 
more involved in family responsibilities and thus the traditional division of labour between the 
spouses is softened. With men taking up more responsibilities, women are more likely to 
reconcile work and family and thus more likely to reach top positions.  
 
H2.3 focuses on the link between parental leave and the gender gap. Because parental 
leave is still taken up mainly by women, generous parental leave is expected to widen the 
gender gap in the same way as maternity leave. Employers are more reluctant to hire women.  
 
H2.4 assumes that short, but well-paid leave is regarded as a tool to help parents to take 
time of work but return quickly. Thus, employers in countries with short well-paid leaves are 
more likely to hire women than in countries with long unpaid leaves as the latter discourage 
women to return to work quickly. On the other hand, long well-paid leaves discourage women 
from returning quicker after childbirth and therefore pose a risk to employers. Thus, long well-
paid leave can be expected to increase the gender gap.  
 
H2.5 argues that extensive publicly funded childcare hinders women from reaching top 
positions as it correlates with large public sector. Women are overrepresented in public sectors 
anyway and thus underrepresented in private sectors. Consequently, this segregation between 
public and private sector employment leads to fewer women in the private sector and thus 
women having relatively lower chances of reaching managerial positions than men. According 
to Mandel and Semyonov (2006), the negative impact of childcare on vertical segregation is due 
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to the strong emphasis of the state on caretaking in the concerned countries which not only 
encourages women to take time off, but also to move into occupations that are more mother-
friendly, allowing them increased flexibility. As expenditure on childcare can be associated with 
high coverage of childcare, we can expect high levels of expenditure to also increase the gender 
gap.  
 
H2.6 focuses on the impact financial incentives have on the division of labour. Both 
childcare allowances and tax allowances and deductions aim to support care at home and thus 
are likely to protect the traditional division of labour between the spouses. Consequently, we 
can expect the gender gap to be higher in countries with generous allowances.  
 
According to H2.7, in countries with policies supporting the traditional division of labour 
between spouses, women are less likely to access top positions. In familiarised countries, 
dependencies between family members are strengthened by reducing economic and social 
consequences of providing care. 
 
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics  
 
To begin with the descriptive part of this Chapter, we need to pay attention to the varying 
sample sizes that are due to data limitation (see tables 6.1 and 6.2, bottom columns). For Albania 
and Turkey, there is no data available on childcare enrolment of children over 3 years old up the 
compulsory school age (table 6.1, model 6-1-2 and 6.2, model 6-2-1). Thus, the sample here is 
reduced to 29 countries and 10372 individuals. Additionally, there is no data available on 
maternity leave and childcare enrolment rates of children under three year old for Turkey, 
Albania and Croatia. At level 2 the models are based on 28 countries, at level 1 on 10210 
individuals (table 6.1, model 6-1-1 and 6.2, model 6-2-1). These three countries in addition to 
Cyprus also do not seem to provide data on paternity and parental leave.  Here, level 2 uses 27 
countries and level 1 9882 individuals (table 6.1, model 6-1-3 and 6.2, model 6-2-3). What is 
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more, data on expenditure for childcare is not available for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Romania, Albania, Croatia and Turkey. Consequently, the sample is reduced to 22 
countries and 8541 individuals. With only 16 countries and 7108 individuals the sample is too low 
for a reliable model, especially considering that later on random slope models with interaction 
terms are run. 
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Table 6.1 Random slope models for different N for managerial and senior professional positions due to varying level 1 and level 2 data  
 Model 6-1-1 Model 6-1-2 Model 6-1-3 Model 6-1-4 
Model to 
compare for 
Maternity Leave and 
Childcare 
Childcare enrolment Paternity and Parental leave Expenditure on Childcare  
 B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. 
Female -0.44*** 0.08 -0.44*** 0.07 -0.43*** 0.08 -0.57*** 0.06 
Constant -1.00** 0.35 -0.98** 0.35 -1.00** 0.35 -1.18** 0.40 
         
Variance female  0.08* 0.04 0.08* 0.04 0.07€ 0.04 0.01 0.02 





       
Loglikelihood -5509.5166 -5615.6559 -5337.0832 -4551.2901 
Level 1 
(individuals) 
10210 10372 9882 8541 
Level 2  
(countries) 
28 29 27 22 
Models control for variables such as Age, Age2, Having children , Having a partner, Youngest child in preschool, Part-time employed, Migrant, Industry 
sector, Construction Transport sector, Financial Services, Public Administration, Education, Health Sector, Other Services, Paid training, Small  Company, 
Large Company, Public sector, Employment status Full models in Appendix. *** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, € =p<0.
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Table 6.2 Random slope models for different N for managerial positions due to varying level 1 and level 2 data  
 Model 6-2-1 Model 6-2-2 Model 6-2-3 Model 6-2-4 
Model to 
compare for 
Maternity Leave and 
Childcare 
Childcare enrolment Paternity and Parental leave Expenditure on Childcare  
 B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. 
Female 
-0.41*** 0.11 -0.40*** 0.11 -0.43*** 0.11 -0.50*** 0.13 
Constant 
-3.66*** 0.59 -3.68*** 0.59 -3.70*** 0.60 -4.20*** 0.67 
 
        
Variance female  
0.11 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.09 
Variance country  




        
Log likelihood -2733.1873   -2329.4026 -2329.4026 
Level 1 
(individuals) 
10210 10372 9882 8541 
Level 2  
(countries) 
28 29 27 22 
Models control for variables such as Age, Age2, Having children , Having a partner, Youngest child in preschool, Part-time employed, Migrant, Industry 
sector, Construction Transport sector, Financial Services, Public Administration, Education, Health Sector, Other Services, Paid training, Small  Company, 
Large Company, Public sector, Employment status. Full models in Appendix. *** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05 
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Random slope models are run with cross-level interaction terms in order to examine the 
impact of family policies on vertical segregation. In order to see whether these cross-level 
interaction terms improve the models and significantly reduce the variance at the individual and 
country level, we need to compare variance of the more advanced models with regular random 
slope models without cross-level interaction. Because the sample size however varies for the 
different context level variables, we cannot compare these models with the ones established in 
Chapter 3. Thus, the models in table 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate random slope models without cross-
level interaction terms for the different samples. Table 6.1 shows the results of the likelihood to 
reach a managerial and senior professional positions, table 6.2 shows the same for managerial 
positioŶs oŶlǇ. The keǇ oďseƌǀatioŶ heƌe is that ǁe fiŶd that ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ƌeaĐh top 
positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s is significantly different across different countries under investigation 
if we include a larger group of countries such as Eastern European and Baltic countries. Data on 
expenditure on childcare is only available for Western European countries including Scandinavia, 
Western and Mediterranean countries, but excluding Eastern and Central European countries. 
We find no significant variation across countries of varying access to managerial and senior 
professional positions in the models with only 22 country cases. According to table 6.2, there is 
Ŷo sigŶifiĐaŶt ǀaƌiatioŶ aĐƌoss ĐouŶtƌies iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌelatiǀe likelihood Đoŵpaƌed to that of ŵeŶ 
to reach managerial position, regardless of the different country cases under investigation. In 
contrast to this, we found with more country cases as discussed in Chapter 4, table 4.1 model 4-
1-4 and 4.3, model 4-3-4 significant variation of the gender gap across countries.  
 
6.2.1 Cross-level interaction terms 
 
Adding one context level variable at a time, we first examine whether family policies 
separately have a significant impact on vertical segregation (Table 6.3-6.4). These observations 
are based on the insignificant main effect and the insignificant cross-level interaction term, which 
indicates whether there is an additioŶal effeĐt oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đaƌeeƌ ĐhaŶĐes ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s.  
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Table 6.3 The impact of context factors in explaining the cross-ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiaŶĐe iŶ ǁoŵeŶ’s ƌelatiǀe likelihood to oďtaiŶ a ŵaŶageƌial aŶd 
senior professional position  
 Leaves 
Models 6-3-1 6-3-2 6-3-3 6-3-4 6-3-5 6-3-6 6-3-7 













parental leave Well-paid leave  
Main effect 
(Macro Factor) 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.04 0.05 
female -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.46*** 
Macro 
factor*female 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.06 -0.07 -0.01 0.10 
Variance female 
level 0.08€ 0.07€ 0.07€ 0.07€ 0.07€ 0.07€ 0.06€ 
Variance country 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 
Exp. Var. random 
slope: female (from 
model 3) 2.96% 11.94% 0.48% 1.19% 6.54% 0.20% 20.23% 
Exp. Var. level 2 
(from model 3) 0.94% -0.52% 1.97% 1.55% -0.55% 0.96% 3.30% 
Log likelihood -5509.22 -5508.59 -5336.69 -5336.64 -5336.65 -5336.95 -5507.70 
Level 2 N 10210 10210 9882 9882 9882 9882 10210 
Level 1 N 28 28 27 27 27 27 28 
Models control for variables such as Age, Age2, Having children , Having a partner, Youngest child in preschool, Part-time employed, Migrant, Industry 
sector, Construction Transport sector, Financial Services, Public Administration, Education, Health Sector, Other Services, Paid training, Small  Company, 
Large Company, Public sector, Employment status Full models in Appendix.*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05
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Table 6.3 continued: The impact of context factors in explaining the cross-ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiaŶĐe iŶ ǁoŵeŶ’s ƌelatiǀe likelihood to oďtaiŶ a 
managerial and senior professional position  
 Childcare policies 





































Main effect (Macro 
Factor) 0.06 0.06 0.09 -0.03 -0.15** 0.02 -0.09 Ϭ.ϭϮ€ 0.14* 
female -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.41*** -0.44*** -0.45*** -0.46*** -0.56*** 
Macro factor*female -0.11 -0.07 0.00 0.01 Ϭ.ϭϯ€ 0.01 -Ϭ.ϭϮ€ 0.17** -0.04 
Variance female level 0.07€ 0.08€ 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.05€ 0.04 0.02 
Variance country 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.07** 0.10** 0.08** 0.08** 0.10** 
Exp. Var. random slope: 
female (from model 3) 2.82% -1.45% -0.45% -0.88% 0.26% 30.44% 45.28% -19.48% 2.82% 
Exp. Var. level 2 (from 
model 3) 2.91% 7.85% 1.00% 18.03% 0.36% 11.25% 17.72% 15.31% 2.91% 
Log likelihood -5508.74 -5508.64 -5509.43 -5505.81 -5615.58 -5612.03 -5609.57 -5609.57 -4549.55 
Level 2 N 10210 10210 10210 10210 10372 10372 10372 10372 8541 
Level 1 N 28 28 28 28 29 29 29 29 22 
Models control for variables such as Age, Age2, Having children , Having a partner, Youngest child in preschool, Part-time employed, Migrant, Industry 
sector, Construction Transport sector, Financial Services, Public Administration, Education, Health Sector, Other Services, Paid training, Small  Company, 
Large Company, Public sector, Employment status Full models in Appendix.*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05
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Table 6.4 The impact of context factors in explaining the cross-ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiaŶĐe iŶ ǁoŵeŶ’s ƌelatiǀe likelihood to oďtaiŶ a ŵanagerial 
position  
 Leaves 
Models 6-4-1 6-4-2 6-4-3 6-4-4 6-4-5 6-4-6 6-4-7 

















leave Wellpaid leave  
Main effect 
(Macro Factor) -0.03 -0.10 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.06 0.05 
female -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.42*** -0.41*** 
Macro 
factor*female 0.01 -0.04 -0.10 0.02 -0.09 -0.12 -0.07 
Variance female 
level 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Variance country 0.08* 0.07* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 
Exp. Var. random 
slope: female (from 
model 3) -0.83% 2.43% 9.98% -1.30% 11.01% 12.80% 4.06% 
Exp. Var. level 2 
(from model 3) 0.38% 13.02% -0.45% 4.30% -0.53% 1.26% 1.15% 
Log likelihood -2733.08 -2731.79 -2644.81 -2645.13 -2644.88 -2644.49 -2732.87 
Level 2 N 10210 10210 9882 9882 9882 9882 10210 
Level 1 N 28 28 27 27 27 27 28 
Models control for variables such as Age, Age2, Having children , Having a partner, Youngest child in preschool, Part-time employed, Migrant, Industry 
sector, Construction Transport sector, Financial Services, Public Administration, Education, Health Sector, Other Services, Paid training, Small  Company, 
Large Company, Public sector, Employment status Full models in Appendix.*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05
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Table 6.4 continued: The impact of context factors in explaining the cross-ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiaŶĐe iŶ ǁoŵeŶ’s ƌelatiǀe likelihood to oďtaiŶ a 
managerial position 
 Childcare policies 
Models 6-4-8 6-4-9 6-4-10 6-4-11 6-4-12 6-4-13 6-4-14 6-4-15 6-4-16 




































Main effect (Macro 
Factor) 0.15* 0.11€ 0.10 0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.08 -0.24** 0.17* 
female -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.40*** -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.51*** 
Macro factor*female 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.14 0.13 
Variance female level 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12€ 0.12 
Variance country 0.06* 0.07* 0.07* 0.08* 0.08* 0.10* 0.09* 0.08* 0.06€ 
Exp. Var. random slope: 
female (from model 3) 3.35% -3.22% -0.46% 5.76% 4.57% -1.82% -0.08% -15.37% 19.39% 
Exp. Var. level 2 (from 
model 3) 26.21% 11.37% 6.72% -1.45% 4.83% 0.42% 3.85% 17.73% 39.68% 
Log likelihood -2730.14 -2731.83 -2732.34 -2732.89 -2732.71 -2756.21 -2755.80 -2752.78 -2324.85 
Level 2 N 10210 10210 10210 10210 10210 10372 10372 10372 8541 
Level 1 N 28 28 28 28 28 29 29 29 22 
Models control for variables such as Age, Age2, Having children , Having a partner, Youngest child in preschool, Part-time employed, Migrant, Industry 
sector, Construction Transport sector, Financial Services, Public Administration, Education, Health Sector, Other Services, Paid training, Small  Company, 
Large Company, Public sector, Employment status Full models in Appendix.*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05 
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As we can see from table 6.3 and 6.4 none of the leave variables examined in this paper 
seems to significantly explain the cross-national variation of gender gap in access to top positions 
across Europe. What is more, none of the family policy variables examined in this thesis seems 
to explain the cross-ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiatioŶ iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs aĐross Europe. 
On the other hand, some childcare policies are associated with cross-national variations of 
gender gap in occupational hierarchies – ŵoƌe speĐifiĐallǇ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌelatiǀelǇ likelihood of 
reaching managerial and senior professional positions. Model 2-16 in table 6.3 shows that part-
tiŵe ĐhildĐaƌe usage foƌ oldeƌ ĐhildƌeŶ is ŶegatiǀelǇ assoĐiated ǁith ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to 
ŵaŶageƌial aŶd seŶioƌ pƌofessioŶal positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, the laƌgeƌ the 
share of older children enrolled in part-time childcare the higher the gender gap. However, we 
do not see the same association in table 6.4 for managerial positions only (model 6-4-14). What 
is more, model 6-3-15 in table 6.3 – again managerial and senior professional occupations – we 
find that the higher the share of older children not enrolled in any form of formal childcare, the 
lower the gender gap.  
 
 Adding an interaction term of female*Part-time childcare enrolment to the model, 
explains 30.44% of the variance of the impact of gender on occupational hierarchies. Enrolment 
in no formal childcare for three to school age at all explains an even higher variance of 45.28%. 
Ironically, we can even see that in countries with high rates of preschool children, more 
specifically three to school age, helps ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌelatiǀe ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs. IŶ otheƌ 
words, countries where there is a high proportion of children between three and school age in 
informal childcare the gender gap in achieving high positions are smaller. On the other hand, high 
rates of preschool children in part-time formal childcare arrangements significantly lower 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đaƌeeƌ pƌospeĐts.  
 
However childcare policies do not seem to have any significant effect in explaining the 
cross-ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiaŶĐe of ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌelatiǀe likelihood of reaching managerial positions.  
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Childcare allowance regulations (models 6-3-10  and 6-4-11 in table 6.3 and 6.4) on the 
other hand do not help explain vertical segregation and are not clearly correlated with vertical 
segregation or occupational hierarchies in general. As shown in model 6-3-12 in table 6.3, 
countries that provide tax subsidies or deductions for childcare and thus support the male 
ďƌeadǁiŶŶeƌ ŵodel sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ iŶĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌelatiǀe ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh ŵaŶageƌial aŶd 
senior professional positions.  
 
6.2.2 Robustness tests – Adding two cross-level interaction terms at a time  
 
Before interpreting what the results from table 6.3 and 6.4 mean for this thesis, we need 
to make sure that the results are robust and observable even if other context-level variables are 
added. Because of the limited number of countries included in the analysis, models can only add 
two cross-level interaction terms at a time. Pairing each family policies variable with each other 
leaves us with 105 models for each dependent variable and 240 models in total. Each variable 
listed in the horizontal column A is paired with each variable listed in the vertical rows B. The cells 
then highlight whether any of the two variables has an impact on the gender gap in top positions 
or not. A bold letter indicates the stronger effect. This section shows that well-paid leave once 
controlled for childcare allowance seems to help women; family taxation seems to be stable 
regardless of what is included in the model. Lastly, part-time childcare and no formal childcare 
enrolment remain stable as well. 
  
Table 6.5 presents the results for the broader dependent variable – senior professional 
and managerial positions – while table 6.6 shows results for managerial positions only. For a 
better overview and because we are only interested in the impact of family policies on the gender 
gap, only significant results for the interaction term are illustrated. Results on the association 
ďetǁeeŶ faŵilǇ poliĐies aŶd iŶdiǀiduals͛ aĐĐess to top positions can be found in the Appendix.  
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Table 6.5 Cross-level interactions for senior professional and managerial positions3 
 
 
                                                             
3 Notes: Entries are results from 105 separate multilevel models, in which contextual variables are introduced in pairs (having controlled for the individual level 
characteristics)A (represents when the variable in column A is significant) B (represents when the variable in column A is significant), n.s. represents when both 
variables are insignificant. The letters in bold represents the stronger predictor in the model.  































under 3  
Allowanc
e for 1 
Child 
Allowanc


















e over 3 
years 
Effective 
maternity leave +               
Paternity leave 
duration + +              
Effective paternity 
leave + + +             
Net Parental leave + + + +            
Effective parental 
leave + + + + +           
Well-paid leave + + + + B#(+)* 
B#(+)** 
A#(-)*          
Childcare usage 
under 3 year old + + B#(-Ϳ€ B#(-)* B#(-)* B#(-Ϳ€ +         
Full-time childcare 
usage under 3 
year old + + + B#(-)€ + + + +        
 191 































under 3  
Allowance 
























allowance for 1 
Child + + + + + + A#;+Ϳ€ + +       
Childcare 
allowance for 3 
Children + + + + + + A#;+Ϳ€ + + +      
Family Taxation 
Subsidies B#;+Ϳ€ 
+ + + 
B#;+Ϳ€ + B #;+Ϳ€  B#;+Ϳ€ B #;+Ϳ€  B #;+Ϳ€ B #;+Ϳ€      
full-time childcare 
enrolment for 3- 
before school + + + + + + + + + + + A#(+Ϳ€    
 part-time 
childcare 
enrolment for 3- 
before school B#(-Ϳ€ + B#(-Ϳ€ + B#(-)* B#(-)* + + 
A#(-Ϳ€ 
B#(-)* B#(-Ϳ€ B#(-Ϳ€ A#(+)* 
A#(-Ϳ€ / 
B#(-)**   
no formal 
childcare 
enrolment for 3- 
before school B#(+)* B#(+)* B#(+)* B#(+)* 
A#(-)* 
B#(+)** B#(+)* B#(+)* + B#(+)* B#(+)* B#(+)* A#(+)* B#(+)** B#;+Ϳ€  
Expenditure 




Table 6.6 Cross-level interactions for managerial positions4 
 
                                                             
4 Notes: Entries are results from 105 separate multilevel models, in which contextual variables are introduced in pairs (having controlled for the individual level 
characteristics)A (represents when the variable in column A is significant) B (represents when the variable in column B is significant), n.s. represents when both 
variables are insignificant. The letters in bold represents the stronger predictor in the model.  
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Effective maternity 
leave 
+           
    
Paternity leave 
duration 
+ +          
    
Effective paternity 
leave 
+ + +         
    
Net Parental leave + + + +            
Effective parental 
leave 
+ + + + +       
    
Wellpaid leave + + + + + +          
Childcare usage 
under 3 year old 
+ + + + + + +     
    
Full-time childcare 
usage under 3 year 
old 
+ + + + + + + +    
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for 1 Child 
+ + + + + + + + +       
Childcare allowance 
for 3 Children 
+ + + + + + + + + +      
Family Taxation 
Subsidies 
+ + + + + + + + + + +     
full-time childcare 
enrolment for 3- 
before school 
+ + + + + + + + + + + +    
 part-time childcare 
enrolment for 3- 
before school 
+ + + + + + + + + + + + +   
no formal childcare 
enrolment for 3- 
before school 
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + +  
Expenditure 
childcare 
+ + + + + A#(-Ϳ€ + + A#(-Ϳ€ 
/B#(+)* 
+ + + + + + 
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Looking at leave policies first, we see that the gender gap in senior professional and 
managerial positions is no bigger or smaller in countries with generous maternity leaves. The 
geŶdeƌ gap ďetǁeeŶ ǁoŵeŶ aŶd ŵeŶ͛s ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ top positioŶs is Ŷot affeĐted the 
tiŵe ŵotheƌs ĐaŶ take off ǁoƌk foƌ Đhildďiƌth aŶd ƌaisiŶg. WoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh top 
positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s and thus narrow the gender gap does not seem to be affected by 
generous paternity leave. We only find that in countries with generous effective weeks of 
paternity leave individuals seem to be affected negatively. However, this negative effect is 
cancelled out by high rates of full-time childcare usage for children under 3 years (table 6).  
 
Another policy that is only significant in a single model is effective parental leave. If 
net parental leave and informal childcare are added to the same model, then parental leave 
significantly impacts the gender gap by widening it. However, because informal childcare at 
the same time decreases vertical segregation and this coefficient is stronger, net parental 
leave in the end has no impact other than moderating the effect of informal childcare. In other 
words, because the positive effect of high rates of children enrolled in no formal childcare at 
all helps reduce the gender gap in managerial and senior professional positions, this negative 
effect is cancelled out.  
 
We can see the same effect when simultaneously adding effective parental leave and 
well-paid leave to the model. Here, we see that although generous parental leave seems to 
hinder women from reaching top positions relative to men, well-paid leave compensates for 
this and actually significantly narrows the gender gap in managerial and senior professional 
positions down. For managerial positions only, we see no effect of parental leave at all on 
either the gender gap or varying levels of access to managerial positions across countries with 
one exception. When controlling for high levels of expenditure on childcare, we see that 
effective parental leave significantly widens the gender gap. In other words, if we look at 
countries with similar levels of expenditure on childcare, we see that effective parental leave 
ǁoƌseŶs ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs aŶd thus ǁideŶs the geŶdeƌ gap. This Ŷeeds 
to be kept in mind for the later analysis, as we know that parental leave is mainly taken up by 




Well-paid leaǀe oŶ the otheƌ haŶd seeŵs to ďe positiǀelǇ assoĐiated ǁith ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
representation in senior professional and managerial positions. According to table 5, in 
countries with similar levels of parental leave and childcare allowances, we find that the 
gender gap in managerial and senior professional occupations is smaller if well-paid leave is 
long. To recap: well-paid leave is defined as when maternity and parental leave is 
compensated for with an income replacement through benefits of 60 percent or more. This 
positive effect of well-paid leave seems to be moderated and strengthened by parental leave 
and childcare allowances. However, this effect is only significant for senior professional and 
managerial positions, but not for top management.  
To suŵŵaƌize, ǁhile paƌeŶtal leaǀe teŶds to ŶegatiǀelǇ affeĐt ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to 
reach top positions and widens the gender gap, we find the opposite for well-paid leave that 
summarizes how well paid both maternity and parental are combined.  
Moving on to childcare, even when other family policies are taken into account, the 
findings hold true in that in countries with high usage rates of childcare for children under 3 
years old the gender gap is wider. This is the case for both full-time and general childcare. We 
can see that when comparing countries with similar levels of paternity leave and parental 
leave, high level of childcare enrolment for young children seem to hinder particularly women 
from reaching managerial and senior professional positions. Interestingly, it is also enrolment 
in full-time childcare that seems to widen the gender gap. Countries with high usage levels 
for full-time childcare for under 3 year olds and high levels of part-time enrolment for older 
children (3 to preschool age), seem to particularly make it harder for women to access 
managerial and senior professional positions and thus widen the gender gap.  
 
We cannot find this association for managerial positions only. However, here it seems 
that generally employees reach managerial positions more easily in countries with high levels 
of childcare usage – both full-time and part-time. This does not help us though to explain 




For older children – 3 year to preschool age – we find that access to cross-national 
ǀaƌiatioŶ iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs ;taďle ϲͿ is Ŷot assoĐiated at all ǁith 
childcare for this age group. We only find that rates of no formal childcare seem to negatively 
affeĐt iŶdiǀiduals͛ ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, ďoth ŵale aŶd 
female workers seem to be less likely to reach managerial positions in countries with high 
levels of no formal childcare in contrast to countries with low level of no formal childcare.  
 
With regard to the main research focus – ǀeƌtiĐal segƌegatioŶ aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to 
top positioŶs iŶ ƌelatioŶ to ŵeŶ͛s – the results for managerial and senior professional 
positions seem more interesting and significant. Table 5 shows that in countries with high 
levels of part-time enrolment in childcare for preschool children the gender gap is significantly 
wider. Women are less likely to be represented in managerial and senior professional 
positions if children are on average only enrolled in part-time childcare. Surprisingly, we find 
no strong evidence for a positive or negative effect of full-time enrolment. Most interestingly, 
it seems that the gender gap is smaller in countries with high rates of preschool children 
enrolled in no formal childcare at all. In other words, where children are on average not 
enrolled in childcare facilities but are cared for by informal arrangements, women seem to be 
more likely to reach managerial and senior professional occupations and thus vertical 
segregation decreases.  
 
Lastly, we need to examine monetary policies such as childcare allowance and tax 
subsidies. Here, we find that tax credits or deductions seems to significantly decrease the 
gender gap by helping women to reach senior professional and managerial positions. This 
effeĐt is oŶlǇ positiǀe foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs as ǁe see that iŶ geŶeƌal, iŶdiǀiduals 
are less likely to reach managerial and senior professional positions in countries with tax 
subsidies. However, when interpreting these results, it needs to be noted that the variable 
for tax subsidies is a summative score for both tax subsidies and tax deductions and only 7 
out of 29 countries offer neither deduction nor subsidies (Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden) and only Austria offers both. The remaining 21 countries 




The gender gap in senior professional and/ or managerial positions does not seem to 
be affected at all by the generosity of childcare allowances. There is no significant impact of 
childcare allowances for 1 or 3 children neither on the gender gap in managerial nor the 
gender gap in senior professional and managerial positions. What is more, only if we compare 
countries with similar levels childcare allowances for one child, we see that these have a 
positive effect on all individuals, but high levels of childcare allowances for three children 
have a similar but negative effect.  
 
Lastly, while in countries with high levels of childcare expenditure individuals are more 
likely to reach top positions than in countries with limited expenditure in this area, we cannot 
find any significant association between expenditure on childcare and vertical segregation. 
Women are not more or less likely to be represented in top positions in countries with low 
levels of spending than in countries with high levels. Thus, expenditure on childcare does not 
help us to understand cross-national variation in vertical segregation.  
 
To summarize, we find that especially the negative impact of parental leave on vertical 
segregation is to be noted and the positive impact of well-paid leave. What is more, it seems 
that no formal childcare is better for women than formal childcare arrangements.  
 
6.3 Discussion  
 
As disĐussed iŶ Chapteƌ ϰ, although ǁoŵeŶ͛s shaƌe of ŵaŶageƌial aŶd seŶioƌ 
professional occupations has increased in many European countries, their gender – among 
other individual factors such as public sector employment and having children – has been 
shown significantly to hinder women from reaching top positions in the countries included in 
this aŶalǇsis. This Chapteƌ shoǁs that ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs does Ŷot oŶlǇ 
vary among individuals, but can be explained to a small extent by national level factors, e.g. 
family policies. In the following analysis, the second research question is addressed in order 
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to see how family policies at a national level affect ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to aĐhieǀe top 
positions at the individual level relatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, do faŵilǇ poliĐies affeĐt the 
gender gap in top positions?  
 
This analysis contributes to the field of family policies and vertical segregation in three 
ways. First of all, observations made for the association between family poliĐies aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
share in managerial positions at the macro-level needs to be reassessed using individual-level 
data and more specific definitions of top positions. Secondly, in contrast to previous scholarly 
work, this analysis examines the impact of a wide range of family policies on vertical 
segregation including various leave policies, childcare coverage and monetary policies. As a 
third contribution, this analysis also tests whether family policy typologies manage to capture 
the impact of single family policies on the gender gap.  
 
6.3.1 Leave policies  
 
The first hypothesis H2.1 assumes that generous maternity leaves make employers 
more reluctant to hire women as it discourages women from returning to work shortly after 
childbirth.  Examining the data we find no strong evidence for the negative impact of 
maternity leave on the gender gap. The length of maternity does not seem to further increase 
discrimination against highly educated women in the labour market from the perspective of 
the employer. Furthermore, long maternity leaves do not seem to affect experience and 
human capital of highly educated women as much as assumed by previous scholars (e.g. 
Polachek, 1981) for the general female workforce. This might be due to the fact that highly 
educated women return to work more quickly after childbirth in Europe, as observed by 
Prozato (2009). Thus, women with tertiary degrees do not seem to be affected by maternity 
leave policies as their career interruptions are shorter and the effect on their human capital 




Moving on from maternity leave, the next hypothesis H2.2 claims that generous 
paternity leave indicates that men are more involved in family responsibilities and thus the 
traditional division of labour between the spouses is softened. Women are more likely to 
reconcile work and family and thus more likely to reach top positions. In contrast to parental 
leave, which can be taken up by women as well, paternity leave indicates the time only fathers 
can take off. In the long run, paternity leave can therefore encourage men to participate more 
in raising children. Thus, paternity leave can help to create more balance within the family 
between the spouses and can potentially decrease inequalities in the labour market (OECD, 
2001). However, as argued by Anker (1997), the availability of paternity leave does not 
necessarily result in high rates of take-up. Paternity leave – even in Scandinavian countries – 
is by far not taken by every father (Estevez-Abe, 2005; Moss and Deven, 1999; Evans, 2002). 
This potentially is the reason for the unclear association between paternity leave and the 
gender gap in managerial positions. Generous paternity leaves at the macro level do not seem 
to help highly educated women to reach top positions more easily. Consequently, the 
hypothesis that the gender gap is smaller in countries with long paternity leaves cannot be 
verified.  
 
Parental leave on the other hand is only theoretically available to both spouses but 
even in Scandinavian countries taken up mostly by women (Evans, 2002), thus we expect that 
employers are less likely to hire women in countries with long parental leaves due to expected 
career interruptions and thus the loss in manpower (Estevez-Abe, 2005). The findings of this 
thesis find limited supporting evidence for this hypothesis. For women in managerial positions 
only, effective parental leave seems to significantly increase the gender gap if we compare 
countries with similar levels of expenditure on childcare services. In all other models, parental 
leave remains insignificant in explaining the cross-national variance in the gender gap in top 
positions.  
 
Lastly, we need to look at whether not only effective weeks of leaves matter, but 
whether we can consider leaves as well paid in general, independently from how long they 
are. H2.3 states that short, but well-paid leave is regarded as a tool to help parents to take 
 200 
 
time off work but return quickly. Thus, employers in countries with short well-paid leaves are 
more likely to hire women than in countries with long unpaid leaves as the latter discourage 
women to invest return to work quickly (e.g. Akgunduz and Plantenga, 2013; Han et al.et al., 
2009).  Chung (2017) suspects a curve-linear relationship in that both no maternity leave and 
too generous maternity leave are detrimental for women, but a certain level of well-paid 
leave beneficial as it allows women to invest into their careers and have a family.  
 
While well-paid leave does not seem to affect the gender gap for managerial positions, 
well-paid leave helps to decrease the gender gap in senior professional and managerial 
positions if we compare countries with similar levels of parental leave. Thus, the positive 
impact of well-paid leaǀe oŶ highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐcess to top positions contradicts 
Estevez-Aďe͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ assuŵptioŶ that leaǀe iŶ geŶeƌal deĐƌeases the deŵaŶd foƌ feŵale 
workers. On the contrary, it seems that highly educated women find it easier to reach top 
positions in countries with well-paid leaves than in countries with low replacement rates. 
Because well-paid leave by definition describes the length of leave (maternity and parental) 
with an income replacement through benefits of 60 percent or more, it seems to encourage 
highly educated women to reconcile paid work and family responsibilities. At the same time, 
well-paid leave seems to make employers less reluctant to hire women. Thus, the hypothesis 
that it is not long well-paid leave, but rather short well-paid leave that decreases the gender 
gap is true.  
 
6.3.2 Childcare policies  
 
Moving on from leave policies to the provision of childcare services, we need to test 
H2.4 which expects that extensive publicly funded childcare hinders women from reaching 
top positions as it correlates with large public sector. Thus, we can expect high levels of 
expenditure to also increase the gender gap. The assumption here is that there is a correlation 
ďetǁeeŶ eǆteŶsiǀe puďliĐlǇ fuŶded ĐhildĐaƌe aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶdeƌƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ pƌiǀate 
sectors and thus more vertical segregation. Mandel and Semyonov (2006) argue that the 
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negative impact of childcare on vertical segregation is due to the strong emphasis of the state 
on caretaking in the concerned countries which does not only encourage women to take time 
off, but also to move into occupations that are more mother friendly, allowing them flexibility. 
As expenditure on childcare can be associated with high coverage of childcare, we can expect 
high levels of expenditure to also increase the gender gap. However the models presented 
control for public sector employment and thus exclude the mitigating effect of public sector 
employment. For future research, the author therefore suggests running all models without 
controlling for public sector and instead adding public sector employment as a macro-level 
variable to the model. The role of the public sector per se is not however the main research 
focus of this thesis.  
 
According to table 6.3 and 6.4, the gender gap is not different in countries with high 
levels of expenditure on childcare services if we control for public sector employment. On the 
oŶe haŶd, these fiŶdiŶgs ĐoŶfiƌŵ MaŶdel aŶd “eŵǇoŶoǀ͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ hǇpothesis that Ŷot 
expenditure in childcare per se leads to a discrimination of women in top positions, but that 
public expenditure on childcare correlates with a different variable which then leads to a 
higher gender gap. On the other hand, the findings do not confirm that public sector 
eŵploǇŵeŶt is detƌiŵeŶtal foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs. PuďliĐ seĐtoƌ 
employment does not significantly impact either of the dependent variables (see Chapter 4).  
 
Going further into detail, we need to test whether specific childcare policies increase 
or decrease the gender gap (see hypothesis 2.6), acknowledging that expenditure in childcare 
is a broad measurement of childcare intensity in a country. Publicly funded childcare 
potentially helps on the one hand to free the individual from the burden of family 
responsibilities (Lohmann and Zagel, 2015) and on the other to ensure equal access to 
childcare facilities. However, based on the findings of Mandel and Semyonov (2006) the 
assumption here is that women are actually less likely to access managerial positions if 
childcare coverage is high, and thus the focus of the government on childcare leads to bigger 
public sectors and thereby creates a preference among women for employment in the public 
sector rather than in the private one. While we already discussed that public sector 
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employment does not seem to correlate with the gender gap in managerial positions, we find 
highly interesting results for the association between childcare and the gender gap. As 
discussed, full-tiŵe ĐhildĐaƌe usage does Ŷot affeĐt highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to seŶioƌ 
professional and managerial positions. However, high levels of part-time childcare widen the 
gender gap. These findings are not surprising as the many of top positions require employees 
to work full-time. This is because as discussed in Chapter 4, part-time employment indeed is 
negatively associated with access to managerial positions and thus it can be expected that 
part-time childcare is not sufficient to allow the individual to work full-time. These findings 
correspond to what van der Lippe et al. ;ϮϬϬϲͿ Đall ͞ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ pƌessuƌe͟. The authors find 
that in countries with high rates of full-time childcare coverage such as Sweden and Denmark, 
but also in countries with high part-time childcare coverage such as the UK the pressure to 
combine paid work and family responsibilities is particularly high. Thus, it seems that not the 
existence of a large public sector seems to explain why more childcare seems to be 
detrimental for women, but more importantly the pressure to combine both the family and 
work. Particularly part-time childcare does not seem to allow women to reconsolidate family 
and paid work, especially not in managerial and senior professional positions. What is more, 
full-tiŵe ĐhildĐaƌe does Ŷot seeŵ to sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ iŵpaĐt ǁoŵeŶ͛s positioŶ iŶ the laďouƌ 
market either. Based on van der Lippe et al (2006), this further supports the idea that 
extensive childcare does not necessarily lead to more gender equality in the labour market.  
 
The most interesting finding however is that the gender gap in managerial and senior 
professional positions seems to be significantly lower in countries where high rates of 
preschool children are not enrolled in any type of formal childcare. This clearly contradicts 
the assumptions made, but seems logical when considering that the sample for this analysis 
consists of highly educated women and their access to top positions. Low rate of formal 
childcare and gender equality are not excluding, but actually reinforcing each other. As argued 
by Pfau-Effinger (2005), not only formal childcare has been modernised to help women 
combine paid work and care. But informal care has undergone a drastic change as well. 
Additionally, informal care such as domestic care providers or the use of private childcare 
centres is becoming more common especially among middle-class women and two-career 
households (Tronto, 2002). Qualitative research undertaken by Gregson and Lowe (1994) for 
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example shows that in the UK dual career households where both partners are working waged 
domestic workers are changing the division of labour at home and thus help spouses gain 
more flexibility. However, the apparent lack of formal childcare does not cause higher levels 
of gender equality overall, as this particular sample of women can be expected to be 
financially able to pay for informal care arrangements and thus benefit from a system that 
does not focus on formal childcare.  
 
H2.5 assumes that both childcare allowances and tax allowances and deductions aim 
to support care at home and thus are likely to protect the traditional division of labour 
between the spouses. Consequently, we can expect the gender gap to be higher in countries 
with generous allowances. Initially, it was assumed that childcare allowances increase the 
likelihood of domestic care and the dependency of children on their parents. Because in the 
majority of cases, it is women undertaking childcare responsibilities, it can be assumed that if 
countries financially reward home care, they support the traditional division of labour 
ďetǁeeŶ the spouses aŶd thus deĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŶĐeŶtiǀe to work. However, it seems that 
this assumption, which is based mainly on research on the overall female workforce, is not 
true for highly educated women. The generosity of childcare allowance does not affect the 
gender gap. This links with the previous observations that childcare policies affect highly 
educated women differently than the overall female workforce. Assuming that highly 
educated women have the financial resources to invest into childcare anyway and are also 
highly likely to have relatively high salaries, childcare allowances are not a financial incentive 
for them to stay at home to look after the children. On the contrary, family taxation subsidies 
for example even significantly decrease the gender gap. However, here it needs to be 
highlighted that the measurement for taxation subsidies is the combination of two binary 
variables and thus only allows countries to have the value 0, 0.5 or 1. Only a few countries 
offer neither tax deductions nor credits – Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Norway, and Sweden – and only Austria offers both. The remaining 21 countries all have the 
same value for this variable. Nevertheless, we can see that it is presumably familiarising 
poliĐies suĐh as taǆ suďsidies that aƌe suspeĐted to iŶĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s dependency on the male 
breadwinner which affect highly educated women differently and actually seem to help them 
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reconcile work and family. The assumption that childcare allowances and tax allowances and 
deductions widen the gender gap therefore cannot be verified.  
 
6.4 Conclusion  
 
The overall research question of this Chapter is how family policies affect the gender 
gap in managerial positions and in managerial and senior professional positions. Based on the 
findings, four main conclusions can be drawn. First of all, the results show that assumptions 
ŵade ďǇ pƌeǀious sĐholaƌs oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs aŶd faŵilǇ poliĐies aƌe Ŷot 
necessarily true if looking at highly educated women only. Whereas it seems that according 
to previous research, leave policies for example hinder women from entering the labour 
market and thus are detrimental for gender equality, maternity leave actually has no impact 
on highly educated women to reach top positions. Well-paid leave even seems to decrease 
the gender gap in managerial positions. Thus, when examining the impact of family policies 
on any dimension of gender equality, we need to clearly distinguish between different 
educational levels of women. Therefore, this Chapter supports the claim made by Mandel and 
Shalev (2009) and Dorado et al. (2002) that occupational segregation follows different 
patterns for highly educated women than for women with lower levels of education. 
 
The second conclusion to be made based on this Chapter is that the welfare state 
paradox hypothesis can be confirmed to some extent for highly educated women using 
individual-level data.  Generous childcare policies do not help women to access top positions, 
but actually widen the gender gap. With childcare policies being a substantial part of 
progressive welfare states, we can therefore say that highly educated women aiming to reach 
top positions are not better off in de-famfamiliarised countries. The opposite is actually found 
with conservative policies such as tax deductions and credit and child allowances decreasing 
the gender gap. Thus, while it may as well be that women generally benefit from childcare 
policies and paternity leave, but are discouraged from pursuing a career in the formal labour 
market if financial incentives encourage them to stay at home and undertake childcare, this 
is not the case for highly educated women and vertical segregation. The glass ceiling is weaker 
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in countries that financially support home childcare. However, here it needs to be noted that 
informal childcare does not mean care is provided by one of the parents. More likely for the 
sample of highly educated women aiming for top positions, the positive impact of informal 
care on vertical segregation might be explained by flexible domestic care arrangements that 
particularly middle class women have access to. Thus, we can conclude that the women find 
it easier to access managerial positions, if childcare is organised informally and these 
aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶts aƌe suppoƌted fiŶaŶĐiallǇ. MaŶdel aŶd “eŵǇoŶoǀ͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ Đlaiŵ that the 
negative impact of childcare coverage on vertical segregation is due to the size of the public 
sector however cannot be verified.  
 
Lastly, this Chapter also shows that the majority of family policies seem to have no 
impact on the gender gap in managerial/ managerial and senior professional jobs. Among 16 
separate indicators for family policies, only a few policies seemed to have a significant impact 
oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s. Thus, ǁe ĐaŶ ĐoŶĐlude that if ĐouŶtƌies 
want to increase the share of women in managerial positions, different policies need to be 
introduced that help women to reconcile job and family responsibilities without at the same 
time making them less employable.  In other words, this study also shows that the welfare 
state paradox needs to be reconsidered given that majority of family policies examined here. 
Although family policies do not help higher educated women reach top positions, they do not 
hinder their position either.   
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Chapter 7: The effect of labour market institutions on vertical segregation  
 
The previous Chapter suggests that family policies do not do a good job in explaining 
the cross-national variation of the gender gap in top positions. This Chapter now turns to 
labour market institutions to see whether they can help explain the likelihood for women to 
achieve top positions at the individual level, relative to men. The results show that in 
countries with strict EPL, a focus on specific skills and a large unionised female workforce, 
women have better access to managerial and senior professional occupations. Thus, the main 
contribution of this Chapter is that, unlike what has been argued by previous scholars such as 
Estevez-Abe (2005), there is evidence that more regulated and rigid labour markets actually 
seem to help highly educated women to reach the top.  
 
As established in Chapter 3, scholars have examined the association between welfare 
states, their family policies and labour market inequalities. However, vertical segregation - in 
other words, ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶdeƌƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ top positioŶs - has not been researched to a 
large extent. To overcome the methodological, but also conceptual, limitations of previous 
studies, Chapter 6 conducted an extensive analysis of numerous family policies, family policy 
typologies and the gender gap using individual-level data for highly educated individuals only, 
using more specific definitions of top positions. However, as established at the end of Chapter 
6, family policies are limited in their explanation of the cross-national variance in the gender 
gap in top positions. Thus, the question remains: What else, other than family policies, is 
causing the cross-national variation of the gender gap discussed in Chapter 5? This Chapter 
aims to investigate whether labour market institutions, as defined in Chapter 3 and 4, can 
help to explain this puzzle. To do so, the Chapter is structured in the following way:  
 
First of all, the theoretical and empirical background is summarised briefly, based on 
what has already been established in Chapter 4. Here, the research question and hypotheses 
are introduced. Next, the results of a multilevel analysis will be discussed using random slope 
cross-level interaction models. The models are conducted in two stages, initially with only one 
random slope interaction term added to the model, and then two interaction terms at a time. 
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The descriptive part of this Chapter is followed by an analysis of the results in order to link 
the findings with the research hypotheses. In the short summary and conclusion, this Chapter 
then highlights the contributions made and the outlook for the following Chapter.  
 
7.1 Background and research questions 
 
Following the findings of the previous Chapters, the ƋuestioŶ ƌeŵaiŶs ǁhǇ ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
chances of reaching top positions vary across countries. Chapter 6 concludes that Mandel and 
“eŵǇoŶoǀ͛s aƌguŵeŶt that the ͞saŵe ǁelfaƌe state aĐtiǀities that pƌoŵote oŶe diŵeŶsioŶ of 
geŶdeƌ eƋualitǇ appeaƌ to iŶhiďit aŶotheƌ diŵeŶsioŶ͟ ;ϮϬϬϲ, p. ϭϵϰϮͿ is tƌue to soŵe eǆteŶt. 
Countries with progressive childcare policies seem to show comparably higher levels of 
vertical gender segregation. However, it seems that the majority of family policies have no 
direct impact at all, and even childcare only affects the gender gap marginally. To solve the 
remaining puzzle of cross-national variations in occupational segregation, a few scholars (e.g., 
Estevez-Abe, 2005; England, 2005; Dieckhoff et al., 2015) have linked labour market 
institutions to occupational gender segregation. This Chapter aims to contribute to this field 
of research in three ways.  
 
First of all, by analysing the association between labour market institutions and 
individual-level data with a more distinct definition of the gender gap in top positions. As a 
second contribution, this Chapter contributes to the recent debate on the association 
between labour market institutions and vertical segregation by combining a wide range of 
labour market institutions that represent two opposing streams in the literature, and allowing 
variables to potentially complement each other.  
 
Thirdly, this Chapter contributes to the recent debate on labour market institutions 
and the gender gap by conducting an analysis of labour market institutions and gender 
inequalities using a wider range of countries, including data from up to 30 European countries 




As established in Chapter 4, the overall research question of this Chapter is:  
Hoǁ do laďouƌ ŵaƌket iŶstitutioŶs affeĐt ǁoŵeŶ’s likelihood to ƌeaĐh top positions 
ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ’s? 
 
In order to answer this question, we now need to summarize the hypotheses that 
centre on unions and collective bargaining as noted in Chapter 4. Some scholars (Schaefer et 
al., 2001) for example, argue that strong unions generally are beneficial for the overall 
workforce and help decrease vertical segregation by decreasing overall inequalities. Thus, the 
first hypothesis is:  
 
H3.1 The gender gap is expected to be lower in countries where unions are strong and 
collective bargaining coverage is high.   
 
However, there is another stream in the literature that distinguishes more carefully 
ďetǁeeŶ uŶioŶs͛ stƌeŶgth aŶd ǁho theǇ aĐtuallǇ ƌepƌeseŶt. Palieƌ aŶd TheleŶ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ, foƌ 
example, argue that coordinated market economies are a highly heterogeneous group due to 
dualisations of their labour markets. They state that CMEs with their relatively strong unions 
and centralized bargaining systems have undergone a change in recent years. In order to 
adjust to a ͞ŵoƌe Đoŵpetitiǀe iŶteƌŶatioŶal eĐoŶoŵiĐ ĐoŶteǆt͟ ;iďid, p. ϭϯϵͿ, CMEs haǀe 
experienced a dualisation of their workforce, by protecting the core highly skilled workers and 
therefore failing to cover all citizens in terms of employment protection or work contracts. 
What is more, in these CMEs the outsider group is gendered, in that women are 
overrepresented. Häusermann and Schwander (2010) argue that atypical employment is 
gendered in many countries, and that especially in continental Europe, these new types of 
employment are the norm rather than the exception for women (Esping-Andersen 1999).  
This may be especially true due to the normative positions of some of these CME countries as 
conservative welfare states, where male breadwinners have traditionally earned the family 
ǁage aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s labour market participation was considered secondary.  Therefore, we 
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can expect that class-related differences in corporatist countries with a dualised labour 
market are more evident than in CMEs with a less fragmented workforce. Looking at this 
argument from a different perspective therefore means that: 
 
H3.2 The gender gap is expected to be higher in countries where unions are strong but 
only represent a small share of the workforce. In other words, the gender gap is expected to 
be different in countries with high union density and collective bargaining coverage.  
 
However, because strong unions representing only the core workforce seem to be 
detrimental for the outsider workforce, by further increasing labour market inequalities. If 
unions are strong – as indicated by collective bargaining coverage – but do not represent 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŶteƌests, ǁe ĐaŶ eǆpeĐt the geŶdeƌ gap to ďe higheƌ. Theƌefoƌe, we can also expect 
that if collective bargaining coverage is high, or rather, unions are strong and centralised, but 
women are not part of unions negotiating these agreements, we expect a negative impact on 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s as the iŶteƌests of the Đoƌe ŵale ǁoƌkfoƌĐe 
aƌe pƌioƌitised. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ aŶd ĐolleĐtiǀe bargaining coverage 
affect the gender gap.  
 
Moving on to the second part of the literature linking labour market institutions with 
occupational segregation, the next hypothesis is based on Estevez-Aďe͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ aƌguŵeŶt 
that women are discriminated against in countries with a high intensity of vocational training 
and education, due to the locus of training, the atrophy rate and the portability of skills (see 
Chapter 2.3.2). Thus, the fourth hypothesis is: 
 
H3.3: In countries with firm specific skill profiles the gender gap in top positions the 
gender gap is expected to be higher because women are less likely than men to invest in firm 




At the same time, because of data used in previous studies on skill profiles and gender 
(Estevez-Abe et al., 2001, Estevez-Abe, 2005) we need to also question the assumption that 
women and men invest in skills differently. In other words, what happens if there is a 
relatively high share of women with specific skills? If women are highly specialised as well, 
then the stratifying effect of skill specificity should disappear and women should be just as 
likely to reach top positions, if we follow the human capital argument. Thus, the fifth 
hypothesis is: 
 
H3.4: In countries with strict employment protection legislation or specific skill profiles, the 
gender gap in managerial positions can be expected to be higher than in less regulated 
countries with general skills.  
 
As indicated already, specific skills and EPL are institutional complementarities in that 
EPL protects skill investments. While this might encourage women to enter the labour market 
in the first place, it seems to hinder women (especially those who are highly educated) from 
reaching top positions. Because in LMEs social protection is more limited and the labour 
market is more deregulated than in CMEs, this causes employment insecurity, which then is 
specifically a burden for workers with lower skills. In CMEs, these workers are more sheltered 
(Mandel and Shalev, 2009) due to stronger social protection, which on the other hand 
penalizes women in higher skilled jobs who do not have the need for social protection. Soskice 
;ϮϬϬϱ, p. ϭϳϱͿ suŵŵaƌizes this dileŵŵa: ͞If Ǉou͛ƌe a highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵaŶ, Ǉou ǁaŶt to 
ǁoƌk iŶ aŶ LME; if Ǉou͛ƌe a ǁoƌkiŶg-class man, you ǁaŶt to ǁoƌk iŶ a CME.͟ 
 
Therefore, we expect that for our sample of highly educated individuals, the gender 
gap is higher in CMEs than in LMEs.  
 
Generous unemployment benefits however – as a second indicator for social 
protection – lower the risk of investments in specific skills and encourage employees to invest 
in more portable sector specific skills. We can therefore expect that in countries with 
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generous unemployment benefits, women are more likely to invest in sector specific skills 
that will then iŶĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood of oďtaiŶiŶg top positioŶs.  
 
Thus, hypothesis H3.7 is that the gender gap in countries with generous 
unemployment benefits is smaller.  
 
To address these hypotheses, the Chapter now continues by describing the results of 
the random slopes models with cross-level interaction terms. In other words, we examine the 
impact of labour market institutions on vertical segregation. Random slope models are run 
for both the wider definition of vertical segregation – senior professional and managerial jobs 
– and managerial jobs only. Due to data availability, the number of countries and individuals 
included varies. In a second step, two cross-level interaction terms for each labour market 
institutions are added at the same time to the model in order to test how robust the results 
are and to take into account the potential correlation of the eight macro-level variables.  
 
After describing the results, the findings are analysed, beginning with a discussion of 
the first variables that aim to operationalise conflict theories, followed by an analysis of the 
arguments focusing on political economies. In a last step, both theories are brought together 
in order to identify how institutions overlap and act as complementarities.  
 
7.2 Baseline models 
 
This seĐtioŶ eǆaŵiŶes the iŵpaĐt of laďouƌ ŵaƌket iŶstitutioŶs oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to 
senior professional and/or managerial positions. As discussed in section 3.4, eight macro-level 
variables have been identified. Four of these – collective bargaining coverage, trade union 
deŶsitǇ, ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ ŵeŵďeƌship ƌates aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ ƌates – aim to capture 
the theoretical assumptions made above on how interest representation and organisation of 
workers in unions can impact the gender gap (see Dieckhoff et al., 2015; Schäfer et al., 2012) 
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and how a dualisation of the labour market (Palier and Thelen, 2010) potentially increases 
vertical segregation.  
 
The remaining four variables – skill profiles for the overall workforce and women in 
particular, employment protection legislation, unemployment benefit generosity – aim to test 
the findings of scholars gendering the Varieties of Capitalism approach, such as Estevez-Abe 
(2005, 2007, 2009), Estevez-Abe et al. (2001), Mandel and Shalev (2009) and Hall (2007). 
Variables aim to investigate whether national skill profiles alone or in combination with 
employment protection and unemployment benefit generosity solidify the glass ceiling for 
highly educated women, using updated and individual-level data.  
 
All variables are added to the random slope model separately first. In a second step, 
two cross-level interaction terms at a time are introduced to the random slope models in 
order to test for moderation effects. This allows us to test whether collective bargaining in 
combiŶatioŶ ǁith ;ǁoŵeŶ͛sͿ uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ has aŶ iŵpaĐt oŶ the geŶdeƌ gap. 
 
Here, it needs to be highlighted that data is not available for all 31 countries for each 
context-level variable. In order to still be able to compare the model fit of the cross-level 
interaction random slope models with the model fit of the random slope models without 
context-level variables, the latter ones need to be rerun for the varying sample sizes. Table 
7.1 and table 7.2 list the results of the random slope models for these different sample sizes. 
While in the previous Chapter the key focus is on analysing the variation in the likelihood of 
women reaching top positions, this Chapter focuses on the impact of labour market 
institutions on vertical segregation. Thus, even though individual and job characteristics are 
controlled for, the detailed coefficients are attached in the appendices and therefore not 
discussed at this point. Additionally, the random slope models without macro-level variables 
are only discussed briefly. More importantly, random slope models are provided here in order 
to compare these with cross-level interaction models and see whether adding macro level 




Table 7.1 and 7.2 show the results for the varying samples both for access to 
managerial and senior professional occupations and access to managerial positions only. As 
discussed in the previous Chapter, the original sample has 31 countries at level 2 and 10,902 
individuals at level 1. Countries included are: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovak, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Data for 
unemployment benefit generosity for around the year 2010 is only available for 30 countries 
and thus Albania is excluded. Furthermore, data on collective bargaining coverage, trade 
union density and employment protection legislation is not available for Albania, Croatia and 
TuƌkeǇ, aŶd data foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s skill pƌofiles ĐaŶŶot ďe fouŶd foƌ TuƌkeǇ, AlďaŶia aŶd 
Luxembourg, but is available for the remaining 28 countries. EPL data is missing for Albania, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Romania, Cƌoatia aŶd TuƌkeǇ, aŶd data foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ 
membership is missing for Albania, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Greece, Romania and Turkey. For 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ, oŶlǇ ϭϴ ĐouŶtƌies aƌe iŶĐluded due to data ŵissiŶg fƌoŵ AlďaŶia, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Greece, 
‘oŵaŶia, “loǀeŶia aŶd TuƌkeǇ. Thus, ŵodels iŶĐludiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ should ďe 
interpreted with particular caution due to the very low number of N at level 2.  
 
The main difference for the outcome of senior professional and managerial positions, 
in comparison to the bigger sample size as discussed in the previous Chapter 8, is that it seems 
that with smaller sample sizes, the variance of gender becomes less significant. In other 
words, the iŵpaĐt of geŶdeƌ oŶ iŶdiǀiduals͛ aĐĐess to ŵaŶageƌial aŶd seŶioƌ pƌofessioŶal 
occupation is clearly significant for sample sizes of 28 and 30 countries at the level 2 (see 
models 7-1-4, 7-1-5, 7-1-6).  However, as indicated in the previous Chapter the selection of 
countries matters as well, as model 7-1-1 shows significant variance at level 1 for a 
significance level of <.1 for 24 countries in contrast to model 7-1-3 despite the same number 
of countries included and more individuals at level 1. This seems to be due to Bulgaria, which 
is included in model 7-1-1, but not in model 7-1-4. Bulgaria has shown to allow women better 




For managerial positions (see table 7.2), we find the same amount of N at level 2 and 
1 as in table 7.1. However, in contrast to the initial model with 31 countries, we find no 
significant variation at the individual level. Thus, the impact of gender does not seem to vary 
for access to managerial positions. Nevertheless, since for the bigger sample size there was a 
significant variation and secondly, this Chapter examines the impact of macro-level factors on 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs, ďoth defiŶitioŶs of top positioŶ aƌe iŶĐluded. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the 





Table 7.1 Random slope models for different N for managerial and senior professional positions due to varying level 1 and level 2 data  
















 B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. 
Female -0.42*** 0.08 -0.58*** 0.07 -0.51*** 0.07 -0.44*** 0.08 -0.42*** 0.08 -0.42*** 0.08 
Constant -0.77* 0.38 -1.38** 0.44 -0.97** 0.37 -1.00** 0.35 -0.98** 0.35 -0.98** 0.35 
Variance 
female  0.07€ 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.08* 0.04 0.08* 0.04 0.08* 0.04 
Variance 




Loglikelihood -4607.6492 -3863.6703 -4970.5012 -5509.5166 -5783.5438 -5418.547 
Level 1 
(individuals) 
8400 7271 9253 10210 10728 10029 
Level 2 
(countries) 
24 18 24 28 30 28 
Models control for variables such as Age, Age2, Having children , Having a partner, Youngest child in preschool, Part-time employed, Migrant, 
Industry sector, Construction Transport sector, Financial Services, Public Administration, Education, Health Sector, Other Services, Paid 
training, Small  Company, Large Company, Public sector, Employment status Full models in Appendix.*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05
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Table 7.2 Random slope models for different N for managerial positions due to varying level 1 and level 2 data  
















 B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. 
Female -0.34** 0.11 -0.39** 0.13 -0.47*** 0.12 -0.41*** 0.11 
-0.41*** 0.10 -0.40*** 0.11 
Constant -3.75*** 0.64 -4.87*** 0.73 -3.90*** 0.63 -3.66*** 0.59 
-3.83*** 0.58 -3.91*** 0.60 
 
            
Variance 
female  0.09 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.07 
0.10 0.07 0.11 0.07 
Variance 





Loglikelihood -2294.8315 -2032.9094 -2481.303 -2733.1873 -2823.3638 -2678.0725 
Level 1 
(individuals) 
8400 7271 9253 10210 10728 10029 
Level 2  
(countries) 
24 18 24 28 30 28 
Models control for variables such as Age, Age2, Having children , Having a partner, Youngest child in preschool, Part-time employed, Migrant, 
Industry sector, Construction Transport sector, Financial Services, Public Administration, Education, Health Sector, Other Services, Paid 
training, Small  Company, Large Company, Public sector, Employment status Full models in Appendix. *** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05 
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7.2.1 Random slope models 
 
The analysis of the association between labour market institutions and access to top 
positions begins with adding macro-level variables separately to the random slope model. 
Variables operationalizing conflict theory are added first (see table 7.3, models 7-3-1 to 7-3-
4). None of the investigated variables have a significant direct impact. 
The first variable examined is union density. This variable expresses the share of the 
workforce that has a union membership and thus indicates how representative unions are for 
the overall workforce. Applying multilevel modelling, model 7-3-1 in table 7.3 shows the 
results for adding trade union density as an explanatory macro-level variable to explain access 
to senior professional and managerial positions. The main effect is not significant, which 
means that according to the data individuals do not reach top positions more or less easily 
depending on how representative trade unions are. More importantly for the research 
question however, representative trade unions also do not seem to affect the gender gap in 
managerial and senior professional positions, as the non-significant value for the additional 
impact of our macro-level variable on women shows (Macro factor*female). 
Because union density is used as an indicator for representation of the workforce, we 
Ŷeed to haǀe a Đloseƌ look at ǁho eǆaĐtlǇ is a ŵeŵďeƌ of tƌade uŶioŶs. The data oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
union density shows the proportion of the female workforce that are a member of unions. It 
therefore does not show whether women are represented by unions more or less than men, 
ďut geŶeƌallǇ hoǁ laƌge a shaƌe of the feŵale ǁoƌkfoƌĐe is uŶioŶised. Data oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ 
density was only available for 18 countries, therefore we must be careful with interpretations. 
But we can see from model 732-2 in table 7.3 and 7-4-2- in table 7.4 that a large unionised 
female workforce has no direct impact on the gender gap. According to the models, there is 
no additional gain of a large unionised female workforce for female workers in particular. The 
variance of gender (female) is non-significant and therefore we cannot say that adding 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ to the ŵodel helps eǆplaiŶ Đƌoss-ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiaŶĐe of ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess 
to managerial positions. 
Moving on to the next variable, the models now show whether there is a significant 
impact of the share of women among trade union members affects the gender gap. The 
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variable shows how many women in relation to men are members of a union, thus the higher 
the score, the better women are represented in comparison to men. However, the random 
slope models with cross-level interaction (see table 7.3, model 7-3-3 and table 7.4, model 7-
4-3) terms do not support these observations. 
 
Going beyond union membership, collective bargaining coverage aims to capture not 
how representative unions are, but how many employees are covered by agreements made 
and therefore how influential unions are. In other words, high levels of collective bargaining 
coverage indicate strong corporatism and unions. According to model 7-3-4 in table 7.3 and 
model 7-4-4 in table 7.4, collective bargaining coverage does not seem to have any statistically 
significant influence on the gender gap in senior professional and/or managerial positions.  
 
To summarize, we find no evidence for the direct impact of trade unions and collective 
bargaining on the gender gap.  
 
Models 7-3-5 to 7-3-8 in table 7.3 and 7-4-5 to 7-4-8 in table 7.4 list the results of 
adding labour market institutions to the random slope model that operationalise the 
gendered VoC arguments. Is vertical segregation the result of institutions that lead to a 
gender bias in skill investments by increasing employment protection and unemployment 
benefits? Modes 7-3-5 and 7-4-5 examine whether skill profiles can help explain cross-
national variation of the gender gap by adding the cross-level interaction term to the random 
slope model. The higher the score for skill profiles, the more specialised a workforce is.  
 
Based on model 7-3-5 (table 7.3), we see that a more specialised workforce does not 
seem to have any impact on the gender gap, nor does it affect the overall workforce. The 
same is true if we only consider how specialised the female workforce is (model 7-3-6). A 
highly specialised feŵale ǁoƌkfoƌĐe does Ŷot seeŵ to affeĐt ǁoƌkeƌs͛, oƌ speĐifiĐallǇ ǁoŵeŶ͛s, 




Closely connected with skill profiles are unemployment benefits. Generous 
unemployment benefits aim to protect skill investments in times of unemployment, and 
therefore should facilitate the development of industry-specific skills, which are not as gender 
biased as firm-specific skills. Thus, the gender gap in countries with more flexible specialised 
skills can be expected to be lower. Based on the models, we find no evidence for a significant 
impact of unemployment benefit generosity and the gender gap either in managerial and 
senior professional positions or in managerial positions only (see table 7.3, model 7-3-7 and 
7.4, model 7-4-7). 
 
Unlike unemployment benefits, employment protection legislation on the other hand 
demonstrates how easy it is to lay workers off and thus it can be expected that with higher 
employment protection, employers are less likely to hire a woman due to expected career 
interruptions. The multilevel models 7-3-8 in table 7.3 and 7-4-8 in table 7.4 provide no 
supporting evidence for the impact of EPL on the gender gap.  
 
To summarize, none of the variables representing the skill investment arguments 
seem to directly decrease oƌ iŶĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes of ƌeaĐhiŶg a top positioŶ.  
 220 
 
Table 7.3 The impact of context factors in explaining the cross-ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiaŶĐe iŶ ǁoŵeŶ’s ƌelatiǀe likelihood to oďtaiŶ ŵaŶageƌial aŶd 
senior professional positions 
 Conflict Theory Gendered VoC Theory 






WoŵeŶ’s peƌĐeŶtage of 











Main effect (Macro 
Factor) 0.10 0.18* 0.13* -0.11 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 
female -0.43*** -0.57*** -0.44*** -0.45*** -0.44*** -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.50*** 
Macro factor*female -0.08 -0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.09 
Variance female level 0.08* 0.03 0.06 Ϭ.Ϭϳ€ Ϭ.Ϭϳ€ Ϭ.Ϭϳ€ 0.08* 0.04 
Variance country 0.08** 0.09* 0.06* 0.08** 0.09** 0.10** 0.09** 0.11** 
Exp. Var. random slope: 
female (from model 3) 0.00% -50.00% 14.29% 12.50% 12.50% 4.78% 14.09% 0.00% 
Exp. Var. level 2 (from 
model 3) 11.11% 30.77% 25.00% 11.11% 0.00% 0.13% -0.14% 0.00% 
Log likelihood -5508.01 -3861.45 -4604.93 -5507.68 -5509.14 -5418.1912 -5782.4803 -4969.56 
Level 2 N 10210 7271 8400 10210 10210 10029 10728 9253 
Level 1 N 28 18 24 28 28 28 30 24 
Each column represents a separate model, where one context variable is included as a main effect on employment insecurity, as well as an 
interaction term with permanent contract. All models include the individual level variables as in model 3.  All level 2 variables are centred and 
standardized. *** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, € = p < 0.10
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Table 7.4 The impact of context factors in explaining the cross-ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiaŶĐe iŶ ǁoŵeŶ’s ƌelatiǀe likelihood to oďtaiŶ ŵaŶageƌial 
positions 
 Conflict Theory Gendered VoC Theory 






WoŵeŶ’s peƌĐeŶtage of 












(Macro factor) 0.09 0.13 0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.10 -0.11 -0.14€ 
Female -0.41*** -0.42*** -0.34** -0.41*** -0.40*** 0.11*** -0.40*** -0.46*** 
Macro factor*female 0.12 0.13 -0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.11 -0.05 -0.02 
Variance female 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.12 
Variance country level 0.07* 0.08€ 0.09* 0.08* 0.08* 0.10** 0.07* 0.08* 
Exp. Var. random slope: 
female (from model 3) 27.27% 36.36% 0.00% -9.09% 9.09% 21.44% 6.74% 0.00% 
Exp. Var. level 2 (from 
model 3) 12.50% 20.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -1.27% 20.49% 11.11% 
Log likelihood -2730.80 -2030.29 -2294.79 -2733.07 -2732.65 -2677.09 -2821.45 -2479.52 
Level 2 N  10210 7271 8400 10210 10210 10029 10728 9253 
Level 1 N 28 18 24 28 28 28 30 24 
Each column represents a separate model, where one context variable is included as a main effect on employment insecurity, as well as an 
interaction term with permanent contract. All models include the individual level variables as in model 3.  All level 2 variables are centred and 
standardized. *** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, € = p < 0.10.  
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7.2.2 Adding two variables at a time  
 
One of the key assumption of Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2004), and 
therefore also of the gendered version of VoC, is that labour market institutions are 
complementarities and highly interconnected. Thus, we need to take into account that 
variables might not individually affect the gender gap, but in combination. However, because 
of limited data availability, some models only have 18 countries at level 2. In order to still gain 
meaningful results, we therefore cannot add more than 2 cross-level interaction terms at a 
tiŵe. Tƌade uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ, ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵeŵďeƌship aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s tƌade uŶioŶ ŵeŵďeƌship aƌe 
highlǇ Đoƌƌelated to oŶe aŶotheƌ. The saŵe is tƌue foƌ skill pƌofiles, ǁoŵeŶ͛s skill pƌofiles; aŶd 
employment protection legislation and unemployment benefits. Consequently, the models 
might show significance where there is none or might actually not take into account 
moderation effects. In order to control for this, context variables are included in the model 
two at a time. This allows us to test hypothesis H3.2, H3.3 and H3.5. H3.2 argues that the 
gender gap is affected by a combination of high union density and collective bargaining 
Đoǀeƌage. HǇpothesis ϯ.ϯ is aďout hoǁ the ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ aŶd 
collective bargaining coverage may affect the gender gap, and H3.5 looks at the combination 
of strict employment protection legislation and specific skill profiles.  
Results for managerial and senior professional occupations can be seen in table 7.5 
and for managerial positions only in table 7.6. Here, the tables illustrate for 28 models which 
variables have a significant impact on the gender gap. For simplicity, the tables only indicate 
significant cross-level interaction terms. In other words, only when a variable has a significant 
impact on the gender gap is its direction included in the table (for results on the main effect, 
see the Appendix E).   
 
Following the structure of the previous Chapters, we examine the impact of variables 
eǆpƌessiŶg the ͞ĐoŶfliĐt theoƌǇ͟ fiƌst; namely union density, collective bargaining coverage, 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵeŵďeƌship ƌate iŶ uŶioŶs oǀeƌ ŵeŶ͛s aŶd the shaƌe of ǁoŵeŶ iŶ uŶioŶs iŶ ƌelatioŶ 
to the overall female workforce. While there are several significant main effects (see 
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Appendix E), there is not a single significant combination of two variables at a time that has 
an impact on the gender gap. Neither the gender gap in managerial nor in managerial and 
senior professional positions seems to be affected at all by collective bargaining coverage or 
any of the union density variables.  
 
Moving to the Gendered VoC variables, we see that with the exception of EPL, we now 
see significant results. Even though the hypothesis is that specific skill profiles seem to solidify 
the glass ceiling, the models find no support for this (table 7.3 and table 7.4, models 2-8). On 
the contrary, countries with specific skill profiles – or in other words a highly educated and 
qualified workforce – seem to decrease the gender gap in managerial and in managerial and 
senior professional occupations. This is the case for managerial positions when we compare 
countries with similar levels of employment protection legislation (table 7.6). This impact is 
significant both when the overall workforce is highly specialised, and also if we look at how 
specialised women in particular are. For the gender gap in senior professional and managerial 
positions, we find that if both women and the overall workforce are highly specialised, the 
gender gap is smaller.  
 
What is more, we see that unemployment benefit generosity seems to significantly 
iŶĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to ŵaŶageƌial aŶd seŶioƌ pƌofessioŶal joďs if ǁe Đoŵpaƌe ĐouŶtƌies 
with the same level of EPL.  
 
LastlǇ, ǁe Ŷeed to see ǁhetheƌ ͞ĐoŶfliĐt͟ aŶd ͞GeŶdeƌed VoC͟ ǀaƌiaďles ĐoŵďiŶed 
have an impact on the gender gap. If we compare countries with similar levels of collective 
bargaining coverage, EPL significantly decreases the gender gap. What is more, when added 
at the saŵe tiŵe, ǁe fiŶd that EPL aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s shaƌe iŶ tƌade uŶioŶs seeŵ to significantly 
decrease the gender gap in managerial and senior professional positions. Moreover, we see 
that when added at the same time, a unionised female workforce decreases the gender gap 




Narrowing the definition of top positions down to only managerial positions (table 
6.6), we see the same effect. A highly unionised female workforce decreases the gender gap, 
while at the same time a highly specialised (female) workforce seems to help all individuals 
to reach top positions more easily.  
 
To summarize, when adding just one macro-level variable at a time, we find no 
evidence in favour or against the Gendered VoC part of the literature or the conflict theories. 
There does not seem to be a direct effect of any of the labour market institutions on the 
gender gap. However, when adding two cross-level interaction terms at a time, we find that 
the effeĐt of ;ǁoŵeŶ͛sͿ skill speĐifiĐitǇ is ŵodeƌated ďǇ a uŶioŶised feŵale ǁoƌkforce and 
EPL. What is ŵoƌe, the EPL ďeĐoŵes sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ positiǀe ǁheŶ ŵodeƌated ďǇ ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
membership rates in trade unions. Unemployment benefit generosity becomes significantly 
positive when moderated by EPL.  
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Table 7.5 Cross-level interaction for access to managerial and senior professional jobs 
 






















      
WoŵeŶ’s peƌĐeŶtage of 
trade union members 
n.s. n.s. 
     
Union density (women) n.s. n.s. n.s.     
Skill profiles n.s. n.s. n.s. B(+)€    
WoŵeŶ’s skill  pƌofiles n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. A(+)€  /B(-)€   
Unemployment Benefits n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. B;+Ϳ€ n.s.  
Employment Protection n.s. B  (+)€  A(+)* / B #;+Ϳ€ n.s. n.s. n.s. A(+)€ 
Notes: Entries are results from 28 separate multilevel models, in which contextual variables are introduced in pairs (having controlled for the 
individual level characteristics)A (represents when the variable in column A is significant) B (represents when the variable in column B is 
significant), n.s. represents when both variables are insignificant. The letters in bold represents the stronger predictor in the model.  
*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, € = p < 0.10 
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 Table 7.6 Cross-level interaction for access to managerial jobs 
 
 A   --   









percentage of trade 
union members 
Union density (women) Skill profiles 
WoŵeŶ’s 






      
WoŵeŶ’s peƌĐeŶtage of 
trade union members 
n.s. n.s. 
     
Union density (women) n.s. n.s. n.s. 
    
Skill profiles n.s. n.s. n.s. 
A(+)€ / B#(+)**    
WoŵeŶ’s skill  pƌofiles n.s. n.s. n.s. 
A (+) € / B# (+)** 
n.s. 
  
Unemployment Benefits n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
n.s.  
Employment Protection n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
A#(+)€ A#(+)* n.s. 
Notes: Entries are results from 28 separate multilevel models, in which contextual variables are introduced in pairs (having controlled for the 
individual level characteristics)A (represents when the variable in column A is significant) B (represents when the variable in column B is 
significant), n.s.represents when both variables are insignificant. The letters in bold represent the stronger predictor in the model.  





Only a few theoretical assumptions were supported by the models. This section aims 
to analyse the findings. We see that hypothesis H3.1 cannot be supported as union density 
alone does not affect the gender gap. H3.2 and H3.3, which assume a combined effect of 
ĐolleĐtiǀe ďaƌgaiŶiŶg Đoǀeƌage aŶd ;ǁoŵeŶ͛sͿ uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ ĐaŶŶot ďe ǀeƌified eitheƌ. EǀeŶ 
though H3.4 – the effect of skill profiles on the gender gap – cannot be fully verified as it is 
not skill profiles alone that seem to be associated with the gender gap, there is however 
eǀideŶĐe foƌ the iŶdiƌeĐt effeĐt of skills speĐifiĐitǇ as the effeĐt s ŵodeƌated ďǇ ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
membership rates in trade unions and EPL. What is more, the EPL becomes significantly 
positive when moderated ďǇ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵeŵďeƌship ƌates iŶ tƌade uŶioŶs. UŶeŵploǇŵeŶt 
benefit generosity becomes significantly positive when moderated by EPL, which confirms 
H3.5 partly. There is an association between skills and EPL, but a positive rather than the 
expected negative one. The following section aims to analyse these findings by linking them 
back with the literature.  
 
7.3.1 Conflict theory  
 
The first hypothesis H3.1 for this Chapter claims that the gender gap is expected to be 
lower in countries where unions are strong. In other words, the collective bargaining coverage 
is eǆpeĐted to haǀe a positiǀe iŵpaĐt oŶ the geŶdeƌ gap. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁe see that ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
ƌelatiǀe ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh the top Đoŵpaƌed to ŵeŶ͛s aƌe Ŷot affeĐted diƌeĐtlǇ ďǇ ĐolleĐtiǀe 
bargaining coverage.  This might be due to the fact that highly skilled workers are generally 
less likely to be covered by collective bargaining agreements (Fitzenberger et al., 2013), and 
whilst we find collective bargaining coverage to raise the level of wages and improve the 
conditions for low and medium skilled workers (Dieckhoff et al, 2015, Calmfors and Drifil, 




What is more, hypothesis H3.2 looks at how not only collective bargaining coverage, 
but also union density and who actually is organised in unions matters. The authors expected 
that the gender gap would be higher in countries where unions are strong but only represent 
a small share of the workforce. In other words, union density is low, but collective bargaining 
coverage is high. The idea here is that strong unions help to distribute occupational hierarchy 
more evenly (Schäfer et al., 2012) and thus help women, who tend to be located in the lower 
tail of the working population in terms of income and position (Mandel and Semyonov, 2005). 
Dieckhoff et al. (2015) argue that women particularly also benefit from high collective 
bargaining coverage in addition to this as full-time permanent employment for women 
increases. With more women in full-time employment, we should therefore expect the 
human capital to become more evenly distributed between genders, which in the long run 
assists women in reaching managerial and senior professional positions. However, the models 
discussed above show mixed evidence for this claim. Unions representing a large share of the 
overall workforce do not seem to directly impact the gender gap – neither directly or 
indirectly. These findings support Schäfer et al. (2012) who find the impact of trade unions on 
iŶdiǀiduals͛ likelihood of ďeiŶg iŶ a high-status occupation insignificant. This can be due to the 
assumption that highly educated employees are less likely to be union members and thus 
they do not depend on union power to improve their career progression as much as less 
educated workers (Goerke and Pannenberg, 1998; Schnabel, 2002). Highly educated 
eŵploǇees haǀe ͞a lesseƌ Ŷeed foƌ ĐolleĐtiǀe ǀoiĐe͟ due to gƌeateƌ iŶdiǀidual ďaƌgaiŶiŶg 
poǁeƌ ;“ĐhŶaďel, ϮϬϬϮ, p. ϭϴͿ. Thus, the ŵiǆed ƌesults of uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ͛s iŵpaĐt oŶ ŵeŶ͛s aŶd 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood of reaching a managerial or a senior professional and managerial position 
are not surprising.  
 
Furthermore, it was expected that if collective bargaining coverage is high, but women 
are not part of unions negotiating these agreements, there would be a negative impact on 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s, as the iŶteƌest of the Đoƌe ŵale ǁoƌkfoƌĐe 
are prioritised. This idea is based on labour market dualisation theories claiming that the 
workforce is not equally represented by unions or covered under collective bargaining 
agreements. Labour market insiders (see Blanchard and Summers, 1986, 1987; Lindbeck and 
Snower, 1988, 1989; Emmenegger et al. 2012) tend to be in standard employment, who are 
 229 
 
unionized, in secured employment, protected by labour laws and have access to social 
security. Outsiders tend to be unemployed or working in atypical employment with low levels 
of social protection and limited political representation. According to Palier and Thelen 
(2010), this trend has worsened in recent years, which particularly affects women as they 
tend to be outsiders (Häusermann and Schwander, 2010). The findings from table 7.5 and 7.6 
suggest that both a large unionised female workforce and a high share of women in unions 
are beneficial not only for highly educated workers in general, but in combination with strict 
employment protection legislation, particularly for female workers. This helps to narrow the 
geŶdeƌ gap. This is shoǁŶ ďǇ the ŵodels iŶĐludiŶg EPL aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ aŶd EPL 
and woŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ ŵeŵďeƌship at the saŵe tiŵe ;Taďle ϳ.ϱͿ. If ǁe tuƌŶ this oďseƌǀatioŶ 
aƌouŶd, ǁe ĐaŶ saǇ that the loǁeƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s shaƌe iŶ uŶioŶs is, the loǁeƌ theiƌ likelihood to 
reach a top positions and thus, the wider the gender gap. This supports the neo-classical 
assumption that women are marginalised as outsiders and thus neglected by unions unless 
they form a large share of their members. A larger share of women in trade unions seems to 
facilitate policies or agreements that benefit the whole workforce, more so than male-
dominated unions do. However, because this effect is only observable in the case of strong 
EPL and does not occur on its own, we have to be careful about interpretations. Also, 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵeŵďeƌship ƌates iŶ uŶioŶs aƌe Ŷot oŶlǇ positiǀe foƌ the gender gap but help 
employees overall to reach top positions. A dualisation of the workforce is therefore not 
ĐleaƌlǇ pƌeseŶt. The ŵaiŶlǇ iŶdiƌeĐt effeĐt of ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ suppoƌts DieĐkhoff et al. 
(2015) who question that women are always outsiders in the labour market. Even if that is 
the Đase, ƌheǇ aƌgue that uŶioŶs saĐƌifiĐe ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŶteƌests iŶ oƌdeƌ to aĐĐoŵŵodate theiƌ 
male members. Women in unions seem to be good for the overall workforce and in some 
combinations even help to decrease the gender gap.  
 
To summarize so far, we find evidence for power resource theory in that unionised 
female workforce is beneficial, but not for dualisation theories. In countries with a unionised 
female workforce and a higher share of women over men in unions seem to facilitate access 




7.3.2 Political economies and the gender gap   
 
As indicated already, union density and collective bargaining coverage seem to be 
highly linked with the remaining labour market institutioŶs, ŶaŵelǇ ;ǁoŵeŶ͛sͿ skill pƌofiles, 
employment protection and unemployment benefit generosity.  Before analysing the 
correlation between these two streams of labour market institutions, we first need to 
examine whether hypothesis 3.3-3.4 are to be rejected or confirmed.  
 
Hypothesis 3.3 claims that countries with specific skill profiles in contrast to general 
skill profiles have a strong emphasis on the accumulation of human capital and thus men are 
more likely than women to be represented in top positions. However, we can expect the 
gender gap to be smaller if the female workforce is also highly specialised. The idea behind 
this assumption is that vocational training systems providing both firm- and industry-specific 
skills increase gender inequality (Estevez-Abe, 2005, Rubery, 1995, Rubery and Fagan, 1993). 
According to Estevez-Abe (2005), the more specific skills are, the less likely women are to 
iŶǀest iŶ theŵ due to theiƌ ͞poƌtaďilitǇ aĐƌoss eŵploǇeƌs, the loĐus of tƌaiŶiŶg, aŶd atƌophǇ 
ƌate͟ ;Estevez-Abe, 2007, p.70). However, the findings presented in table 6.5 and 6.6 show 
that the opposite is true. The more specialised the overall workforce is in terms of vocational 
training and education, the smaller the gender gap. Women seem to reach managerial and 
senior professional occupations in comparison to men more easily when the general and 
female workforce has specific skills, meaning the overall rate of vocational training and 
education is high. This contradicts the conclusion of Estevez-Abe (2005, 2009) who claims that 
women from all educational backgrounds are discriminated against in countries with a focus 
on specific skills. Here, it needs to be noted however that scores used for skill specificity 
stƌiĐtlǇ folloǁ IǀeƌseŶ͛s ŵethod ;see Esteǀez-Abe et al., ϮϬϬϭͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ďeĐause IǀeƌseŶ͛s 
data is from the 1990s and uses an additive average score summarizing vocational training 
intensity 1980-1990s, data used in this thesis is much more up to date. Consequently, 
countries do not follow the initial VoC typology and countries assumed to have specific skills 
profiles, such as Germany and Denmark, are not leading here. This also highlights the fact that 
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different conclusions can be made when context variables such as skill specificity are 
measured in different ways.  
 
Moving on to hypothesis 3.4, we need to investigate whether employment protection 
increases vertical segregation. The idea here is that EPL aims to reduce the risk of employees 
in investing in their skills. Thus, employment protection makes it harder for the employer to 
lay off workers, which is why employers prefer hiring men in the first place due to the higher 
risk of career interruptions of female workers. Thus, women are disadvantaged as they are 
less likely to be hired and thus less likely to accumulate experience and human capital despite 
having the relevant qualifications (Estevez-Abe 2005, 2009).  This results in lower chances to 
reach managerial and senior professional positions where human capital is essential. Estevez-
Abe (2005) claims that EPL protects skill investments by making it harder to lay workers off, 
therefore workers tend to stay longer with companies to make investments pay off. However 
due to career interruptions, women are less likely to be hired if EPL is strong. Here, Estevez-
Abe (2005) looks at the overall workforce, but not at highly educated women only.  
 
However, especially for managerial and senior professional jobs, the opposite seems 
to be the case according to the models presented in table 7.5. We find that if we compare 
ĐouŶtƌies ǁith siŵilaƌ leǀels of ĐolleĐtiǀe ďaƌgaiŶiŶg Đoǀeƌage, EPL iŶĐƌeases ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess 
to top positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s, aŶd thus deĐƌeases the geŶdeƌ gap. The theoƌetiĐal 
assumption was that more regulated labour markets make it harder for employers to lay 
workers off and therefore they are more reluctant to hire women. This does not seem to be 
the case for highly educated women if we compare countries with similarly strong unions. 
The reasons here could be that EPL protects skill investments generally and thus encourages 
both men and women to invest in human capital, which  in return helps to narrow the gender 
gap. Thus, EPL as a potential tool for skill formation seems to be beneficial for highly educated 
women. This conclusion also indicated that a strong emphasis on human capital is not 





As explained earlier, once we update the data on skill profiles, countries do not fall 
neatly into the CME and LME groups anymore. But if we just follow the VoC logic as explained 
in Chapter 4 and assume that generally, CMEs have specific skill profiles and LMEs general, 
theŶ the Đlaiŵ is Ŷot tƌue that ͞if Ǉou͛ƌe a highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ, Ǉou ǁaŶt to work in an 
LME; if Ǉou͛ƌe a ǁoƌkiŶg-Đlass ŵaŶ, Ǉou ǁaŶt to ǁoƌk iŶ a CME͟ ;“oskiĐe ϮϬϬϱ, ϭϳϱͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, 
we also cannot see that EPL and skills are reinforcing each other as there is no effect when 
adding EPL and skill profiles at the same time, despite the ͞ŵutuallǇ ƌeiŶfoƌĐiŶg͟ effeĐt of EPL 
and skills (Mandel and Shalev, 2009, p.165). In contrast to their assumption, highly educated 
women aiming for managerial and senior professionals jobs are not affected negatively by 
EPL. The opposite seems to be the case.   
 
Besides employment protection, we now need to look at the seventh hypothesis that 
concerns the second variable indicating social protection – unemployment benefit generosity. 
H3.5 argues that the gender gap is smaller in countries with generous unemployment 
benefits. The assumption here is that unemployment protection serves as a tool to protect 
the value of skills in the case of unemployment. Thus, generous unemployment protection 
encourages workers to invest in occupational skills that are easily transferable, but more 
specific than general skills. Mandel and Shalev (2009) assume however that this only benefits 
men. Nevertheless, as this sample only looks at highly educated individuals, it can be expected 
that not only men but also women benefit from unemployment benefits protecting their 
skills, and this encourages investment into sector-specific skills, but not firm-specific ones. 
According to table 6.5, generous unemployment benefits seem to decrease the gender gap in 
managerial and senior professional positions when added to the same model as skill 
specificity, and additionally makes the effect of EPL statistically significant. This supports the 
idea that unemployment benefits serve as institutional complementarities with skills and EPL. 
As argued by Estevez-Abe et al. (2001), workers invest in highly portable skills – general and 




7.3.3 Linking theoretical approaches 
 
In a last step, we now need to examine how theories on the political economy and 
conflict theory are connected. We find that the two key characteristics of CMEs – EPL and skill 
specificity – only directly decrease the gender gap if moderated by either a unionised female 
workforce or high female membership rates in unions. In either case, if women are 
represented in unions and therefore part of negotiations, we find that strict EPL and a focus 
on specific skills narrow the gender gap. This provides evidence for dualisation theories, as it 
shows that only if women are part of unions and therefore are not outsiders, the gender gap 
decreases. What is more, it shows how interconnected unions, vocational training and 
education are. In any case, the positive impact of both specific skills, EPL and unions clearly 
contradicts Estevez-Aďe͛s ;et al., 2001; 2005, 2009) findings that EPL and skill specificity 
always discriminate against women, but benefit men. We find this combination of a largely 
unionised female workforce in combination with strict EPL in Baltic countries, for example.  
 
Thus, we can say that partly both arguments are true for highly educated women – 
political economy theory and conflict. In countries where EPL shelters women, but unions are 
female-doŵiŶated, ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŶteƌests seeŵ to ďe ƌepƌeseŶted ǁell aŶd thus ǀeƌtical 
segregation is smaller. What is more, a large unionised female workforce in countries with a 
focus on specific skills also seems to be a particularly good combination for women to reach 
managerial positions and for everyone to reach senior professional and managerial positions. 
As discussed before, unemployment benefits and employment protection both aim to protect 
skill investments – industry- specific skills on the one hand and firm-specific ones on the other. 
It is therefore not surprising that high ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ aŶd geŶeƌous uŶeŵploǇŵeŶt 
benefits seem to be complementarities as well.  
 
The question of course remains whether labour market institutions in combination 
with family policies affect woŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs. This is because one could argue 
that family policies and labour market institutions are highly interconnected and influence 
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each other. Family policies for example can be seen as a result of collective bargaining on the 
one hand, or as institutional complementarities similar to employment and unemployment 
protection to protect skill investments. The author decided to move the literature supporting 
this argument and also its analysis into Appendix F, as it mainly mirrors the findings of 
previous Chapters. Similar family policies show a significant impact on the gender gap. At the 
same time, this Chapter shows how dependent any significant effect of family policies on the 
gender gap is on the institutional surroundings. 
 
7.4 Conclusion  
 
The key focus was to see what other than family policies can explain for the variance 
of the gender gap in top positions. This is because Chapter 6 resulted in largely insignificant 
results if not results that conflict with our assumptions. To summarize, one of the key 
contributions of this thesis is to examine whether highly educated women are truly affected 
differently by labour market institutions than the general female workforce in relation to 
men. Here, the findings of scholars such as Schäfer et al. (2015) and Dieckhoff et al (2015) on 
the one hand and Estevez-Abe (2005, 2009) and Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) and Mandel and 
Shalev  (2009) on the other needed to be tested for highly educated workers only, using 
micro-level data. If women are organised in unions, it seems that individuals have better 
access to top positions than in countries where mostly men are represented. However, it is 
not the case that only women benefit from a unionised female workforce. Regarding our 
Gendered VoC arguments, we find that nearly all claims made by the gendered approach to 
the VoC are not applicable to highly educated employees. It is particularly not the case that 
vertical segregation increases due to strict EPL or a focus on specific skills. The opposite seems 
to be true for highly educated women. Thus, we can conclude that a strong focus on human 
capital is beneficial for highly educated women in terms of reaching top positions. This might 
be because strict EPL protects skill investments and thus encourages women to invest in 




Another contribution of this thesis is to investigate the correlation between both sides 
of the disĐussioŶ. Heƌe, ǁe fiŶd that, iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ ŵeŵďeƌship aŶd skills aŶd 
EPL are highly correlated and in countries with high EPL, specific skills and a large unionised 
female workforce, women have relatively better access to managerial and senior professional 
occupations. Thus, Estevez-Abe (2009) was correct in saying that countries are much more 
diverse than the VoC typology allows. We cannot simply distinguish between LMEs and CMEs, 
as configurations of institutional complementarities are more complex, especially when 




Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to investigate what explains the cross-national variation 
in the gender gap in top positions. In other words, why is it that women in some countries are 
even more underrepresented in top positions than in other countries? Here, the key focus of the 
thesis was to see whether family policies act as a deterrent in enabling women into top positions, 
increasing gender inequalities as argued by the welfare state paradox theories. In addition to this, 
this thesis examined which factors at the national level, other than family policies, can help 
eǆplaiŶ ǁhǇ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs is ŵoƌe diffiĐult ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s. This ĐoŶĐludiŶg 
Chapter aims to first of all summarise the literature described in Chapters 2 to 3 and the findings 
made in the analytical Chapters 5 to 7. All research questions are addressed briefly and connected 
with the literature. Afterwards, this Chapter critically reflects on the overall research strategy, 
the selection of the data and the methods. What is more, the author suggests improvements that 
with hindsight could have made this thesis and its contributions even stronger. The section also 
discusses directions for future research and presents ideas both on potential methodological and 
on theoretical contributions that need to be made in order to help understand why women are 
underrepresented in top positions. This Chapter and the overall thesis conclude with a brief 
discussion of the policy implications for both policy makers as well as practitioners drawn from 
this thesis by recommending policies that could help decrease the gender gap in top positions.  
 
8.1 Summary of the thesis: What was done and why 
 
This thesis critically analysed the welfare paradox theory by examining whether family 
policies hinder women from reaching top positions in the labour market. Prior to this, some key 
descriptive statistics to highlight the current gender market inequalities were examined. In order 
to highlight gaps in the literature and academic research, this thesis started with a literature 
review on the empirical background of gender labour market inequalities. Here, the Chapter 
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reviewed various dimensions of inequalities from a comparative perspective ranging from 
gendered differences in employment rates and the occurrence of part-time work, through the 
gender pay gap and occupational segregation, which again was divided into vertical and 
horizontal segregation. The overall aim of this Chapter was to provide evidence for the claim that 
women are discriminated against in every developed economy in terms of wage structures, 
occupational segregation and hours worked (European Commission, 2015). From an empirical 
perspective, this Chapter also aimed to highlight patterns in the cross-national variation of 
gender inequalities. Horizontal segregation seems to be the norm in nearly every country with 
the exception of only Greece, Italy and Luxembourg. Vertical segregation as measured in 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶdeƌƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ ŵaŶageƌial positioŶs eǆists iŶ all ϯϬ EuƌopeaŶ ĐouŶtƌies 
included in this Chapter. Even in Scandinavian countries, such as Denmark and Finland, only one 
third of all managers are female.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 examined the theories around how family policies and labour market 
institutions may influence gender labour market inequalities. Chapter 2 concluded that while 
family policies solve the puzzle of cross-national variation in employment rates, they do not help 
to uŶdeƌstaŶd ǀeƌtiĐal segƌegatioŶ as the saŵe poliĐies that help pƌoŵote ǁoŵeŶ͛s eŵploǇŵeŶt 
rates seem to affect the gender gap in top positions differently. The Chapter introduced the 
welfare state paradox theory as argued by Mandel and Shalev (2009), namely that family policies 
widen the gender gap between men and women because extensive family policies lead to a 
higheƌ ŵotheƌhood peŶaltǇ aŶd ŵoƌe eŵploǇeƌs͛ disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ. This is ďeĐause ǁoŵeŶ aƌe 
more likely to interrupt their careers and remain at home longer if family policies such as 
maternity leave are generous. So, whilst these policies help women enter the labour market, they 
can become barriers when aiming to access top positions.  
The Chapter concludes by pointing out the limitations of previous research in that it uses 
macro-level data only, defines top positions too vaguely and also includes only a limited range of 
family policies, mainly indices – and thus fails to capture direct effects individual policies. It also 
provides some evidence of previous studies many of which come to the conclusion that family 
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policies may not matter in explaining the glass ceiling. Thus, the author decided to include labour 
market institutions into the analysis as family policies alone do not seem to explain cross-national 
variation of the gender gap in top positions.  
 
Chapter 3 therefore turns to labour market institutions to better understand cross-
national variation in vertical segregation between genders. The literature review highlighted 
strengths and limitations of two bodies of literature – one arguing that labour market institutions 
such as unions and collectiǀe ďaƌgaiŶiŶg help pƌoŵote ǁoƌkeƌs͛ iŶteƌests aŶd thus ĐaŶ help 
decrease the gender gap. Here however, dualization scholars such as Häusermann and 
Schwander (2010) also discuss the potentially negative effect of strong unions on gender labour 
market inequalities as the core workforce represented by unions tends to be male and thus 
women are at risk of being outsiders. A second body of literature focuses on the role of EPL and 
unemployment benefit generosity and skills specificity. The key argument here is that more 
regulated and protected labour markets with a strong focus on specific skills harden the glass 
ceiling, as women are less likely to invest in specific skills and thus are less attractive to 
employers. The more protected workers are and the more difficult hiring and firing becomes, the 
more employers prefer hiring men over women, as women impose higher risks to employers due 
to potential family responsibilities. The Chapter also brought to light some of the limitations to 
these existing studies. Both bodies of the literature focus on the overall workforce only and do 
not distinguish between educational levels. With a few exceptions (such as Schäfer et al., 2012) 
it mainly applies aggregate macro-level data and does not adjust the definition of top-level 
positions to the arguments. Additionally, data used in some research is outdated. For example, 
skill specificity stems from the 1980s and should therefore not be used anymore.  
 
Chapter 4 outlined the data and methods chosen to answer the research questions. EWCS 
data from around the year 2010 was chosen as it allowed the author to redefine the 
understanding of top positions and offered a wide sample for cross-national comparisons. It also 
enabled the research to control for various individual- and job-level characteristics. Furthermore, 
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EWCS allowed the author to narrow down the sample to highly educated individuals only. Family 
policies and labour market institutions stem from a wide range of sources and are measured at 
a national level. Due to various reasons the country sample includes only European countries and 
is a cross-sectional comparison, as this thesis was interested in the association between 
institutions and the gender gap and not change over time as this does not appear to be the core 
issue (see Chapter 2). Because the thesis used individual level and national level variables, the 
preferred method was multilevel modelling. As the author was interested in cross-national 
variation of the gender gap and thus the varying effect gender has on an iŶdiǀidual͛s likelihood 
to reach a top position, random slope models with cross-level interaction terms were suggested.  
 
The analytical Chapter 5 however took the reader stepwise though multilevel modelling 
in order to highlight first of all the need for individual- and job-level control variables and also 
highlighted that the effect of gender does vary significantly across countries. Research Question 
ϭ aŶsǁeƌed iŶ this Chapteƌ ǁas: To ǁhat eǆteŶt does ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ďe eŵploǇed iŶ a top 
position ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s ǀaƌǇ aĐƌoss ĐouŶtƌies? Based oŶ the fiŶdiŶgs of Chapteƌ ϱ, it ĐaŶ ďe said 
that first of all women on average are less likely to reach top positions compared to men. But 
more importantly, this likelihood varies significantly across countries. Here, the analysis shows 
two additional aspects: the importance of how we define top positions and also the need to 
distinguish between educational levels as individual-level factors affect the gender gap of highly 
educated individuals differently and also the gender gap itself is more extreme. The key finding 
of Chapter 5 was that highly educated women face even greater gender gaps than women from 
less educated backgrounds. The robustness of the results of the multilevel model was examined 
through comparing the results with that of a fixed effects model, which confirms the cross-
ŶatioŶal ǀaƌiatioŶ iŶ the geŶdeƌ gap iŶ ǁoƌkeƌs͛ likelihood of ƌeaĐhiŶg top positioŶs. 
 
Chapter 6 answered the second research question: How do family policies at a national 
level affeĐt ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to aĐhieǀe top positioŶs at the iŶdiǀidual leǀel ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s? 
This was done in order to test whether the assumption of the welfare state paradox is true, that 
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policies can even widen the gender gap if we look at individual-level data, highly educated 
individuals only and also include a much wider range of family policies. It can be seen that 
assumptions based on the overall workforce are not true for higher educated population. 
Maternity and paternity leave actually has no impact on the gender gap amongst highly educated 
individuals. Well-paid leave even seems to decrease the gender gap in senior professional and 
managerial positions. Surprisingly, the lack of formal care also decreases the gender gap. As 
expected, high enrolment rates in part-time childcare seem to widen the gender gap. The Chapter 
somewhat supported the claim made by Mandel and Shalev (2009) and Dorado et al. (2002) to 
be critical of the effect of policies on gender inequalities. 
 
Because the findings of Chapter 6 suggest that family policies alone cannot explain cross-
national variation of the gender gap in top positions, Chapter 7 examined how labour market 
iŶstitutioŶs affeĐt ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to aĐhieǀe top positioŶs at the iŶdiǀidual leǀel ƌelatiǀe to 
ŵeŶ͛s. IŶ suŵŵaƌǇ, Chapteƌ ϳ shoǁs that laďouƌ ŵaƌket iŶstitutioŶs iŶdiǀiduallǇ haǀe ŵiŶiŵal 
effect on the gender gap when we look at highly educated women only and use individual-level 
data. Unions added as an individual variable do not seem to affect the gender gap. There is also 
no evidence for dualisation theories as there is no effect of a largely unionised female workforce 
on the gender gap. However, high rates of women in trade unions significantly decrease the 
gender gap if, in addition to this, EPL is also high. GeŶeƌallǇ, ǁheŶ the ŵodels ĐoŵďiŶed ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
share in unions with skill specificity, skills seemed to have a positive impact on narrowing the 
gender gap. Estevez-Aďe͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ aƌguŵeŶt oŶ the Ŷegatiǀe effeĐt of EPL oŶ the glass ĐeiliŶg 
therefore cannot be verified either, the opposite is the case. A strong focus on human capital, as 
measured as skill specificity in this thesis, is beneficial for highly educated women in terms of 
reaching top positions – when combined with union density. This might be because strict EPL 
protects skill investments and thus encourages women to invest in specific skills that allow them 
to progress in their careers. What is more, the Chapter illuminated limitations of typologies, as 
countries cannot be divided into CMEs and LMEs. It is seen that in countries with strict EPL, a 
focus on specific skills and a large unionised female workforce, women actually have better 
access to managerial and senior professional occupations. Thus, the main contribution of this 
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Chapter was that more regulated and rigid labour markets actually appear to help highly 
educated women to reach the top.  
 
8.2 Limitations of the thesis and directions for future research  
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the drivers of cross-national variation of the gender 
gap between highly educated employees in top positions. Because the question consequently 
required a cross-national comparison, several decisions in terms of the research strategy had to 
ďe ŵade. Despite the authoƌ͛s ďest iŶteŶtioŶs to find both appropriate data and methods, there 
are some drawbacks to this study. The first limitation of the study is the lack of comparisons – 
both longitudinal comparisons of the gender gap, but also comparisons between the highly 
educated and the general workforce. All models examine correlation, but cannot assert with 
certainty whether there is causation. For example, it cannot be concluded that informal childcare 
impacts the gender gap. A longitudinal comparison could help to examine whether this statistical 
association holds over time and whether context level factors presumably cause the gender gap 
to widen or narrow. Nevertheless, as with any social research, causality can never be assumed 
with certainty and it might well be that the gender gap affects the context level variables. The 
other comparative aspect that this thesis only partially addresses is to what extent highly 
educated women are different to the general female workforce. Based on Chapters 2 and 7, we 
can assume significant differences, but it would have been interesting to examine whether this 
difference becomes stronger when adding other variables.  
 
Secondly, the use of quantitative large scale studies leads to a simplification of the 
findings. Multilevel modelling examines whether there is significant variation of the gender gap 
between countries and whether family policies or labour market institutions can help to 
understand this variation. However, this approach is not necessarily designed for diving deeper 
into the findings. Examining the specific country factors driving the gender gap for each macro-
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level variable examined would have exceeded the scope of this thesis. However, due to the 
contributions the multilevel approach has made, this method was still to be preferred over linear 
regressions. What is more, while quantitative data and multilevel modelling enable an overview 
and the identification of patterns, a more dynamic qualitative approach would have allowed the 
research to grasp drivers and the complexity of the gender gap that cannot be quantified and 
measured easily. Interviews or focus groups, particularly with employers, could have helped to 
gain essential insight in workplace discrimination for example. Therefore, this study should be 
seen as a first step for future qualitative or smaller scale quantitative research.  
 
Another limitation of this thesis is the relatively small number of countries included in 
some of the models, due to data availability. This reduces the power of the models and therefore 
findings need to be treated with caution. A suggestion here would be to merge the European 
Working Conditions dataset with other datasets such as the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). 
Another advantage of merging datasets is the higher heterogeneity of the countries included and 
thus the gender gap can be expected to vary even more significantly between countries.   
 
Another contribution of this thesis is the observation that neither policies nor institutions 
seem to fully address the issue of gendered hierarchies. However, what the thesis does not 
examine is to what extent legislation can help reduce the gender gap. Here, it would have been 
interesting to look at how quotas or at least disclosure for management can help narrow the gap. 
An example would be quotas in politics and the corporate sphere (OECD, 2017). While quotas 
seem to positively affect policy outcomes, the effect of quotas on the economy and also the 
representation or pay of highly educated women appears to be insignificant. Bertrand et al. 
(2014) examine how the quota has affected the glass ceiling in Norway. The authors found that 
even though women were more represented in boards and that the gender wage gap in boards 
deĐƌeased, it had Ŷo effeĐt oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s paǇ oƌ theiƌ ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs outside of 
boards. Thus, ǁhile Ƌuotas seeŵ to ďe a helpful tool to iŶĐƌease ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ 
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politics, there is little evidence that quotas will significantly lower the gender gap in senior 
professional and managerial positions generally.  
 
The main limitation of this thesis is the lack of norms and culture in the analysis. Even 
though the author conducted an in-depth analysis of a vast range of variables, the question still 
remains what drivers significantly impact the gender gap in top positions. For future research, 
the author therefore recommends following approaches by Pfau-Effinger (1998), Morgan (2013) 
and Anker (1997) who all emphasise that policies do not necessarily lead to change and affect 
labour market outcomes, but that norms and attitudes are persistent. Pfau-Effinger (1998) 
suggests a Ŷeǁ fƌaŵeǁoƌk that iŶĐludes Ŷoƌŵs ďǇ foĐusiŶg oŶ ͞iŶteƌƌelatioŶs of Đultuƌe, 
stƌuĐtuƌe aŶd aĐtioŶ͟ ;Pfau-Effinger, 1998, p. 150). This interrelation shapes gendered 
arrangements that do not necessarily reflect policies, but are rather based on the behaviour of 
social actors. Therefore, changes in gendered arrangements are driven by traditions and norms 
which then result in cross-national variations of female labour market participation. These 
traditions lead to different peƌĐeptioŶs of the ͞ĐoƌƌeĐt͟ geŶdeƌed diǀisioŶ of laďouƌ. IŶ the 
Netherlands for example, the male breadwinner model is still strong due to the prevailing 
gendered arrangement of housewife marriages that go back to the 17th century. A main reason 
for this was the strong urban bourgeoisie with its ideal type of a housewife marriage. In Sweden 
and Finland, this bourgeoisie class was not as prevalent as the family model of free farmers. 
Consequently, when examining gender inequalities at the household level, it is necessary to 
include attitudes and culture as gendered arrangements do not always correspond with national 
policies, but rather interrelate with those. Pfau-Effinger (1998) and also Morgan (2013) therefore 
highlight how changes in policies do not necessarily affect labour market outcomes immediately, 
but that change needs time. As outlined in the methods section of this thesis, models take time-
lagged effects into account to some extent by using family policy data from 2008 and individual-
level data from 2010. However, following Morgan (2013) for example, there has been substantial 
change in family policies in the past decade. Applying Pfau-EffiŶgeƌ͛s ;ϭϵϵϴͿ theoƌǇ that Ŷoƌŵs 
and traditions are path-dependent, a change in policies does not directly affect individuals. This 
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thesis therefore suggests repeating this kind of research with individual-level data from 2015 to 
examine time-lagged effects.  
 
Especially with regards to vertical segregation, discrimination based on gendered norms 
that impact emploǇeƌs͛ ďehaǀiouƌ Ŷeeds to ďe eǆaŵiŶed, as oĐĐupatioŶal segƌegatioŶ is highlǇ 
based on cultural aspects and gender-related stereotypes (Anker, 1997). Anker distinguishes 
between positive characteristics, negative and other characteristics. While the positive 
stereotypes assume that women have a caring nature, are skilled in domestic work, have greater 
finger dexterity, are more honest and also have a more attractive physical appearance, negative 
stereotypes assume women to be unable to supervise others, to be less talented in science and 
mathematics, and physically not as strong as men. Additionally, women are suspected to be more 
willing to take orders which also refers back to their perceived inability to give orders. This does 
not only have consequences for the type of job they get, but results in gendered hierarchies. 
According to Anker (1997) women are less likely to complain about bad working conditions or 
their work in general. This is why female-dominated occupations tend to be more repetitive and 
monotonous which again has consequences both on vertical and horizontal segregation and 
female occupations tend to be lower-paid (England et al., 2007). These types of jobs also provide 
workers with less control over their work (Chung, 2018).  
 
These gender-related stereotypes and gendered norms can also explain gendered 
hierarchies in the labour market. Even though different patterns exist among those different 
tǇpes of diǀisioŶs, geŶeƌallǇ ŵeŶ oďtaiŶ ŵoƌe poǁeƌ aŶd ͞alŵost alǁaǇs͟ ǁoƌk iŶ the ͞highest 
position of oƌgaŶizatioŶal poǁeƌ͟ ;AĐkeƌ, ϭϵϵϬ, p. ϭϰϲͿ. Cƌiteƌia that deĐide oǀeƌ the leǀel of a 
job are the required knowledge, skills, their complexity, the effort and working conditions (Acker, 
1990). In addition, responsibility and job complexity defined by managerial and senior 
professional tasks are detrimental. Even though these criteria come across as rational, they are 
ďased oŶ the assuŵptioŶ of oƌgaŶisatioŶal logiĐ that oŶlǇ the ͞ideal ǁoƌkeƌs͟, those ǁithout aŶǇ 
other commitments, can fully meet the expected level of responsibility and authority. This is 
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specifically problematic for women as any form of commitment such as child-rearing leads to a 
lower-rank position with lower wages. Cha and Weeden (2014) and Goldin (2014) have shown 
how, for example, loŶgeƌ houƌs aƌe dispƌopoƌtioŶallǇ ƌeǁaƌded ďǇ paǇ. GeŶeƌallǇ, ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
bodies and every factor that is incidental with it such as pregnancies or even their menstruation 
seem to cause exclusions and stigma that again are the basis for prejudices. These prejudices 
lead to the assumption that women cannot meet the requirements of a higher ranked job such 
as a skilled blue-Đollaƌ ǁoƌk oƌ top ŵaŶageŵeŶt ;AĐkeƌ, ϭϵϵϬͿ. IŶ a Ŷutshell, AĐkeƌ͛s theoƌǇ oŶ 
gendered organisations argues that vertical and horizontal segregation exist due to the 
connection between arguably rational judgements on job hierarchies and stereotypes against the 
female worker that does not fit into the male and patriarchal structures.  
 
For future research, the models should also examine gender attitudes as another context 
variable that may influence gender hierarchies – and we should also look at mechanisms to 
change attitudes. In order to tackle the gender gap in top positions, policy-makers and employers 
need to invest in female and male role models. This recommendation is based on the 
representative bureaucracy theory (see for example Krislov and Rosenbloom, 1981). According 
to this theory, a bureaucracy needs to represent individuals who share the values and attitudes 
of the public. Ideally, a bureaucracy representing the diversity of the public will produce policies 
that respect a variety of viewpoints. Scholars such as Mai-Dalton and Sullivan (1981), Ibarra 
(1993) and Daley (1996) apply this theory to gender inequalities. They argue that firstly, the 
underrepresentation of women and minorities in top positions reduces chances for new policies 
aŶd ŵeĐhaŶisŵs to eŵeƌge that ĐaŶ faĐilitate otheƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đaƌeeƌ pƌogƌessioŶs. “eĐoŶdlǇ, 
women in top positions serve as role models and encourage other women to follow their 
example. Thus, policy-makers and employers need to ensure that female role models are 
supported in order to encourage women to apply for top positions (OECD, 2017). While female 
role models might not impact statistical discrimination and discrimination in the promotion, it 




Futuƌe ƌeseaƌĐh should also look at hoǁ ǁe ĐaŶ ĐhaŶge eŵploǇeƌs͛ aŶd leadeƌs͛ ŵiŶd-
sets and increase acceptance of the fact that breaking the glass ceiling should not only make 
sense from a moral and social point of view but also from a financial and economic perspective. 
͞The ďest ƌeasoŶ foƌ ďelieǀiŶg that ŵoƌe ǁoŵeŶ ǁill ďe iŶ Đhaƌge ďefoƌe loŶg is that iŶ a 
ferociously competitive global economy, no company can afford to waste valuable brainpower 
siŵplǇ ďeĐause it's ǁeaƌiŶg a skiƌt͟ ;Fisheƌ aŶd EiďeŶ, ϭϵϵϮ, p. ϱϲͿ. To attƌaĐt ŵoƌe ǁoŵeŶ to 
top positions, workplace culture including working conditions therefore need to change. Work-
life balance needs to be increased by encouraging flexible working arrangements and 
discouraging working overtime and long hours (OECD; 2014). 
 
The results of the various analyses in this thesis can easily be misread. One of the key 
findings is that in countries with high rates of children in informal childcare, the gender gap in 
top positions is significantly lower. Another finding is that family policies generally seem to affect 
highly educated women only marginally. Thus a simple – and incorrect – conclusion could be that 
family policies generally contribute to a wider gender gap and harden the glass ceiling. Especially 
in times of austerity and cutbacks in public policies, these results could potentially provide the 
evidence for even more limited family policies. Nevertheless, regardless of the insignificant 
results of family policies in explaining the gender gap, these policies do help women to get into 
the labour market. However, what this thesis and its models cannot capture is the direction of 
causation. That is to say, are gender gaps in countries with limited family policies truly smaller 
because family policies are ineffective or is it rather the case that family policies only indirectly 
affect the gender gap and actually directly affect attitudes towards working women and mothers 
in the first place? In other words, the gender gap in top positions and influential jobs remains 
ďeĐause iŶeƋualities ͞steŵ Ŷot oŶlǇ fƌoŵ iŶstitutioŶal aŶd oƌgaŶisatioŶal stƌuĐtuƌe, ďut fƌoŵ 
social and cultural norms, inadequate buy-in or support from leaders, assumptions about 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ that seƌǀe theŵ ill iŶ leadeƌship positioŶs, aŶd uŶdeƌdeǀeloped seŶioƌ 
pƌofessioŶal Ŷetǁoƌks foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͟ ;OECD, ϮϬϭϳ, p. ϭϴϱͿ. Thus, iŶ oƌdeƌ to ĐhalleŶge geŶdeƌ gaps 
in top positions meaningfully, the way forward cannot be the implementation of new policies 
and institutional structures only as a change in the system is not automatically followed by a 
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change in attitudes and behaviour. As a starting point the focus of this PhD was to understand 
cross-national variation of the gender gap in top positions and it only examined the impact of 
laďouƌ ŵaƌket iŶstitutioŶs aŶd faŵilǇ poliĐies oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs.  
 
8.3 Contributions and policy recommendations 
 
As analysed in Chapter 4, one of the key contributions of this thesis is not only to focus on 
vertical segregation and hierarchies, but most importantly to create a new definition of top 
positions and thus of the gender gap in top positions. This was done by firstly using individual-
leǀel data to defiŶe ǁoŵeŶ͛s aŶd ŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ƌeaĐh top positioŶs aŶd seĐoŶdlǇ, ďǇ 
redefining what should be considered a top position based on the factors impacting the gender 
gap as eǆplaiŶed iŶ Chapteƌs Ϯ to ϰ. This is ďeĐause aggƌegate ŵeasuƌeŵeŶts of ǁoŵeŶ͛s shaƌe 
in top positions can hide composition effects and therefore measuring the dependent variable at 
the individual level is preferable as this also allowed us to narrow down the sample size to women 
and men with tertiary education only. Secondly, not only should we look at managerial positions, 
but also at individuals in senior professional occupations. This is because the gender gap in top 
positions reflects occupational hierarchies that are caused by decisions at the household level, 
policies and labour market factors such as human capital considerations. According to ESeC not 
only managerial occupations fulfil the criteria of the higher salariat, but also certain senior 
professional occupations, such as lawyers or university teachers. Additionally, from a rather 
technical point of view, there is an already existing overlap between the main ISCO-ϴϴ gƌoup͛s 
managers and senior professionals, as it is sometimes hard to decide whether specific skills are 
required at the legislative, administrative or managerial level or whether skills need to be directly 
applied. This leads to problems in the ISCO, but also illustrates the second reason for including 
both managerial and senior professional occupations. Not only hierarchies in terms of power are 




And indeed, looking at the results of the analysis mainly in Chapter 5, we find both 
samples overlap. It can be said that in 2010 on European average women were less likely to reach 
both managerial and/ or senior professional positions. Even though coefficients differ slightly, 
the impact gender has on the dependent variable is almost the same for both the narrow and the 
wider definition of top positions. Additionally, we find that the impact gender has on vertical 
segregation varies significantly across countries. However, it is more statistically significant for 
the wider definition of senior professional and managerial positions than for the more narrow 
definition of managerial positions only. This may be due to the power of the overall model and 
the reduced sample size of the more narrow definition. Most interestingly, highly educated 
women face higher barriers to reach top positions than women from less educated backgrounds. 
In other words, the gender gap found for tertiary educated workers is larger than that found for 
the overall worker population. 
 
For the effect of family policies, we find similar trends. Generally, of all the family policies 
included in the models, only part-time childcare and informal childcare seem to affect the gender 
gap. This is however only the case for the wider definition of top positions – senior professional 
and managerial occupations. Here, part-time childcare and informal childcare have a significant 
effect. While high rates of children not enrolled in any formal childcare seem to narrow down the 
gender gap, part-time childcare increases it. These findings suggest that there is no evidence to 
show that family policies address the gender gap for highly educated women appropriately. 
While they do not seem to hinder women from reaching top positions as argued by the welfare 
state paradox, at the same time they do not effectively help to narrow down the gender gap 
either. This is even more the case for women in managerial positions than for women in senior 
professional occupations. This might be due to women in these positions having the resources 
such as money to pay for childcare and therefore are not dependent on policies. Thus, we can 
say that based on this, more distinct definition of the gender gap using individual-level data and 
holding human capital (education) levels constant, there is no evidence to support the welfare 
state paradox theory. However the existing policies, although may help women especially 
mothers stay in employment, they do not do enough to decrease occupational hierarchies and 
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need to be much more targeted. Workplaces and organisations need to be tackled. As suggested 
by the Women and Equality Committee (2018), other policies that aim at encouraging fathers to 
spend more time with their children and thus support a more equal share of childcare could be 
more useful. The models showed no significant impact of paternity leave on the gender gap. 
However, this could be due to limited variations in paternity leaves and also due to the overall 
low duration of paternity leave. Fathers could be granted a right to take paid time off to attend 
antenatal appointments (2018, p.3). Furthermore, paternity leave should be paid at a higher level 
to encourage fathers regardless of their income to spend time with their children. The Committee 
suggested a paǇ at ϵϬ peƌĐeŶt of the fatheƌ͛s paǇ.  The Coŵŵittee also suggested lookiŶg iŶto 
iŶtƌoduĐiŶg ϭϮ ǁeeks pateƌŶitǇ leaǀe iŶ the Đhild͛s fiƌst Ǉeaƌ that is dediĐated to fatheƌs only and 
would then replace shared parental leave that still tends to be taken up mostly by mothers.  
 
This thesis was not able to look into more innovative and flexible measures of policies, 
but the author suggests that future research needs to look into more flexible ways to provide 
childcare for example. Clearly, the nature of jobs included in both samples – managerial and 
managerial and senior professional occupations – requires a more flexible approach towards the 
delivery of childcare. This is indicated by the negative impact of part-time childcare on the gender 
gap aŶd at the saŵe tiŵe ďǇ the positiǀe iŵpaĐt of iŶfoƌŵal ĐhildĐaƌe oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to 
ƌeaĐh top positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s. CoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, oŶe has to ǁoŶdeƌ ǁhetheƌ ͞Ŷoƌŵal͟ tǇpes 
of childcare provision simply are not targeted enough to the needs of highly educated women 
with aspirations to reach top positions. How can childcare services adapt to suit a 24-hour 
economy and also the development that more and more children grow up in single parent 
households? One way of addressing the flexible demand for childcare is a combination of public 
and private services as for example implemented in France (see for example Letablier, 2008). 
Here, parents of children under three years old can choose between public collective childcare 
services (crèches) with trained and qualified employees, care in the private home of a registered 
childminder, or at their own home by a family employee. Thus, childcare is flexible and 
segmented between the private and public sectors and between collective and more flexible 
individual arrangements. Especially with increasing flexibility in the economy, this flexibility is 
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needed and can additionally be increased by supporting childcare centres to open at non-
standard hours or by encouraging employers to provide childcare services matching the needs of 
theiƌ eŵploǇees. AŶotheƌ politiĐal appƌoaĐh Đould ďe to suppoƌt ͞shift-paƌeŶtiŶg͟ ;see Letaďlieƌ, 
2008; Boyer and Nicolas, 2006). Allowing parents to work flexibly helps them to organise their 
shifts so that they can look after their children accordingly, which also positively affects the time 
fathers spent with their children and can thus helping to decrease gender inequalities at the 
household level as argued by Boyer and Nicolas (2006), Kim (2018), Chung and Van der Horst 
(2018). Crucial here is to address overtime and long hours in the labour market. As argued by 
Goldinm (2014), the gender pay gap would be smaller if long hours were not rewarded anymore. 
Goldin finds that because longer hours in certain occupations are rewarded disproportionally, 
͞eaƌŶiŶgs haǀe a ŶoŶliŶeaƌ ƌelatioŶship ǁith ƌespeĐt to houƌs͟ ;ϮϬϭϰ, p. ϮϳͿ. OĐĐupatioŶs 
affected by this overwork trends are managerial and professional jobs, where overwork is 
embedded in organisational structures and occupational cultures (Cha and Weeden, 2014). Even 
though this thesis did not explore the relevance of over-time or longer hours, this could be done 
in future research.  
 
Another contribution of this thesis is to examine a wide range of labour market 
institutions and their correlation with the gender gap measured at the individual-level. Despite 
all the literature presented in the beginning Chapters of this thesis, the findings suggest that in 
contrast to Estevez-Abe (2005, 2009) et al. (2007) conclusions, highly educated women are more 
likely to reach top positions in highly protected and regulated labour markets if unions are strong. 
Also, this thesis contributes as it examines the interaction between EPL and unions strength and 
skill pƌofiles. We fiŶd that espeĐiallǇ ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ ŵeŵďeƌship, skills aŶd EPL aƌe highlǇ 
correlated and in countries with high EPL, specific skills and a large unionised female workforce, 
women have a relatively better access to managerial and senior professional occupations. Thus, 
we can conclude that a strong focus on human capital is beneficial for highly educated women in 
terms of reaching top positions. This might be because strict EPL protects skill investments and 
thus encourages women to invest in specific skills that allow them to progress in their careers. In 
other words, when human capital is the key focus of employers, gender seems to play a 
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subordinate role as the economic conditions and needs are prioritized. EPL as a tool to protect 
skill investments also seems to help women. However, the conclusion and policy 
recommendation cannot be to further increase EPL and regulations more generally as the last 
Chapter of the thesis highlighted.  
 
One of the findings was that well-paid leaǀe iŶĐƌeases ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh top 
positions. Thus, the author recommends investing into well-paid leaves and increase also 
paternity leave – both by introducing more generous and longer paternity leaves, but also by 
actively encouraging men to take the leave. As mentioned before, parental leave even in 
Scandinavian countries is still largely used by mothers. Thus, as long as presumably gender-
neutral policies such as parental leave actually reinforce the traditional division of labour, we 
cannot say whether they can help narrowing the gender gap. Consequently, policy-makers and 
employers need to create incentives so that fathers are more likely to take up paid leave. Bünning 
(2015) finds that fathers who took parental leave in the long run reduced their working hours 
and got more involved in childcare. Fathers who took more than 2 months of leave while their 
partner was working also got more involved in housework which indicates an even more 
substantial impact on gender equality in the household. However, research also suggests that it 
is not only the availability of the policy that matters, but also the workplace environment. Bygren 
et al. (2007) find that men are more likely to shorten their parental leave if other male colleagues 
have done so similarly. Thus, not only policies or parents, but also employers need to support the 
take up of parental leave for fathers.  
 
In summary, this thesis makes the following policy recommendations:  
1. For employers, particularly in the private sector, to change workplace culture by 
improving work-life balance, encouraging flexible working arrangements and 
discouraging working overtime and long hours (OECD; 2014). 
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2. For Governments and companies to share role model examples of equal sharing of paid 
work and care commitmeŶts iŶ oƌdeƌ to ĐhaŶge ďoth ŵeŶ͛s aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s attitudes aŶd 
behaviour towards working-mothers. 
3. For Governments and particularly private sector employers to share success stories of 
female role models.  
4. For Governments to provide longer paternity leaves, increase pay of paternity leave and 
for employers to actively encourage fathers to take up paternity leave.  
5. For women to join unions and for unions to take actions to challenge inequalities even if 
their core members do not necessarily benefit.  
6. For employers to address the extensive use of longer hours and overtime and stop 
rewarding longer hours disproportionally.  
7. Foƌ GoǀeƌŶŵeŶts aŶd UŶioŶs to ĐhalleŶge eŵploǇeƌs͛ statistiĐal disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ of ǁoŵeŶ.  
8. For Governments and/or employers to invest in more flexible childcare arrangements 
such as a mixture of private and public childcare, childcare facilities with non-standard 
hours and to allow parents to organise their shifts so that they can look after their children 
accordingly.  
9. For women to invest into in firm specific skills as these may not actually be a deterrent in 
reaching top positions.  
 
 
All in all, this thesis clearly highlights how career chances of highly educated women are 
currently not addressed at all by family policies or labour market institutions. Not only do unions 
and employers seem to fail to break the glass ceiling, but also policy-makers. Only if stakeholders 
both in the labour market and in governments realise the potential that is lost to the economy 
and society by hindering particularly highly educated women from reaching the top, can progress 
be made. For this, it is vital to acknowledge the diversity of the female workforce as this thesis 
clearly points out how education plays a major role and that the gender gap seems to be even 
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Appendix A: Supporting Literature for Chapter 2  
 
The impact of household and market-level factors on gender labour market inequalities 
The focus of this thesis is to understand cross-national variation of the gender gap in top 
positions. Therefore, factors at the individual-level are not directly part of this research. However, 
as the author is aware of the vast body of literature on household and market-level factors 
affecting gender labour market inequalities, the following sections aim to briefly summarise the 
literature on gender inequalities. In other words, why is it that individuals at the household level 
or in the labour market make decisions that lead to inequalities?  
 
 
Gender labour market inequalities at the market level 
Both horizontal and vertical segregation can be analysed from the perspective of human 
capital. HuŵaŶ Capital TheoƌǇ ;HCTͿ defiŶes this ͞as the stoĐk of kŶoǁledge and skills 
aĐĐuŵulated ďǇ aŶ iŶdiǀidual aŶd is aĐƋuiƌed thƌough eduĐatioŶ, tƌaiŶiŶg aŶd eǆpeƌieŶĐe͟ 
(Perales, 2013, p. 602). In a nutshell, HCT applied to gender labour market inequalities explains 
the gender gap through differences in human capital between men and women. Differences in 
Human Capital are due to the traditional division of labour. However this does not only affect 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s paƌt-time rates as explained before, but has an impact on their career choices on the 
one hand and ultimately leads to discrimination at the labour market due to gendered norms 
employers have. This chain of effects begins with the traditional division of domestic and paid 
labour between the spouses as explained earlier. From a HCT perspective, Becker (1985) argues 
that the tendency of women to do the majority of domestic work has a negative impact on their 
earnings. In his theory on work effort and rational choice theory he describes that domestic work 
deĐƌeases ǁoŵeŶ͛s eaƌŶiŶg siŶĐe it liŵits the tiŵe ŵaƌƌied ǁoŵeŶ ĐaŶ spend on the formal 
labour market. Due to domestic work and children in particular women have to interrupt their 
work and career. This leads to less work experience, training and therefore to a disadvantage on 
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the labour market (Polachek, 1981) and also discourages women to invest in their qualifications.  
The key aspect here is that women therefore choose to work in more flexible jobs that do not 
require experience and allow for interruptions. The starting wage might be comparably high but 
in the long run, because experience and specific skills do not matter, women earn less than men 
(Perales, 2013). Beyond the wage gap due to reduced hours worked, this consequently leads to 
the described horizontal segregation of the labour market, as women choose occupation that 
allow for interruptions. (Female) workers choose the best-paid job keeping their own 
qualifications, limitations and preferences in mind (Anker, 1997).  However, there are limitations 
to these studies. Firstly, they overemphasise the impact of motherhood on career developments 
and choices. Reducing individuals career decisions to the conflict of combining work and family, 
does not capture this development, as first of all, not every woman will become a mother and 
second, women have been investing into education and qualifications to an even larger extent 
than men have in recent decades (Bettio et al., 2009). Consequently, we need to also include 
eŵploǇeƌs as theǇ seeŵ to ďe ͞the gatekeepeƌs to eŵploǇŵeŶt͟ ;BuƌĐhell et al., 2014, p. 12). 
Following Human Capital Theory, employers aim to maximize profits by choosing the worker that 
helps to maximize productivity and minimize costs.  
 
In addition, both Human Capital Theory and social exchange theory share a key limitation: 
the assumption that both employers and employees base their decision on a completely rational 
eǀaluatioŶ of the iŶdiǀidual͛s skills sets. Pfau-Effinger (1998) criticises these theories for 
oǀeƌeŵphasisiŶg oŶ the ƌatioŶalitǇ of iŶdiǀidual͛s ďehaǀiouƌ. “he aƌgues that ǁoŵeŶ͛s deĐisioŶs 
regarding division of work at the household level are not based on financial incentives only. She 
suggests a Ŷeǁ fƌaŵeǁoƌk that iŶĐludes Ŷoƌŵs ďǇ foĐusiŶg oŶ ͞iŶteƌƌelatioŶs of Đultuƌe, 
stƌuĐtuƌe aŶd aĐtioŶ͟ ;Pfau-Effinger, 1998, p. 150). This interrelation shapes gendered 
arrangements that do not necessarily reflect policies, but are rather based on the behaviour of 
social actors. Therefore, changes in gendered arrangements are driven by traditions and norms 
which then result in cross-national variations of female labour market participation. These 
tƌaditioŶs lead to diffeƌeŶt peƌĐeptioŶs of the ͞ĐoƌƌeĐt͟ geŶdeƌed diǀisioŶ of laďouƌ. IŶ the 
Netherlands for example, the male breadwinner model is still strong due to the prevailing 
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gendered arrangement of housewife marriage that go back to the 17th century. A main reason 
for this was the strong urban bourgeoisie with its ideal type of a housewife marriage. In Sweden 
and Finland, this bourgeoisie was not as prevalent as the family model of free farmers. 
Consequently, when examining gender inequalities at the household level, we need to include 
attitudes and culture as gendered arrangements do not always correspond with national policies, 
but rather interrelate with those. Visser (2002) for example shows that in the case of the 
Netherlands, the increase in part-time work is not only due to married women entering the 
labour market and a lack of childcare facilities, but also caused by embedded structures of a 
former traditional male breadwinner society.  
 
Especially with regards to vertical segregation, we need to examine discrimination based 
oŶ geŶdeƌed Ŷoƌŵs that iŵpaĐt eŵploǇeƌs͛ ďehaǀiouƌ as oĐĐupatioŶal segƌegatioŶ is highlǇ 
based on cultural aspects and gender-related stereotypes (Anker, 1997). Anker distinguishes 
between positive characteristics, negative and other characteristics. While the positive 
stereotypes assume that women have a caring nature, are skilled in domestic work, have greater 
finger dexterity, are more honest and also have a more attractive physical appearance, negative 
stereotypes assume women to be unable to supervise other, to be less talented in science and 
mathematics, and physically not as strong as men. Additionally, women are suspected to be more 
willing to take orders which also refer back to their inability to give orders. This does not only 
have consequences for the type of job they get, but results in gendered hierarchies. According to 
Anker (1997) women are less likely to complain about bad working conditions or their work in 
general. This is why female-dominated occupations tend to be more repetitive and monotonous 
which again has consequences both on vertical and horizontal segregation and female 
occupations tend to be lower-paid (England et al., 2007). These types of jobs also provide workers 
with less control over their work (Chung, 2018).  
 
These gender-related stereotypes and gendered norms can also explain gendered 
hierarchies in the labour market. Even though different patterns exist among those different 
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types of divisions, geneƌallǇ ŵeŶ oďtaiŶ ŵoƌe poǁeƌ aŶd ͞alŵost alǁaǇs͟ ǁoƌk iŶ the ͞highest 
positioŶ of oƌgaŶizatioŶal poǁeƌ͟ ;AĐkeƌ, ϭϵϵϬ, p. ϭϰϲͿ. Cƌiteƌia that deĐide oǀeƌ the leǀel of a 
job are the required knowledge, skills, their complexity, the effort and working conditions (Acker, 
1990). In addition, responsibility and job complexity defined by managerial and professional tasks 
are detrimental. Even though these criteria come across as rational, they are based on the 
assuŵptioŶ of oƌgaŶizatioŶal logiĐ that oŶlǇ the ͞ideal ǁoƌkeƌs͟, those ǁithout aŶǇ otheƌ 
commitments can fully meet the expected level of responsibility and authority. This is specifically 
problematic for women as any form of commitment such as child-rearing leads to a lower-rank 
position with lower wages. GeŶeƌallǇ, ǁoŵeŶ͛s ďodies aŶd eǀeƌǇ faĐtoƌ that is iŶĐideŶtal ǁith it 
such as pregnancies or even their menstruation seems to cause exclusions and stigmata that 
again are the basis for prejudices. These prejudices lead to the assumption that women cannot 
meet the requirements of a higher ranked job such as a skilled blue-collar work or top 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt ;AĐkeƌ, ϭϵϵϬͿ. IŶ a Ŷutshell, AĐkeƌ͛s theoƌǇ oŶ geŶdeƌed oƌgaŶizatioŶs aƌgues that 
vertical and horizontal segregation exist due to the connection between arguably rational 
judgements on job hierarchies and stereotypes against the female worker that does not fit into 
the male and patriarchal structures.  
 
Gender labour market inequalities at the household level  
Whereas it seems that for men there have to be reasons that literally hinder them from 
working full-time, such as the lack of full-time jobs or health problems, unemployment, school 
attendance or partial retirement (Rosenfeld and Birkelund, 1995, p.111), many women choose 
part-time work because of child-rearing and providing care for family members (Stier and Lewin-
Epstein, 2001). Since women still do most of the domestic work including childrearing, they tend 
to choose jobs with reduced hours in order to combine domestic and formal labour-market work 
(Blossfeld, 1994; Moen, 1985). Other scholars such as Warren (2010) examine the type and level 
of jobs and their association with part-time employment. Warren (2010) observes that in the UK 
and Austria for example women in part-time employment are particularly common in low-level 
employment, whereas in Finland, France, Luxembourg and Spain this is the case for manual/ 
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elementary jobs. In the Netherlands and Ireland on the other hand, Warren finds high part-time 
rates across all levels and types of employment. Thus, the question could arise whether at all 
part-time rates are an indicator for gender labour market inequalities. Warren (2001) finds that 
for the UK and Denmark, part-time rates are associated with the reinforcement of the male 




What is more, these gendered stereotypes in combination with seemingly rational 
decisions based on human capital and gendered stereotypes lead do women being discriminated 
in the laďouƌ ŵaƌket ďased oŶ eŵploǇeƌs͛ feaƌ of Đaƌeeƌ iŶteƌƌuptioŶs due to ĐhildďeaƌiŶg oƌ 
ĐaƌiŶg ƌespoŶsiďilities. EŵploǇeƌs eŶgage iŶ ͞statistiĐal disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ͟ of ǁoŵeŶ aŶd theǇ aƌe 
more likely to hire men as they fear potential work interruptions. Statistical discrimination 
(Anker, 1997) is based on the assumptions that on average women have different skills, 
productivity and experience. By not questioning these assumptions in the individual case, 
employers save the cost of recruiting the appropriate candidate of either gender. Basically, it is 
cheaper to hold on to statistical discrimination than to invest into recruitment.  According to 
Anker (1997) this approach also explains why in some job sectors gender segregation sustains 
even though there are both men and women with appropriate skills and experience. 
 
While social exchange theory and Human Capital Theory focus on decisions made at the 
family or the individual level and to some extent by the market, Pfau-Effinger and Acker add a 
more holistic perspective that is based les on rational decision making, but more on norms, 
culture and tradition. By doing so, the national context is taken into account. Going beyond the 
individual and the market, other focus on policies at the state level. Even though welfare states 
can impact labour markets by implementing regulations and policies, the effect of national 
poliĐies oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ ŵaƌket positioŶ is Ŷot stƌaight-forward as the following paragraph 
highlights. We can expect gender labour market inequalities to vary as first of all policies still vary 
 283 
 
substantially across countries, but also attitudes and embedded labour market structures vary. 
From an empirical perspective, this assumption is logical based on the previous sections where 
there was considerable variation in the various forms of gender inequalities across countries.  
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Appendix B: Statistical Appendix to Chapter 4  

















Austria 743709 293980 509495 13468 42,17230356 
Belgium 805880 321512 657662 42212 46,31426073 
Bulgaria 531980 160123 494882 6929 31,49957158 
Cyprus 63662 4236 66719 2291 10,08769532 
Czech Republic 836847 334690 683163 6659 40,96889936 
Denmark 504205 131952 326728 7535 28,47650736 
Estonia 95331 18686 101168 3928 23,48382969 
Finland 426710 131388 322521 87 30,81791028 
France 5873103 1173133 3930005 221720 25,61639407 
Germany 7663755 1557160 4471040 94057 22,42219322 
Greece 716601 111738 624782 20791 18,92049828 
Hungary 904848 137774 644296 8500 16,54547314 
Ireland 336464 62983 307685 13547 23,12196987 
Italy 4626426 1708779 2991346 3195 37,04199306 
Latvia 147375 34772 159828 4958 26,69631714 
Lithuania 342905 38324 235078 12672 16,56682453 
Luxembourg 42536 12867 29417 435 31,72840765 
Malta 37163 5585 25950 241 15,95709751 
Netherlands 1474983 698116 998953 976 47,4281461 
Norway 435085 130995 308294 323 30,21268007 
Poland 2841629 814077 2936439 5176 28,82451863 
Portugal 720688 183156 584261 80 25,42774131 
Romania 1821782 607797 1474042 140 33,37227107 
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Slovakia 549760 194950 412511 745 35,64152965 
Slovenia 138354 49571 130144 7956 41,94233347 
Spain 3185008 532582 2388415 89710 20,47757528 
Sweden 731273 234966 609266 7737 33,40098063 
United 
Kingdom  5538230 732919 4197265 134683 16,44264062 




Appendix C: Statistical Appendix to Chapter 5 
Table C.1 Random effects models  
  











Albania   -0.33 0.13 -0.33 0.00 
Austria  -0.22 -0.24 -0.33 -0.30 
Belgium  -0.05 -0.43 -0.25 -0.46 
Bulgaria  -0.19 0.05 -0.37 -0.01 
Croatia  -0.22 0.04 -0.36 -0.21 
Cyprus  -0.35 -0.68 -0.40 -0.63 
Czech Republic  -0.51 -0.65 -0.38 -0.56 
Denmark  -0.42 -0.51 -0.42 -0.40 
Estonia  -0.46 -0.36 -0.43 -0.42 
Finland  -0.42 -0.79 -0.30 -0.70 
France  -0.58 -0.69 -0.40 -0.58 
Germany  -0.72 -0.78 -0.54 -0.65 
Global Average   -0.39 -0.37 -0.39 -0.40 
Greece  -0.73 -0.61 -0.52 -0.65 
Hungary  -0.37 -0.47 -0.31 -0.40 
Ireland  -0.42 -0.67 -0.42 -0.60 
Italy  -0.70 -0.41 -0.51 -0.44 
Latvia  -0.34 0.08 -0.46 -0.12 
Lithuania  -0.37 -0.26 -0.38 -0.33 
Luxembourg  -0.51 -0.65 -0.41 -0.53 
Malta  -0.15 -0.07 -0.36 -0.33 
Netherlands  -0.09 -0.38 -0.34 -0.45 
Norway  -0.11 0.13 -0.29 -0.62 
Poland  -0.25 -0.12 -0.40 -0.29 
Portugal  -0.33 -0.31 -0.42 -0.41 
Romania  -0.50 -0.04 -0.39 -0.13 
Slovak Republic  -0.53 -0.31 -0.34 -0.22 
Slovenia  -0.70 -0.33 -0.55 -0.21 
Spain  -0.49 -0.53 -0.52 -0.66 
Sweden  -0.04 -0.24 -0.19 -0.23 
Turkey  -0.43 -0.59 -0.50 -0.41 
United Kingdom  -0.15 -0.50 -0.27 -0.52 
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Table D.1 Statistically significant main effect – senior professional and managerial positions 5 
                                                             
5 Notes: Entries are results from 105 separate multilevel models, in which contextual variables are introduced in pairs (having controlled for the individual level 
characteristics)A (represents when the variable in column A is significant) B (represents when the variable in column B is significant), n.s. represents when both variables 
are insignificant. The letters in bold represents the stronger predictor in the model.  





































































































Table D.1 Statistically significant main effect – senior professional and managerial positions (cont.)6 

























































for 1 Child 





+ + + + + + + + + 
A (+)** B (-
)** 






















for 3-  




+ + A (-)** B(+)* +  
Expenditure 
childcare 
B(+)* B;+Ϳ€ B(+)* B(+)* A(-Ϳ€ B;+Ϳ€ B;+Ϳ€ B;+Ϳ€ + + B;+Ϳ€ B;+Ϳ€ A (-)* B;+Ϳ€ B(+)* 
A (+)* 
B(+)** 
                                                             
6 Notes: Entries are results from 105 separate multilevel models, in which contextual variables are introduced in pairs (having controlled for the individual level 
characteristics)A (represents when the variable in column A is significant) B (represents when the variable in column B is significant), n.s. represents when both variables 
are insignificant. The letters in bold represents the stronger predictor in the model.  
*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, € = p < 0.10 
 295 
 
Table D.2 Statistically significant main effect – managerial positions7 
 
 
                                                             
7 Notes: Entries are results from 105 separate multilevel models, in which contextual variables are introduced in pairs (having controlled for the individual level 
characteristics)A (represents when the variable in column A is significant) B (represents when the variable in column B is significant), n.s. represents when both variables 
are insignificant. The letters in bold represents the stronger predictor in the model.  
*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, € = p < 0.10 
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under 3  
B(+)* B;+Ϳ€ B(+)* B(+)** B(+)* B(+)* n.s.   








n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
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Table D.2 Statistically significant main effect – managerial positions (cont)8 
                                                             
8 Notes: Entries are results from 105 separate multilevel models, in which contextual variables are introduced in pairs (having controlled for the individual level 
characteristics)A (represents when the variable in column A is significant) B (represents when the variable in column B is significant), n.s. represents when both 
variables are insignificant. The letters in bold represents the stronger predictor in the model.  
*** = p <0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05, € = p < 0.10 
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Appendix E: Statistical Appendix to Chapter 7 
Figure E.1 Labour market institutions and access 





Figure ffff Labour market institutions and access 




































Table E.3 Statistically significant main effects – Managerial and senior professional 
occupations 
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+ A€(-) A(+)* +    
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A(+)* + + + 
Notes: Entries are results from 28 separate multilevel models, in which contextual variables 
are introduced in pairs (having controlled for the individual level characteristics)A (represents 
when the variable in column A is significant) B (represents when the variable in column B is 
significant), n.s. represents when both variables are insignificant. The letters in bold represents 
the stronger predictor in the model.  




Table E.2 Main effects for access to managerial jobs 
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+ + 
B (-) * 
Notes: Entries are results from 28 separate multilevel models, in which contextual variables are 
introduced in pairs (having controlled for the individual level characteristics)A (represents when 
the variable in column A is significant) B (represents when the variable in column B is significant), 
n.s. represents when both variables are insignificant. The letters in bold represents the stronger 
predictor in the model.  





Appendix F: Family policies, labour market institutions and the gender gap in top positions – 
a mediating relationship?  
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to test whether family policies in combination with 
labour market institutions indirectly affect the gender gap. This is because family policies and 
labour market institutions are highly interconnected and influence each other. In other 
words, family policies can be seen as a result of collective bargaining on the one hand, or as 
institutional complementarities similar to employment and unemployment protection to 
protect skill investments. However, the previous analytical Chapters have not shown a strong 
correlation between family policies, labour market institutions and the gender gap, which is 
why the question remains whether these two factors – family policies and labour market 
institutions – have a combined effect on the gender gap. This Chapter finds that we need to 
take into account the interaction between family policies and labour market institutions when 
designing new family policies. This is because certain family policies only seem to have an 
effect on the gender gap in the presence of  certain, but not all labour market institutions.  
The gender gap in managerial positions seems to be wider in countries with similar levels of 
EPL. For senior professional and managerial jobs, part-time childcare increases the gender 
gap iŶ ĐouŶtƌies ǁith siŵilaƌ leǀels of ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ ŵeŵďeƌships. The gap deĐƌeases iŶ 
these countries with similar levels of ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ ŵeŵďeƌship shaƌes ǁith higheƌ leǀels 
of part-time childcare for older children. It also decreases if collective bargaining coverage is 
similar and levels of childcare enrolment are low. These findings therefore mirror the findings 
of previous Chapters to some extent as similar family policies show a significant impact on 
the gender gap. At the same time, this Chapter shows how dependent any significant effect 
of family policies on the gender gap is on the institutional surroundings.  
This Chapter is another contribution, as this thesis – to the authoƌ͛s kŶoǁledge – is the 
first study that examines the combined effect of family policies and labour market institutions 
on vertical segregation in order to allow for an indirect effect of either variables. And indeed, 
findings suggest that there is no direct effect of labour market institutions on the gender gap 
in top positions and thus contradict assumptions that strong representative unions are good 
foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đaƌeeƌs aŶd iŶfoƌŵal ĐhildĐaƌe ďad. It even seems that the opposite is true. 
When unions are weak and no childcare policies are introduced, highly educated women 
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aiming to pursue a career seem to benefit. This supports the idea of Estevez-Abe (2007) that 
in less regulated and protective labour markets highly educated women do not need to face 
motherhood penalties to the same extent as in highly regulated countries since employers do 
not have to fear additional regulations when hiring women. Maternity leave – not only 
correlates with EPL, but also increases the gender gap. Therefore, EPL indirectly affects the 
geŶdeƌ gap aŶd “oskiĐe͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ idea that highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ ďeŶefit fƌoŵ uŶƌegulated 
and unsheltered LMEs seems correct, but this effect only appears when family policies and 
labour market institutions are introduced to the models together.   
 
The literature underlying this additional Chapter is discussed in the section below. 
Afterwards, a multilevel analysis is conducted with those labour market institutions and 
family policies that show significant correlation and are thus expected to be connected.    
 
 
F.1 Background and research questions 
 
Only few scholars have examined the impact of these labour market institutions on 
family policies. A gendered version of the Varieties of Capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice, 
2005) for example argues that family policies not only enable the employees to manage work 
and personal lives, but that employers also provide family friendly policies to retain and 
recruit workers (Davis and Kalleberg, 2006). Social policies here serve as politics for markets 
(Iversen, 2005). VoC compares national political economies according to their labour market 
institutions and Comparative Institutional Advantages. These result from interconnected 
complementarities institutions such as labour relations and corporate governance, labour 
relations and the national training system, corporate governance and inter-firm relations 
(Hancké et al., 2007: p.5). It assumes a certain level of complementarities between 
institutions. In other words, various labour market and welfare state institutions are not 
developed in isolation but as a package of arrangements to support a certain skill formation 
and employment strategy. Similarly, based on this logic, we can expect that family policies to 
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have developed depending on the different employment strategies that are in place in the 




F.1.1 Family Policies for the market 
 
According to the VoC, employers do not consider welfare states and social policy as 
their opponents (Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2009) or politics against the market (Esping-
Andersen, 1985), but as politics for markets (Iversen, 2005). According to the business case 
argument, employers provide firm-level social policies if the benefits for the company exceed 
the costs for these policies (Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2009). Changes in family policies 
trace back to the argument of skill formation i.e., that employers provide family friendly 
policies to retain and recruit workers – which is a central assumption in VoC (Davies and 
Kalleberg, 2006). Unemployment benefits and employment protection should be seen as 
complementarities to skill profiles. Davis and Kalleberg (2006) similarly argue that changes in 
family policies trace back to the argument of skill formation i.e., that employers provide family 
friendly policies to retain and recruit workers and the specific skill set they have – a central 
assumption in VoC. They note three reasons why employers may provide family policies: 
internal and external economic pressure and institutional pressure. Internal pressure relates 
back to the idea of investment into human capital and training. Employers do not want to lose 
the investments that have been made into the worker, which is why they face pressure to 
keep those workers. External economic pressure on the other hand is not about protecting 
investments, but attracting workers to the firms and keeping current employees. Institutional 
pressures are defined as law regulations, normative pressures or the pressure not to lag 
behind other successful companies.  
 
In other words, similar to the logic behind VoC literature in terms of providing EPL and 
UB for workers for maintaining skill profiles, family policies can be understood as policies that 
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are developed to maintain high firm/industry specific skills. Unlike UB and EPL, however, it is 
especially geared towards retaining workers with family responsibilities – i.e., parents and 
women. Following this logic, we would expect that CMEs and companies relying on 
firm/sector specific skills are the ones where national and company level family policies are 
most developed.  Surprisingly, Davis and Kalleberg (2006) find that in contrast to our 
assumption, employers relying on high firm/industry skills do not offer generous family 
policies, at least in the case of varying company practices within the US (Davis and Kalleberg, 
2006). However, other scholars such as Chung (2009, 2014) and Den Dulk et al. (2012) show 
that companies with higher proportions of skilled workers are more likely to provide flexitime.  
 
Fleckenstein and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011) examine family policy provision in companies 
in LMEs and CMEs to argue that the degree of support differs between them. In Germany for 
eǆaŵple, eŵploǇeƌs aƌe the ͞ pƌoŵoteƌs͟ foƌ eŵploǇŵeŶt-driven family policies (ibid., p. 145) 
supporting the expansion of childcare for children under three years and the earnings-related 
parental leave benefit, instead of long-term parental leaves. The reason for this is because 
employers consider family policies as a necessity in order to bring more women into 
eŵploǇŵeŶt aŶd theƌefoƌe iŶĐƌease huŵaŶ Đapital aŶd the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s ĐapaĐitǇ foƌ 
innovations. On the other hand, employers in the UK, a typical LME country, have also 
supported employment-friendly family policies, but to a much lower and less binding degrees. 
Rather than supporting a public national level family policy, employers in the UK support a 
more voluntary firm-level approach in terms of parental leave although employers also accept 
the need for the expansion of affordable childcare. It should also be added here, that Seeleib-
Kaiser and Fleckenstein argue that not only employers, but also parties matter in terms of 
change in social policy. Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein (2009) also add that the classical skill 
specificity argument of VoC alone is not sufficient in order to explain changes in family 
policies. It is not only the specificity of skills that encourages employers to promote 
employment-friendly (firm-level) policies, but also the level of these skills. Thus, companies 
relying on high general skills also feel the incentive to offer policies in order to attract and 




F.1.2 Family policies against the market 
 
VoC is a clearly firm- or employer-centred approach in that it assumes that employers 
play the key role shaping national political economies. Thus, changes in family policies are 
due to the eŵploǇeƌs͛ aĐtioŶs aŶd iŶteƌests iŶ ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg a Đoŵpetitiǀe skills stƌategǇ. IŶ 
contrast to that, we find that family policies also seem to be shaped the conflict between 
capital and labour and the organisation of workers interests, as Morgan (2005) shows. The 
author finds examples for how trade unions impact family policies. She examines the impact 
of strong unions and the level of coordination on the provision of childcare for Sweden, 
France and the U.S. using the example of childcare. She states that, rather than employers, 
unions and industrial relations play a crucial role in shaping the provision and quality of 
childcare services. Since family policies have emerged as a result of rising employment rates 
of women, family policies themselves can be seen as an institution embedded within the 
political economy as they theoretically aim to change labour market outcomes. More 
importantly though, they are shaped by other labour market institutions.  
 
MoƌgaŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ fiŶdiŶgs suggest that in coordinated market economies family 
policies have emerged to be less market-oriented. In LMEs where unions are weak and not 
coordinated, wages are more dispersed and the economy is more unregulated. Thus childcare 
relies mostly on the unskilled low wage staff, and the quality of the service is low. On the 
other hand, strong unions and consequently high wages and labour market regulations in 
CMEs exert pressure on the governments to engage in the provision of childcare. In CMEs 
such as Sweden, there are collectively agreed wage levels, which are more along with a more 
unified level of working conditions and social protection.  Since it is impossible to use staff on 
a low-cost basis, the strategy is then to provide high-quality service provided by highly 
qualified staff (Morgan, 2005).  
 
In France, another CME, the government supports a more flexible approach of hiring 
less-trained and more flexible workforce despite the opinion of the unions, which are neither 
as strong nor as centralised as in Sweden. One cause of this is because unions are more 
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fragmented in France and the level of centralization and of coordination is lower (Morgan, 
2005) as more actors are involved.  
 
These findings suggest that it family policies are not only a Gendered VoC tool for 
employers to maintain skill profiles and workers, but are an outcome of the conflict between 
Đapital aŶd laďouƌ as desĐƌiďed ďǇ Koƌpi͛s ;ϭϵϳϰͿ Poǁeƌ ‘esouƌĐe TheoƌǇ. P‘T sees eŵploǇeƌs 
not as protagonists, but as antagonists and highlights the importance of unions in order to 
oƌgaŶize ǁoƌkeƌs͛ iŶteƌests, iŶ this Đase the pƌoǀisioŶ of faŵilǇ poliĐies. EǀeŶ though Koƌpi 
;ϮϬϬϲͿ appƌoǀes the idea of also eŵphasisiŶg eŵploǇeƌs͛ ƌole, he ĐƌitiĐizes the VoC foƌ thƌee 
aspects: the overemphasis of VoC on investments in asset-specific skills, the underestimation 
of power resource distribution between employers and employees and the stiffness of the 
concept of collective actors in times of more and more fragmented unions even in classical 
CMEs. Korpi (2006) criticizes that VoC has a narrow understanding of class-related risks and 
argues that there is an overemphasis on the protection of skills investment. He stresses that 
protecting the investment in skills is an important driver for both employers and employees, 
but that insurances such as EPL and unemployment benefits are not only aiming to protect 
the value of skills but also to protect from other risks associated with aging, illness, work 
accidents, unemployment, poverty, family formation. In addition to that, he argues that the 
eŵploǇeƌs͛ iŶteƌests oŶlǇ foĐus oŶ pƌofitaďilitǇ aŶd Ŷot oŶ pƌoteĐtiŶg skills aŶd ǁoƌkeƌs peƌ 
se. In order to protect workers from being subordinate and therefore powerless against 
eŵploǇeƌs͛ iŶteƌests, theǇ ŵust oƌgaŶize foƌ ĐolleĐtiǀe actions according to PRT. Collective 
actions are a mean to redistribute power resources since the distribution of economic assets 
and human capital is unequal between employers and employees. This leads to another 
critique point, Korpi brings against VoC. He argues that both employers and employees are 
internally heterogeneous (2006, p.174). VoC though does not take into account the 
fƌagŵeŶted Ŷatuƌe of the ǁoƌkfoƌĐe aŶd ͞faĐes a stiff ĐhalleŶge to eŵpiƌiĐallǇ ideŶtifǇ ŵajoƌ 
collective actors primarily representing workers with specific skills, actors assumed to be 
ĐeŶtƌal iŶ the eŵeƌgeŶĐe of CMEs͟ ;Koƌpi, ϮϬϬϲ, p. ϮϬϰͿ. IŶ ƌealitǇ though, tƌade uŶioŶs faĐe 
the challenge to represent different levels and types of skills, occupations, and trades.   
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Thus, according to the PRT the main reason family policies will be developed is based 
on how much power unions have in putting family policies in the agenda. However, as seen 
iŶ MoƌgaŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ fiŶdiŶg, Ŷot oŶlǇ the stƌeŶgth of uŶioŶs ŵatteƌs, ďut also ǁho theǇ aƌe 
actually representing. In France, where unions are highly fragmented, we see a weaker impact 
on the provision of childcare. Additionally, we need to keep in mind that as discussed 
previously, CMEs have experienced a dualisation of their workforce and we find that in CMEs 
such as Germany mainly the male core highly-skilled worker is protected, but the overall 
workforce. What is more, in these CMEs the outsider group is gendered, in that it is 
overrepresented by women (Häusermann and Schwander, 2010). If we carry this argument 
fuƌtheƌ, ǁe ĐaŶ assuŵe that the iŶĐeŶtiǀes iŶ CMEs to iŵpƌoǀe ǁoŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ ŵaƌket 
situation by introducing family policies are lower in dualised labour markets such as classical 
CME if their skill needs can be met by the insider male workforce. Studies on institutional 
drivers of family policies however have not distinguished countries according to their level of 
dualisation. However, we can assume that in highly dualised labour market the focus of family 
policies is to promote the male breadwinner that still forms the core workforce. 
Consequently, family policies are expected to be more traditional. 
 
The results discussed in Chapter 9 show that overall the association between the listed 
variables and the gender gap is insignificant. Only when added two variables at a time, we see 
that unemployment benefit generosity as expected is significantly reduces the gender gap 
wjen controlling for various individual-level variables and controlling for skill specificity. Thus, 
we can say that in countries with generous unemployment benefits women are more likely 
to have a top position than women in countries where this form of social protection is more 
limited. What is more, EPL as another type of social protection seems to also positively affect 
womeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s. AgaiŶst the hǇpothesis, ǁe ĐaŶ theƌefoƌe 
say that highly regulated labour markets seem to be more beneficial to highly educated 
women to reach top positions than labour market with no such protection in place. The 
protection of skills via regulations seems to help women retain their skills and encourage 




Lastly, skill specificity – which also was suspected to have a negative impact on 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đaƌeeƌs – seems to also significantly decrease the gender gap in countries with 
comparable levels of union density and unemployment benefit generosity. Therefore, all in 
all there is no supporting evidence for the theory that women are more disadvantaged in 
coordinated market economy than in liberal market economies and it seems that for highly 
educated women the opposite is the case.  
 
A second main finding of Chapter 9 is that not only the link between Gendered VoC 
theories and the gender gap is different than expected, but also assumptions made in favour 
of conflict theory have not proofed to be fully correct. To summarize, there were two sides of 
the argument on the association between unions and bargaining power and the gender gap. 
One argues that strong unions push for more equality in the labour market and therefore 
reduces the polarization of job hierarchies. Unions here are seen as opponents to employers 
and capital and as representatives for employees or labour. However, the second side of the 
conflict theory follows labour market dualisation theories and assumes that unions are only 
suppoƌtiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŶteƌests if theǇ aƌe ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe of the oǀeƌall ǁoƌkfoƌĐe aŶd do Ŷot 
only represent the interests of the core male workforce. Thus, while collective bargaining 
coverage indicates the strength of unions, it can be expected that if union density is low and 
especially the share of women in trade unions is low, but collective bargaining coverage is 
high, ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŶteƌests aƌe Ŷot ƌepƌeseŶted aŶd thus the geŶdeƌ gap is eǆpeĐted to ďe 
higher.  
 
However, based on Chapter 9 we cannot say that there is a strong association between 
the gender gap in top positions and unions strength or density. Only in countries with 
comparable levels of EPL, we find that a high share of women in unions seems to help narrow 
down the gender gap. All other variables remain insignificant. Thus, there seems to be no 
eǀideŶĐe foƌ the iŵpaĐt of tƌade uŶioŶs oŶ highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đaƌeeƌ ĐhaŶĐes, ǁhiĐh 
may be due to the fact that highly educated individuals are less likely to be represented. 
Consequently, we need to understand the underlying dynamics between family policies and 
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labour market institutions first in order to then address the puzzle of cross-national variation 
iŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ ŵaƌket aĐtiǀitǇ.  
 
As discussed above, family policies can be seen as a consequence of labour market 
institutions. On the one hand and according to Power Resource Theory, strong unions 
ĐƌuĐiallǇ shape faŵilǇ poliĐies. Hoǁeǀeƌ, as seeŶ iŶ MoƌgaŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ fiŶdiŶg, Ŷot oŶlǇ the 
uŶioŶs͛ stƌeŶgth matters, but also who they are actually representing and how dualised the 
labour market is. Therefore, the first hypothesis is:  
 
H4.1 The combined effect of progressive family policies and unions or collective bargaining 
coverage on vertical segregation is expected to be significant. 
 
However, as argued by Häusermann and Schwander (2010), dualisation is gendered 
and women are overrepresented among outsiders. Following this logic, incentives in CMEs to 
iŵpƌoǀe ǁoŵeŶ͛s laďouƌ ŵaƌket situatioŶ ďǇ iŶtƌoduĐing family policies are lower in dualised 
labour markets such as classical CME if their skill needs can be met by the insider male 
workforce. Consequently, in CMEs family policies are expected to be more traditional. 
Therefore, the next hypothesis is:  
 
H4.2: In countries with traditional family policies countries with stronger unions have a 
significantly larger gender gap, especially if these unions do not represent the female 
workforce.  
 
The assumption here is that traditional family policies are expected to be the result of strong 
unions representing only the male workforce. Thus, when women are underrepresented in 
unions, traditional family policies – defined as maternity leaves, taxation and childcare 




Unemployment benefits and employment protection should be seen as 
complementarities to skill profiles. Davis and Kalleberg (2006) argue that changes in family 
policies trace back to the argument of skill formation i.e., that employers provide family 
friendly policies to retain and recruit workers and the specific skill set they have. Therefore, 
the third hypothesis H4.3 assumes that the effect of EPL and specific skill profiles on the 
gender gap is significant in countries with traditional family policies.  
 
This is based on the idea that in CMEs with a highly specialised workforce and strict 
EPL, employers want to hire employees with the lowest risk of career interruptions. Thus, 
women are directly discriminated against. However, EPL and specific skills also indirectly 
affect the gender gap, as employers are more likely to support the traditional division of 
genders by also supporting traditional family policies. These traditional policies make women 
more likely than men to interrupt their career, but help men to stay in the labour market. 
Therefore, family policies can be seen as an institutional complementarities to EPL and skill 
specificity and thus mediate their effect on the gender gap. In other words, as theorised 
before, family policies and labour market institutions are associated and linked, but more 
regulation does not necessarily cause the gender gap to widen. Highly educated women seem 
to be encouraged to invest in skills and this seems to pay off. This is a key contribution as 
previous studies have only looked at one side of the story – either family policies or labour 
market institutions.  
 
However, according to hypothesis 4.4, this does not have to be the case if the female 
workforce is also highly specialised and therefore employers have an interest in reducing the 
time women take off for family responsibilities. H4.4 suggests that if the female workforce is 
also highly specialised, progressive family policies are expected to have emerged as a tool to 
bind female workers to their workplace and thus mediate the indirect effect a specialised 
workforce has on vertical segregation. Consequently, family policies can have a combined 
effect on the relationship between labour market institutions and the gender gap or the other 
way round. Korpi (2000) describes faŵilǇ poliĐies as aŶ ͞iŶteƌǀeŶiŶg ǀaƌiaďle͟ ;Koƌpi, ϮϬϬϬͿ 




The following Chapter examines the correlation between family policies and labour 
market institutions. The idea here is to highlight how interconnected both sets of 
independent variables are in order to understand underlying dynamics in labour markets that 
multilevel modelling cannot capture. First of all, simple correlations between all labour 
market institution variables and the significant family policy variables are executed. In a 
second step, multilevel models are carried out only adding two correlated context level 
variables at a time that at the same time are not at risk of multicollinearity. While the first 
step aims to understand the interconnectivity between family policies and labour market 
institutions, the second step then links these institutional complementarities with the main 
research question and investigates how labour market institutions along with family policies 
impact the gender gap in managerial and professional occupations.  
 
F.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
First of all, all labour market institution variables and family policy variables are 
examined regarding their degree of correlation. For this, a correlation matrix showing Pearson 
R correlation coefficients has been run. Table F.1 lists the results of the Pearson correlation 
matrix. Even though all correlated variables are of potential interest, this Chapter focuses only 
on the combinations linked to the hypotheses. These combinations are full-time childcare 
coverage, expenditure on childcare and parental leave on the one side and union density and 
collective bargaining coverage on the other hand. Secondly, this Chapter examines the 
combined effect of maternity leave, taxation and childcare allowances on the one hand and 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ oŶ the otheƌ. EPL aŶd skill speĐifiĐitǇ aŶd aƌe eǆpeĐted to haǀe a 
combined effect with maternity leave, taxation and childcare allowances. A highly specialised 
female workforce and full-time childcare coverage, expenditure on childcare and parental 

























Protection -0.45 0.24 0.12 0.21 0.05 0.16 0.12 
Trade Union 
Density -0.29 -0.50 0.02 0.01 -0.49 -0.24 -0.17 
Collective 
bargaining 
coverage -0.49 -0.31 0.14 0.14 -0.28 -0.19 -0.30 




members 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.17 0.01 0.28 
Union density 
(women) -0.24 -0.59 0.44 0.25 -0.40 -0.11 0.10 
WoŵeŶ’s skill  
profiles -0.16 -0.03 0.15 -0.03 -0.38 -0.25 -0.24 
Unemployment 
















for 1 Child 
Allowance 






over 3 years 
 part-time 
childcare 
over 3 years 
no formal 
childcare 




Protection -0.02 0.21 -0.22 -0.16 0.12 0.20 -0.30 0.18 -0.21 
Trade Union 
Density 0.40 0.36 0.21 0.11 -0.39 0.21 -0.01 -0.26 0.44 
Collective 
bargaining coverage 0.53 0.41 -0.19 0.17 0.19 0.07 0.36 -0.62 0.38 
Skill profiles 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.32 0.21 0.18 0.00 -0.24 -0.07 
WoŵeŶ’s 
percentage of trade 
union members -0.01 0.15 -0.19 -0.23 -0.40 0.21 -0.43 0.35 0.23 
Union density 
(women) 0.49 0.51 0.30 0.16 -0.55 0.47 -0.28 -0.20 0.52 
WoŵeŶ’s skill  
profiles 0.22 0.05 0.01 0.32 0.22 0.10 0.07 -0.22 -0.01 
Unemployment 
Benefits -0.21 -0.04 -0.21 -0.26 -0.05 0.18 -0.31 0.20 -0.30 
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Table F.2 Significant cross-level interaction terms – effect on the gender gap  
 Managerial 
Occupations 











B(-)€   
Family taxation   
 B(+)* 
Part-time childcare 
for older children 
 
 B(-)€ 
No childcare usage 
for older children 
 
B(+)* B(+)* 
Notes: Entries are the only statistically significant results from 80 separate multilevel 
random slope cross-level interaction models (40 with managerial and professional 
occupations as DV, 40 with managerial occupations as DV), in which contextual variables 
are introduced in pairs (having controlled for individual level characteristics). A represents 
when the variable in column A is significant; B when the variable in column B is significant. 
Only statistically significant interaction terms*female are listed.  





F.2.1 Family policies and unions 
 
According to table F.1, the highest correlations (R>.50) are between institutions 
capturing unions and family policies. There are three key observations here: 
1. Trade union density ;aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇͿ aŶd effeĐtiǀe ŵateƌŶitǇ 
leave are highly negatively correlated and positively correlated with childcare 
usage under 3 and no formal childcare for over 3 year olds. 
2. A highly unionised female workforce seems to be highly correlated with full-
time childcare under 3 year olds and expenditure on childcare, but negatively 
correlated with high rates of part-time childcare for older children and family 
taxation.  
3. A highly unionised female workforce is negatively correlated with net parental 
leave; but positively correlated with the de-familization score and paternity 
leave duration. 
What does this mean with regards to the assumptions made in Chapter 6? The first 
poiŶt diƌeĐtlǇ ƌefleĐts MoƌgaŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ fiŶdiŶgs that iŶ ĐouŶtƌies ǁith stƌong unions, childcare 
is provided and used to a greater extent than in countries with weak unions. Additionally, her 
findings also show that in countries with high union density, family policies tend to be more 
progressive and thus the negative correlation with rather traditional family policies such as 
long maternity leaves and family taxation are not surprising. Kopi (1974) also argues that 
strong unions and collective bargaining result in stronger family policies. This corresponds 
with the finding that collective bargaining coverage is positively correlated with the de-
familization score, full-time childcare for under 3 year olds (in contrast to general usage), part-
time childcare over 3 year olds (in contrast to no formal childcare) and expenditure; but 
negatively correlated with maternity leave policies and well-paid leave. In terms of 
operationalisation, this means that the general theoretical assumption is true that strong 






Another theoretical assumption based on the literature on labour market dualisation 
(see section 3.1 and 4.2) and mainly on the idea that first of all labour markets are divided 
between outsiders and insiders and secondly that this dualisation is gendered (Häusermann 
and Schwander, 2010). Thus, following the findings of Morgan (2005) and Korpi (1974) that 
strong unions aim to push for policies supporting the workforce they represent, we could 
therefore assume that if unions only represent a small share of the workforce, they will only 
ƌepƌeseŶt theiƌ ŵeŵďeƌs͛ iŶteƌests ;see DieĐkhoff et al., ϮϬϭϱͿ. Thus, if ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ 
density is low, then we can expect traditional family policies that aim to support the insider 
male workforce and the status of the male breadwinner.  
 
 
F.2.2 Family policies and EPL/ skill specificity   
 
According to table F.1 EPL is negatively correlated with the familisation score and thus 
traditional family policies, length of net maternity leave and part-time childcare for over 3 
year olds; but positively correlated with effective weeks of maternity leave. In other words, 
we find generous maternity leave (in terms of both pay and duration) in regulated labour 
markets, but not long and ineffective maternity leave or part-time childcare. Comparable to 
this, in countries with generous unemployment benefits effective paternity is high, but part-
time childcare and spending on childcare is low.  
What is more, we also see that in countries with a highly specialised (female) 
workforce net parental leave is shorter, but allowances for children are high.   
These findings generally reflect the idea that family policies do not necessarily go 
agaiŶst eŵploǇeƌs͛ iŶteƌests ďut ĐaŶ ďe utilised iŶ oƌdeƌ to ƌetaiŶ aŶd attƌaĐt skilled ǁoƌkeƌs. 
According to Davis and Kalleberg (2006) we expect family policies such as earnings-related 
parental leave to be correlated with skill specificity and also with strict EPL. Generous, but not 





particularly women if they know that well-paid leave is guaranteed. Fleckenstein and Seeleib-
Kaiser (2011) also see that effective parental leave can be used to retain and recruit skilled 
workers.  
 
F.2.3 The combined effect of family policies and labour market institutions on the gender 
gap 
 
Based on these combinations, which have been selected due to significant correlation, 
we now need to examine whether labour market institutions along with family policies affect 
the gender gap in top positions. In other words, is there a combined effect of family policies 
and labour market institutions on the gender gap? In order to answer this research question, 
multilevel models are once again conducted, this time adding correlated pairing at the same 
time. 40 multilevel random slope models with cross-level interaction terms are run for each 
dependent variable, in which two contextual variables with the interaction term (one each 
for family policies and labour market institutions) are added. Because we are only interested 
at this point in the combined effect, only statistically significant cross-level interaction terms 
are discussed and listed in table F.2 (for significant main effects on the overall population 
without interaction term see Appendix; for results of all 80 models see end of this chapter, 
tables F.3 and F.4).  
 
The results are easy to grasp with only 5 pairings showing a statistically significant 
impact on either of our two dependent variables. Most interestingly, the only statistically 
significant impacts are due to family policies, but not labour market institutions. This suggests 
that indeed family policies and labour market institutions are interconnected, but that labour 
market institutions only indirectly via family policies affect the gender gap. It seems as if when 
adding family policies to the models, labour market institutions become insignificant. Thus, 
we need to be careful when interpreting the findings of Chapter 7. Here, the conclusion was 





defined as CMEs – the gender gap is smaller. However, when family policies are included this 
effect disappears.  
 
However, we see that in countries with comparable levels of EPL generous effective 
maternity leave – which is positively correlated with EPL (see table F.1) – increases the gender 
gap for managerial positions. This is a typical combination we would expect in a continental 
CME – traditional family policies and strict EPL. Therefore, Estevez-Abe (2007) seems to 
partially have a point when she argues that women are indeed discriminated against in highly 
regulated labour markets. However, this is only the case if maternity leave and EPL both are 
high, but it is not a direct effect EPL per se but more linked to the longer maternity leave.  This 
contradicts the assumptions of Hegewisch and Gornick( 2011) that leaves can be used to build 
up tenure and continuity with one employer and thus strengthen their position in the labour 
market. It rather suppoƌts otheƌ sĐholaƌs͛ ;Coƌƌell, BeŶaƌd, aŶd Paik ϮϬϬϳ; PeteƌseŶ aŶd 
Saporta 2004; Spence 1973; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009) findings that investments into female 
employees are too risky. Thus, leaves in highly protected labour markets ultimately hinder 
women from reaching the top as the combination of long maternity leaves and EPL and thus 
the inability to hire and fire quickly increases motherhood penalty.  
 
What is more, even when labour market institutions are included in the model, some 
of the findings from Chapter 5 remain significant with family taxation being significantly 
positiǀe foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s aĐĐess to top positioŶs ƌelatiǀe to ŵeŶ͛s iŶ ĐouŶtƌies ǁith siŵilaƌ leǀels 
of female members in unions. This is interesting as we find a negative correlation between a 
large unionised female workforce and family taxation. The assumption was that family 
taxation provides an incentive to protect the male breadwinner model. However, what we 
find here is that whilst in countries with a large unionised workforce family taxation seems 
unpopular, it does help highly educated women to reach top positions. This finding suggests 
that whilst in countries with unionised women interests of the female workforce are 
protected and represented. However, there does not seem to be a direct benefit of this for 






 In countries with comparable shares of women in trade unions, we also find the same 
negative effect of part-time childcare for older children on the gender gap. This is not very 
surprising as we know that part-time childcare does not allow for full-time employment. 
However, from Chapter 5 we know that working part-tiŵe loǁeƌs ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to ƌeaĐh 
top positions. Additionally, we find that provision of part-time childcare only is unpopular in 
unionised countries, especially in those with a large unionised female workforce due to the 
mentioned reasons that unions try to implement policies that help their members.  
 
 Again, we also see that in countries with high rates of children not enrolled in any 
form of formal childcare the gender gap is comparably smaller, if we compare countries with 




When investigating the potentially mediating effect of family policies on the 
relationship between labour market institutions and the gender gap in managerial positions, 
this thesis aim to answer four research hypotheses. The theoretical foundation for these four 
hypotheses is discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
F.3.1 The combination of Progressive family policies and union density/ collective 
bargaining coverage on the gender gap  
 
The first hypothesis is based on the assumption that we expect family policies to be 
the result of union strength and collective bargaining power. Thus, progressive family policies 
– defined as full-time childcare coverage, expenditure on childcare and parental leave – are 





collective bargaining coverage are expected to have a combined effect with progressive family 
policies on vertical segregation as these have a direct effect on the gender gap. Regarding the 
first part of the hypothesis – the correlation between union density, collective bargaining 
coverage and progressive family policies, we can say the following: A large unionised female 
workforce is positively correlated with de-famfamiliarised countries in general, and 
particularly with expenditure on childcare and early education, full-time childcare usage for 
under 3 year olds and older children and even paternity leave that help to get men more 
involved in family responsibilities. Thus, we can say that unions representing a large share of 
women seem to go hand in hand with progressive family policies. Strong unions – as 
measured in collective bargaining coverage – also are correlated with de-famfamiliarised 
countries, full-time childcare and expenditure on childcare. In order to answer the second 
part of the hypothesis – whether there is a mediating effect between progressive family 
policies and strong and representative unions on the gender gap – we can say that there does 
not seem to be a significant impact. Based on table F.2, progressive family policies as defined 
earlier in this thesis have no statistically significant impact on the gender gap in top positions. 
What is more, in the multilevel random slope models in which we paired progressive family 
poliĐies ǁith eitheƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ, oƌ ŵeŵďeƌship oƌ ĐolleĐtiǀe ďaƌgaiŶiŶg Đoǀeƌage 
there was no significant combination effect to be found. Consequently, hypothesis H4.1 
cannot be supported.  
 
F.3.2 The combined effect of strong unions representing only the male workforce and 
traditional family policies on the gender gap 
 
Hypothesis 4.2 is similar to H4.1, but examines the mediating effect of traditional 
family policies on the relationship between unions and the gender gap. The assumption here 
is that traditional family policies are expected to be the result of strong unions representing 
only the male workforce. Thus, when women are underrepresented in unions, traditional 
family policies – defined as maternity leaves, taxation and childcare allowances – are 





union density is highly negatively correlated with generous maternity leave, family taxation 
subsidies and parental leave. Union density overall also seems to be negatively correlated 
with maternity and parental leave and taxation subsidies, but positively with (full-time) 
childcare coverage and expenditure. What is more, collective bargaining coverage is 
negatively correlated with informal childcare, well-paid leave and maternity leave. While it is 
also correlated with childcare usage for under 3 year olds, it at the same time is positively 
correlated with full-time childcare usage. Thus, we can say that indeed a large unionised 
female workforce is negatively associated with traditional family policies. In other words, if 
women are not unionised and generally union density is low, family policies are traditional in 
that they protect the traditional division of labour by introducing leaves and monetary 
incentives no to return quickly to work after childbirth. However, while according to Chapter 
6, a unionised female workforce and/ or strong unions do not result in a lower gender gap, 
table 2 delivers some interesting results. If we compare countries with similar collective 
bargaining coverage we find that informal childcare has a positive impact on the gender gap 
ďǇ iŶĐƌeasiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌelatiǀe aĐĐess to ŵaŶageƌial aŶd pƌofessioŶal positioŶs. IŶ otheƌ 
words, in countries with strong centralised unions, having more access to informal childcare 
iŶĐƌeases ǁoŵeŶ͛s likelihood to ƌeaĐh to positioŶs. Thus, it seeŵs that ĐolleĐtiǀe ďaƌgaiŶiŶg 
coverage correlates with informal childcare. We also know from table F.1 that collective 
bargaining coverage is highly negatively correlated with informal childcare. Thus, while strong 
unions per se do not seem to have any impact on the gender gap, weak unions in their inability 
to push for more childcare seem to indirectly help highly educated women to reach top 
positions.  
 
It seeŵs that “oskiĐe͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ is correct in that bargaining power is not necessarily 
beneficial to women. Soskice assumes this is because the lack of wage bargaining leads to 
more inequalities and therefore benefits highly educated individuals in the higher class. 
Productive and qualified individuals are highly rewarded, while workers with lower levels of 
eduĐatioŶ aƌe left uŶpƌoteĐted. ͞If Ǉou͛ƌe a highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵaŶ, Ǉou ǁaŶt to ǁoƌk iŶ aŶ 





p. 175) his argument. According to the models, bargaining coverage does not seem to directly 
affect the gender gap. But because the lack of bargaining power also seems to hinder family 
policies from emerging. While this is problematic for women with lower levels of education 
as it hinders them from entering the labour market, it at the same time also prevents a 
motherhood penalty from emerging. Liberal or market economies that are characterized by 
weak unions but also gender-neutrality due to their lack of family policies (Estevez-Abe, 2005; 
MĐCall aŶd Oƌloff, ϮϬϬϱ; Oƌloff, ϮϬϬϲͿ, theƌefoƌe seeŵ to help highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ ͞ǁho 
aƌe ǁilliŶg to puƌsue a ŵasĐuliŶized eŵploǇŵeŶt patteƌŶ͟ ;Oƌloff, ϮϬϬϵ, p. ϯϮϴͿ aŶd thus 
reduce the gender gap for top positions.  
 
The effeĐt of iŶfoƌŵal ĐhildĐaƌe oŶ the geŶdeƌ gap also ƌeŵaiŶs ǁheŶ addiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
share among union members to the model. Here, we also still see the significant impact of 
informal childcare on the gender gap. While we can see informal childcare as in indicator for 
lack of either progressive or traditional policies, we can however see that part-time childcare 
remains increasing the gender gap as discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
When comparing countries with similar levels of female trade union members, we find 
the effect of part-time childcare to remain significantly negative.  According to table F.1, both 
variables are negatively correlated. Thus, we can conclude that if unions are largely male-
dominated the level of part-time childcare is high and therefore women – who still undertake 
the majority of family responsibilities – are more likely to be working part-time and the 
traditional division of labour remains. Consequently, the gender gap in top positions is higher. 
Theƌefoƌe, it is Ŷot ǁoŵeŶ͛s shaƌe iŶ uŶioŶs peƌ se that affects the gender gap, but the effect 
is mediated by part-time childcare that is more likely to be the norm in countries with male-
dominated unions. This is a clear indicator for the assumption made in section 2.4.2 that in 
dualised CMEs the need to introduce progressive family policies is limited and thus traditional 
policies are more prevalent if only the core male workforce is represented by unions. And 





unions, traditional family policies such as part-time childcare are introduced which in the end 
leads to  a higher gender gap.  
 
F.3.3 The effect of traditional family policies and EPL/ skill specificity  on the gender gap  
 
The third hypothesis assumed that in CMEs with a highly specialised workforce and 
strict EPL, employers want to hire employees with the lowest risk of career interruptions. 
These are most likely to be male workers. Because traditional family policies aim to reinforce 
the traditional division of genders and therefore make women more likely than men to 
interrupt their career, traditional family policies can be seen as an institutional 
complementarities to EPL and skill specificity and thus mediate their effect on the gender gap. 
Based on table 1, we can see that EPL indeed positively correlates with effective maternity 
leave. What is more, when adding EPL and effective maternity leave to the same model, we 
find that maternity leave significantly increases the gender gap in managerial positions, even 
though on its own it has no effect (see Chapter 5). This indicates that in countries with 
comparable level of EPL the negative effect of maternity leave becomes stronger. This again 
links well with the previous argument that strong social protection, which both maternity 
leave and EPL represent, might help women with lower levels of education to enter the labour 
market, but creates a motherhood penalty in that it creates gender inequalities. This is 
because while in countries with low EPL and short maternity leaves employers have little 
reason to discriminate between male and female workers as career interruptions can be 
expected to be short, in highly protected countries women are seen as a risk to employers. 
Consequently, we can say that indeed EPL does not have a direct impact on the gender gap, 
ďut ďeĐause it is highlǇ Đoƌƌelated ǁith ŵateƌŶitǇ leaǀe, it does affeĐt ǁoŵeŶ͛s ĐhaŶĐes to 
reach the top negatively and supports arguments made by Estevez-Abe (2005), McCall and 
Orloff (2005), Soskice (2005), Orloff (2006) and others. Consequently, hypothesis three can 
be partly verified. However, we cannot see any significant impact skill specificity on the 
gender gap when adding family policies to the same model. Skill specificity is negatively 





1). What is more, skill specificity was one of the few variables according to Chapter 6 with any 
significant impact on the gender gap. However, now it seems as if net parental leave and 
childcare allowances act as confounding variables as no significant association between our 
dependent variables and skill profiles can be found anymore. While these findings are not of 
great interest, they however warn against the conclusions made in Chapter 6 that highly 
educated women benefit from a focus on specific skills as this effect only seems to exist in 
ĐouŶtƌies ǁith siŵilaƌ leǀels of ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ. Thus, skill speĐifiĐitǇ – neither 
indirectly nor directly – seems to help or hinder women to reach top positions.  
 
F.3.4 The effect of progressiǀe faŵily policies aŶd ǁoŵeŶ’s skill specificity oŶ the geŶder 
gap 
 
But what happens if not the overall workforce, but particularly the female workforce 
is highly specialised? Hypothesis 4 summarised this question and argues that if the female 
workforce is also highly specialised progressive family policies are expected to have emerged 
as a tool to bind female workers to their workplace and thus mediate the indirect effect a 
specialised workforce has on vertical segregation. In countries with a highly specialised female 
workforce, we find net parental leave to be relatively short (see table F.1). Childcare 
allowances on the other hand are high. While in Chapter 6 we found that a specialised female 
ǁoƌkfoƌĐe iŶ ĐouŶtƌies ǁith siŵilaƌ leǀels of ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ aŶd eŵploǇŵeŶt 
protection seems to contribute to a more narrow gender gap in managerial positions, we do 
not find any significant impact in the models conducted for this Chapter. Either net parental 
leave and childcare allowances again are confounding variables or alternatively, EPL and 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ deŶsitǇ aƌe ŵodeƌatiŶg the effeĐt. Neǀeƌtheless, ǁe ĐaŶ saǇ that theƌe is Ŷo 
clear evidence supporting hypothesis 4 that a highly specialised female workforce correlates 







F.4 Summary and conclusion  
 
The overall research question of this Chapter is: How do labour market institutions 
along with family policies affect the gender gap in top positions? Findings are limited and only 
few results significant. However, we can say that certain family policies and labour market 
institutions seem to have a combined effect on the gender gap. We mainly see that following 
the assumptions made by Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) and Soskice (2005) and others, labour 
market institutions such as unions and collective bargaining coverage can contribute to a 
discrimination of highly educated women by introducing family policies and therefore 
increasing the motherhood penalty. Even though collective bargaining coverage – thus strong 
unions –  aŶd ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶioŶ ŵeŵďeƌship ƌates – thus representative unions – have no 
impact on the gender gap, they are highly negatively correlated with informal childcare which 
has shown to decrease the gender gap. Therefore, against the first theoretical assumptions 
that stƌoŶg ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe uŶioŶs aƌe good foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đaƌeeƌs aŶd iŶfoƌŵal ĐhildĐaƌe ďad, 
it seems that the opposite is true. When unions are weak and no childcare policies are 
introduced, highly educated women aiming to pursue a career seem to benefit. This supports 
the idea of Estevez-Abe (2007) that more labour market regulations – in this case family 
policies and unions potentially imposing regulations – women face more discrimination as 
employers prefer hiring men over women that do not impose the same risk. Thus, in countries 
where highly educated women arrange flexible childcare and cannot rely on unions, this 
seems to affect their career less as employers do not need to fear additional barriers when 
hiring women. However, it needs to be highlighted here that we are only looking at highly 
educated women aiming for top positions. Thus, the conclusion should not be that unions and 
childcare policies create a gender gap. What seems to happen is that in countries with little 
ƌegulatioŶs ǁoŵeŶ͛s status is Ŷot diffeƌeŶt to ŵeŶ͛s, ǁhiĐh suppoƌts the idea of ͞if Ǉou͛ƌe a 
highlǇ eduĐated ǁoŵeŶ, Ǉou ǁaŶt to ǁoƌk iŶ aŶ LME; if Ǉou͛ƌe a ǁoƌkiŶg-class man, you want 






We can see proof for this assumption that motherhood in highly regulated labour 
markets can lead to discrimination.  Maternity leave – not only correlates with EPL, but also 
increases the gender gap. Therefore, EPL iŶdiƌeĐtlǇ affeĐts the geŶdeƌ gap aŶd “oskiĐe͛s 
(2005) idea that highly educated women benefit from unregulated and unsheltered LMEs 
seems correct.  
 
To conclude, this Chapter has shown us the importance of combining both approaches 
– family policies and labour market institutions – when trying to understand why the extent 
to which highly educated women are underrepresented in top positions varies so much across 
countries. Labour market institutions do not directly affect the gender gap, but are highly 
interconnected with family policies. The Chapter also claims that for future research we need 
to always distinguish between different education levels in order to truly understand how 
policies and institutions affect women. While certain policies clearly shelter and protect 
women and therefore help them to enter the labour market, they also create a motherhood 
penalty, which leads to the discrimination of highly educated women aiming to reach top 
positions. Therefore, this Chapter warns against the idea that family policies are widening the 
gender gap in top positions. However, it does argue that we need different and more flexible 







Table F.3 Statistically significant main effects – Managerial occupations 
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Notes: Entries are the only statistically significant results for the main effect from 40 separate 
multilevel random slope cross-level interaction models with managerial occupations as DV, in which 
contextual variables are introduced in pairs (having controlled for individual level characteristics). A 
represents when the variable in column A is significant; B when the variable in column B is significant. 










B EPL  
Unemployment 


















  A;+Ϳ€   
Parental leave 
(duration) 










   A(-)*/B;+Ϳ€  
Family 
Taxation  













 B;+Ϳ€  A(-) *** 
/B(+)*** 
 
Notes: Entries are the only statistically significant results for the main effect from 40 separate 
multilevel random slope cross-level interaction models with managerial occupations as DV, in which 
contextual variables are introduced in pairs (having controlled for individual level characteristics). A 
represents when the variable in column A is significant; B when the variable in column B is 
significant. Only statistically significant main effects are listed.  
***= p<.ϬϬϭ, **= p<.Ϭϭ, *= p<.Ϭϱ, €=p<.ϭϬ 
 
